Ending War, Building Peace

Contribution of the national DDR program in DRC to peace in the african Great Lakes Region

Yvan Conoir
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Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADF</td>
<td>Allies Democratic Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>BUNADER</td>
<td>National Office of Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAAFG</td>
<td>Children Associated to Armed Forces and Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARITAS</td>
<td>Catholic Church Development Branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CELPAY</td>
<td>Payment system for the demobilized (Private Company)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIAT</td>
<td>International committee supporting the transition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CI-DDR</td>
<td>Inter-ministerial DDR Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNDP</td>
<td>National Congress for the Defense of the People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONADER</td>
<td>National Demobilization and Reinsertion Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Child Protection Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRHP</td>
<td>Rehabilitation Center for Physical Handicapped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DO</td>
<td>Disarmament Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Disarmament Point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Ex-Combatants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMG</td>
<td>General Army Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUSEC</td>
<td>European Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FARDC</td>
<td>Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDLR</td>
<td>Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNL</td>
<td>National Forces of Liberation (Burundi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLR</td>
<td>Great Lakes Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDW</td>
<td>Human Dignity in the World</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICR</td>
<td>Implementation Completion Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IU-NDDRP</td>
<td>National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Implementation Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGA</td>
<td>Income generating activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labor Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INPP</td>
<td>National Institute of Professional Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INS</td>
<td>National Statistic Institute</td>
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</table>
IU  Implementing Unit
IVO  Identification, Verification and Orientation
JOC  Joint Operations Coordination Center
JOC  Joint Operations Center
LEAP  Learning for Equality, Access and Peace Program
LRA  Lord’s Resistance Army
MDRP  Multi-donors Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program
MDTF  Multi-donors Trust Fund
M&E  Monitoring and Evaluation
MDNAC  Ministry of National Defense and Veterans
MONUC  United Nations Organization Mission in the DR Congo
MONUSCO  United Nations Organization Stabilisation Mission in the DR Congo
NDDRDP  National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program
                  (PNDDR - French acronym)
NGO  Non Governmental Organization
OC  Orientation Center
OCHA  Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of United Nations
OC  Orientation Center
OTC  Orientation Transitional Center
RC  Regrouping Center
SCF  Save the Children Fund
SMI  Integrated Military Structure
SSR  Reinsertion Monitoring System
STAREC  Stabilization and Reconstruction Program
TF  Trust Fund
TDRP  Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program
TSA  Transitional Safety Net
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UN  United Nations
UNICEF  United Nations Children’s Fund
WAAFG  Women Associated to Armed Forces and Groups
WB  World Bank
WEC  Wounded Ex-Combatants
The National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NDDRP) Programme in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was implemented over a period of seven years (2004-2011) with the World Bank’s support and funding. An additional phase, initiated in 2011, supported by the African Development Bank (AfDB) is still ongoing. The NDDRP had three objectives: 1) disarmament of all combatants willing to be granted a status of “demobilized” person; and 2) demobilization of all ex-combatants who met the conditions for a return to civilian life through a downsizing process of armed forces or groups; and 3) reintegrate the demobilized “in the social and economic practices of the community of their choice with opportunities and conditions similar to those of other members of the community”.

To achieve these objectives, the DRC government initially established a National Commission of Demobilization and Reinsertion (CONADER, 2003), then established the NDDRP (2004), and finally created a new NDDRP Implementation Unit (IU-NDDRP, 2007). NDDRP was divided into three distinct phases, each capitalizing on the gains as well as the mistakes of the past. In the early years of the regional Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (2004-2008) and after the end of the CONADER, a “Recovery phase” (2008-2010) followed by an “Extension Phase” (2010 - September 2011) were implemented.

In spring 2003, the Congolese authorities estimated the total number of armed combatants at 330,000 and the number of people to demobilize at 150,000 including 30,000 children associated with armed forces and groups (CAAFG). An evaluation of the program funded by the World Bank, estimated that the number of economically and socially reintegrated demobilized people was close to 90,000 out of an estimated caseload of 208,000 of which over 66,000 had opted for their integration within the national army while more than 33,000 CAAFG were reunited with their families and reintegrated. Economic reintegration of demobilized ex-combatants represented four out of five demobilized as recorded by the program. At the program’s conclusion, the implementing partners decided to support the creation, legalization, and strengthening of demobilized persons’ economic associations. This model of economic and social reintegration developed by the NDDRP could serve as a model framework for future rehabilitation and reintegration processes in DRC as well as in other countries.

Finally, while the results were not as high as expected in regard to the number of women as well as wounded and disabled veterans demobilized, the NDDRP can be lauded for successfully reaching and reintegrating a highly significant number of CAAFG through special projects executed by different implementing partners.

1 National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program, pp. 22-27.
A DDR Program within Complex Regional Dynamics

DRC has been going through a series of successive wars starting with the first war from 1996 to 1998, followed by the so-called “First African World War” where no less than seven countries participated for several years in an open conflict over the territory of the DRC. The conflict is estimated to have cost about three to five million lives.\(^2\) Cease-fire agreements in Lusaka (July 1999) put an end to the conflict. Following the signing of the Comprehensive and Inclusive Agreement of 2002\(^3\), a transitional government was formed in late 2003, including the appointment of a president, Laurent Kabila, and four vice presidents. The Comprehensive and Inclusive Agreement, the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, and the establishment of the UN Peacekeeping mission, MONUC, resulted in a gradual return of relative security that allowed the realization of the first free multiparty elections on July 30, 2006 since independence in 1960. After two rounds of voting, Mr. Joseph Kabila was elected President in November 2006. New elections were held in November 2011, seeking to consolidate the democratic process in DRC and contribute to a gradual return of peace and sustainable development.\(^4\)

Since the beginning of the peace construction process, violence, however, did not cease, particularly in eastern Congo, and the Congolese parties that signed the accords and their international partners confronted an enormous challenge in ensuring peace and stability. The various types of organized armed forces in the Congo included:

- Regular foreign armed forces: up to ten neighboring states had regular soldiers on DRC territory;
- Foreign armed groups: a number of foreign groups sought sanctuary in DRC including the FDLR, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), the FNL and the ADF\(^5\);
- Congolese armed forces: including the national army, the Forces Armées Congolaises (FAC), and the rebel signatories to the Global Accords including RCD-Goma, MLC, RCD-ML and a select few Mai Mai forces;
- Congolese irregular armed groups: included local militia such as the Mai Mai forces as well as other armed groups that emerged during the continuing conflict in eastern Congo such as the FPI, FNI, and the CNDP.

Under the Global Accords and subsequent peace treaties a multi-layered approach was established to push towards gradual demilitarization of an estimated 300,000 armed forces in DRC. The legal framework and international support for the various armed forces is outlined below:\(^6\)

- Regular foreign armed forces: from the Lusaka agreements in July 1999, to the Pretoria Agree-

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\(^2\) On this topic, http://www.mdrp.org/PDFs/MDRP_DRC_FS_0309_Fr.pdf International Rescue Committee has estimated this figure to 5,4 million since 1998, see http://www.rescue.org/special-reports/special-report-congo-

\(^3\) http://www.congonline.com/DI/documents/Accord_global_et_inclusif_de_Pretoria_17122002_signed.htm

\(^4\) ICR 2168, op. Quoted, para. 2.

\(^5\) Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (Rwanda), Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), Forces Nationales de Libération (Burundi) and Allies Defense Forces (Uganda).

\(^6\) ICR 2168, op. Quoted, para. 3.
ment between Rwanda and DRC in July 2002, the Luanda Agreement between Uganda and DRC in September 2002, these forces were demarcated and withdrew from DRC territory by 2004, under the monitoring of the Third Party Verification Mechanism (South Africa) and the UN Peacekeeping Mission (MONUC);

- Foreign Armed Groups: no binding agreements were ever signed and these have remained the priority of MONUC under its DDRRR program (disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration) for a decade supported by the rapprochement between DRC and Rwanda in 2008;

- Congolese Armed Forces: as signatories to the Global Accords and numbering about 150,000 combatants these forces were the target population of the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program (NDDRP) of the Government financed by the World Bank and donor partners, and after July 2003, supported by MONUC whose mandate was extended to include the demobilization of Congolese combatants (UN Resolution 1493);

- Congolese irregular armed groups: these were addressed in a haphazard way according to local peace agreements over the decade. The Dar es Salaam peace accords of 2003 provided the framework for cessation of the Ituri conflict supported by the Government with UNDP, USAID and the World Bank. Later agreements, including Goma in 2008 and 2009, provided for the CNDP and local Mai Mai groups, which were primarily integrated into the national army, the FARDC.

Throughout the years of war, the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (NDDRP), both the result of the Cease-fire Agreement as well as of the Global Inclusive Agreement of 2002, was a key player for facilitating the return to civilian life of thousands of men, women and children and was the largest DDR program in the sub-region of Central Africa and the Great Lakes Region (GLR). It benefited, not often without problems, from the support of the World Bank as well as many other international donors and partners for whom the end of hostilities, disarmament and demobilization as well as the social and economic reintegration of hundreds of thousands of ex-combatants (ECs) were a major security and peace-building issue, both nationally and internationally.

DRC’s NDDRP has occupied a prominent place in the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), a regional program of the World Bank set up to facilitate the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of almost 350,000 ex-combatants in Africa’s GLR. A total of seven countries in the GLR, involved in a regional conflict rooted in the DRC during the 1990s and early 2000s, participated in MDRP: Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic (CAR), Republic of the Congo (RoC), Rwanda and Uganda. More than 40 national and international partners participated in the management of the MDRP during its implementation (2002-2009), with a $500 million funding from 13 donors who contributed to a multi-donor trust fund, and International Development Association (IDA). A total of 279,263 combatants were demobilized through national programs and special projects supported by the MDRP, or 78% of the initial number of combatants expected for all country programs.

The overall objective of NDDRP was to help consolidate peace and to promote economic stability and sustainable development in the DRC and the GLR.

In order to achieve its overall objective, the specific objectives of the program included:

- The demobilization and reintegration of 150,000 ex-combatants including 30,000 children in the social and economic life of the country; and

- Promoting the reallocation of Government expenditure from military to social and economic sectors.

The three program components were the following:

- Disarmament: Disarmament is the act of voluntary surrender of weapons by the combatants to the competent military authority;

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7 For more information on the MDRP, see the MDRP Final Report, 2010, at http://www.mdrp.org/PDFs/MDRP_Final_Report_fn.pdf
8 Ibidem, p. 23.
9 For an in-depth study of the root and immediate causes of the conflict as well as its resolution, we would like to invite the reader to consult para. 1 to 13 of the National DDR Program (NDDRP).
10 These definitions of the MDRP are different from the UN standard definitions on what is D, D and R adopted in 2005.
Demobilization: Demobilization is a specific administrative act by which the soldier changes his military status to that of civilian; and

Reintegration: Reintegration is the process by which the demobilized go back to the social and economic practices of the community of their choice in conditions and opportunities similar to those of other community members.

Two components of assistance were provided by NDDRP within the socio-economic reintegration phase:

- Immediate/interim assistance—also called “transitional safety net”; and
- Assistance to the socio-economic development of communities that combined a diverse range of support services.

Eventually, the expected impacts of the program were: (1) political stability and security in the country and the region through the disarmament and demilitarization of society, (2) capacity development of the demobilized so s/he can take care of himself or herself, and (3) poverty reduction as a result of the resumption of economic and trade exchanges and the incorporation of a new labour force (demobilized) in production and the economy.

At the beginning of the DDR process, domestic governance in the DRC had its impact on the creation of the first National Commission for DDR (CONADER, 12/2003 - 07/2007), the latter being representative of the national political transitional process (Inclusive Global Agreements). Each of the five branches of the CONADER, therefore, was representative of the five actors and political powers at the head of the country including the Office of the President and four Vice-presidencies, or the “One plus Four”. This political architecture was one of the factors that generated slowness and inertia within the first institution responsible for DDR in DRC, the CONADER. Additionally, it is important to note the crucial role played by the Ministry of National Defense and Veterans Affairs (MDNDAC), from the beginning up to the end of the process with MDNDAC primarily responsible for ensuring expected results of the whole process.

The final element important for understanding the DDR dynamics in DRC is its “integrated” approach, whereby the approach, strategy and expected outcomes of DDR are conditioned by the security sector reform process in DRC as well as by the revitalization of local communities in the fight against poverty. The program relies on the principle of a “common core” between

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11 http://www.mdrp.org/programs_proj.htm
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demobilization and the integration and restructuring of the army, mainly in terms of awareness and sensitization as well as in regard to the identification and regrouping of the ECs.

The structure of the Joint Operations Coordination Center (JOCC) has facilitated the achievement of the DDR/SSR component's objectives by forming a consultation forum including the representatives of the General Army Staff (EMG), the Ministry of National Defence and Veterans, the European EUSEC, the MONUC and the Military Integration Structure (SMI).

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13 CBR – Mixing “Brewing” and Recycling Center – Mixing – “operation that involves mixing elements from FARDC units not yet mixed, the various armed groups and political-military movements, so as to form new homogeneous units” Recycling “activity which provides basic and/or complementary military training for integration candidates after mixing, to inculcate them military values of the FARDC, “Joint Technical Commission for Peace and Security”, October 2008.
Graph 3. Governance of the NDDR in Democratic Republic of the Congo

Source: Integrated Military Structure (SMI).
2.1 Two Distinct Demobilization Phases

Disarmament is the inspection, collection and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and heavy weapons in the hands of combatants. Under NDDRP, the process was overseen by the Joint Operations Center (JOC) which meant that a disarmament operation (DO) was composed of members of the SMI, the CONADER and MONUC. In 2004, it anticipated the disarmament of 330,000 combatants of different forces, movements and armed groups. Of these, 150,000, including 30,000 children, were to be demobilized and reintegrated into civilian life. In general, the disarmament operations\textsuperscript{14} were taking place in Regrouping Centers (RCs) for fighters of Category 1\textsuperscript{15} and in the Disarmament Points (DPs) for the fighters of categories 2, 3 and 4\textsuperscript{16,17}.

In practice, disarmament activities were held in two phases: (1) the pre-disarmament phase consisting of the identification and preparation of regrouping facilities for combatants, sensitization and communication, the deployment of a joint disarmament team, security and control of fighters in the RCs or DPs, and (2) the disarmament phase which included registration of combatants and weapons / ammunition, the awarding of a Certificate of disarmament/checklist and the gathering of deactivated firearms and ammunition presented by the candidates.

CONADER commissioned specialized agencies to sensitize both the potential beneficiaries and the communities to which they returned on the content and implications of PNDDDR in order to manage expectations and secure participation in the program.\textsuperscript{18}

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**Demobilization Criteria of Combatants Belonging to Armed Group not Administered by the FARDC**

- Provide evidence of membership in a movement or armed group;
- Physical identification of the fighter and by his military command;
- Present a personal weapon in working order and ammunition, or have access to a collective weapon, according to the ratios established by region, or having been disarmed under an interim program and hold a Certificate of disarmament;
- Be recognized as a fighter by the Registration and Verification Team;
- Ability to use an assault rifle and possibly other types of weapons;
- Skills and basic military competencies;
- Membership and knowledge of the command structure.

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\textsuperscript{15} These ones are those whose movements signed the Lusaka Cease Fire Agreement (ex-Government, RCD-Goma, MLG, RCD-ML, RCD-N) and of the Global and Inclusive Agreement (Mai- Mai).

\textsuperscript{16} Combatants of Category 2 were those who belonged to the movements signatories of the Dar-es-Salaam Agreements (May 2003, PUSIC, UPC, FNJ/FRPI, FAPC, FPDC) and those of Category 3 is composed of combatants who did not sign any of the different agreements. Last but not least, Congolese combatants outside of DRC as well as stand-alone or isolated combatants are within Category 4.

\textsuperscript{17} National Program, para 90 et alt.; GRIP, ibidem.

\textsuperscript{18} ICR 2168, op. Quoted, para 11.
In total, NDDRPP presented of 118,458 weapons collected during disarmament operations. After disarmament, the SMI was responsible for transferring the combatants to orientation centers (OCs) managed by NDDRPP where combatants choose between either demobilization or integration within the army. At this stage, unlike the adult combatants who join the OCs to initiate the demobilization or integration processes, CAAFG are moved as soon as they are identified in order for child protection agencies (CPAs) to begin their coaching process.

After disarmament, the combatants transfer to an OC for the process of identification, verification, and orientation (IVO) which will help verify the status of ex-combatants. Those who are verified as ex-combatants are oriented towards integration into the DRC Armed Forces (FARDC) or reintegration into civilian life.

Throughout CONADER’s seven years of existence, the greatest efforts were made to ensure the bulk of the demobilization process.

At the end of 2007, therefore, the number of people who had passed through the demobilization process was estimated at 191,254 out of which, excluding CAAFG, just over two thirds (64.5%) of the adults (105,059) chose the path of demobilization and the rest their integration into the national army. Over 50% of the demobilized were concentrated in eastern DRC and in the Province Orientale (late 2007).

### 2.2 Demobilization and Security Sector Reform

The demobilization component included the establishment of and transport to demobilization centers of ex-combatants (including provisions for special target groups: separation of women and children from men, special care for children and consideration of dependents). In addition, medical screening (including HIV/AIDS counseling and voluntary testing and identification of special needs of women and children) was undertaken. Also included was the verification of ex-combatants’ eligibility status, provision of identity

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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Forecast</th>
<th>Achievements</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Staff to address</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>191,254</td>
<td>63.75 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff to demobilize</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>105,509</td>
<td>87.92 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAAFG</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>27,908</td>
<td>93.02 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orientation Centers</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>82 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demobilized physically installed</td>
<td>105,509</td>
<td>88,019</td>
<td>83.42 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribution to the composition of a new Army</td>
<td>18 Brigades to constitute</td>
<td>15 Brigades to constitute</td>
<td>83 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partners</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Identification</td>
<td>Bio-ID</td>
<td>Bio-ID</td>
<td>100 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Payment Safety Net</td>
<td>Celpay</td>
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<tr>
<td>Numbers reintegrated (2006/2007)</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>53,172</td>
<td>44 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of reintegration projects</td>
<td>33 projects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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19 The original projection by the government of 330,000 staff was later reduced to 300,000.
20 « Situation évolutive du PNDDR en chiffres, Identification au 26 septembre 2011 », MIS Department, NDDRPP.
21 Ibidem
22 E.g. a demobilized person who is registered within a regional office of the NDDRPP.
23 Annual report 2010, op. quoted.
24 « Situation évolutive du PNDDR en chiffres, Identification au 26 septembre 2011 », MIS Department, NDDRPP.
cards, collection of basic socio-economic data and pre-discharge orientation about civilian life and program benefits. Ex-combatants were then given a transport allowance, a Transitional Safety Net (TSN), and facilitation of transport to the ex-combatants’ preferred area of return. At demobilization, operations were established within the Project team to: (i) deploy and coordinate mobile demobilization teams; (ii) coordinate operations with MONUC and the principal coordination mechanism, the Integrated Military Structure (SMI); (iii) coordinate transportation of limited number of ex-combatants; and (iv) coordinate with BIO-ID Technology (process ID cards) and Cellpay (to set up payment structures for ex-combatants). Reinsertion kits were adapted to the local context: instead of the $110 kit ($60 for transport and $50 for reinsertion payments) plus a $30 bag, demobilized ex-combatants received $140 in cash. The number of payments to ex-combatants was revised to take into account difficulties in transportation and the huge distances to reach beneficiaries: initially designed to provide $25 per month for 12 months, the NDDRP cut down the frequency of payments to six or less. In Phase I (2004-2007), delays occurred between demobilization and the launch of reintegration activities. The delay in reintegration support could have caused unrest amongst the demobilized but CONADER staff intervened to manage potential and reassure beneficiaries that benefits would be delivered. Most of these problems were largely ironed out and absent during Phase II (2008-2011). This was partly due to modifications to the project design in the Phase II based on lessons learned during implementation of Phase I. Notwithstanding these early teething problems, overall the demobilization and reinsertion process was successfully completed. In its first phase, the program registered a high interest for demobilization, but this had the effect of greatly retarding the formation of new integrated brigades due to a lack of a sufficient number of candidates for integration into the army. In some instances, the propensity to demobilize represents almost all fighters. Initially, this disaffection on the part of former FARDC soldiers, as well as the high interest of former armed group members to demobilize, resulted in the FARDC constituting only 15 of the 18 Brigades planned for a total of 49,012 enlisted personnel. This has partially slowed one of the objectives of NDDRP to “build an army of the Republic that could guarantee stability and security throughout the territory” as well as ensure that “in 2006, all the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo would have been identified and integrated.” The conclusion of the CONADER, in 2007, was followed by the creation of a new and much lighter unit, the Implementation Unit (IU) - NDDRP, which worked and achieved better results in good intelligence with a limited number of operational partners. Reintegration support was provided through 12 implementing partners compared with 42 originally managed

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26 ICR 2168, op. quoted, para 11.
27 ICR 2168, op. quoted, para 27.
28 Report of the SMI, covering the period from August 22 to December 30, 2006. The mixed personnel were coming respectively from the Ex-Government (20,718), Ex-RCD (10,852), Ex-MLC (7,491), Mait-Mai (4,674), RCD/KML (2,985), GP-Ituri (838), GP-Masunzu (75), Ex-Tigre (232), Ex-FAZ (426), for a total of 49,012 elements. This disaffection is also linked to the de facto absence of a salary for the soldier (which changed when salary and payment supervision through EUSEC was introduced) and particularly to the composition of the elements to integrated: local armed groups, as opposed to standing army members, showed a tendency not to wish leave their area of operation (and home).
29 National DDR Program, para. 37.
Table 2. New Demobilization objectives of the NDDRP – “Recovery” Phase (2008-2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“Recovery” Phase objectives</th>
<th>Starting objectives</th>
<th>Adjusted objectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Staff to be treated initially</td>
<td>FARDC</td>
<td>98,703 combatants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed groups</td>
<td>79,103 combatants</td>
<td>79,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate objectives (April 2009)</td>
<td>19,600 combatants</td>
<td>18,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19,250 combatants</td>
<td>17,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff to be demobilized</td>
<td>FARDC</td>
<td>35,700 demobilized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed groups</td>
<td>23,000 demobilized</td>
<td>21,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12,700 demobilized</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAAFG to free</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounded ex-combatants (WEC) to demobilize</td>
<td>10,000 demobilized</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

by CONADER\textsuperscript{32}. The new IU-NDDRP combined a small number of professionals recognized for their understanding of technical and institutional issues of the DDR process in DRC and demonstrated a greater effectiveness and efficiency than the old great “white elephant”, CONADER which had limited flexibility and was hardly operational\textsuperscript{33}.

In the second phase of the program, the new IU-NDDRP started the operations of the “Recovery” phase (2008/2009) by initiating a new demobilization process on April 27, 2009 at Kokolo camp in Kinshasa. Phase I of NDDRP had faced long delays and shortcomings with the setting up and management of the OCs, a finding that justified the creation of integrated mobile teams IU-NDDRP-SMI. Following a new assessment of the security situation in the East that anticipated an accelerated integration of armed groups, the numbers were revised downward. Other strategic decisions have reoriented the program objectives to lower figures as well.

In 2009, the demobilization process, in military terms, “grew more powerful.” The number of Mobile Identification Teams (MIT) grew from five to 14 and the operations of identification exceeded revised targets set up by the new IU-NDDRP.

Additionally, in regard to the new adjusted targets of the second phase, disarmament and demobilization results have exceeded expectations: 142% ex-combatants treated, 164% being integrated (vs. target) and 119% demobilized (vs. target). The nature of the second demobilization phase was very different from the first with the number of actual end-treated group showing the predominance of the FARDC in the second phase of demobilization. The statistics show that the option of demobilization remained the most chosen with the ranks of armed groups in comparison to only a third by the FARDC (less than twice in the first phase).

This reversal is explained by the fact that much more attention was paid to the FARDC personnel in the second demobilization phase compared to Phase 1. One cannot exclude the idea that a number of FARDC soldiers potentially did not wish to lose a certain number of benefits, rights or material incentives that they could keep receiving within the FARDC in contrast to the uncertainties of a return to civilian life. In some instances, in the context of an accelerated integration process, the option of demobilization was not offered. A similar phenomenon seems to explain the low rate of demobilization of injured or disabled FARDC soldiers.\textsuperscript{34}

As of late 2011, the balance of integration figures within the FARDC vs. demobilization within the NDDRP as shown on table 3.

The political and military decision to stop the demobilization process in DRC at the end of 2009 has allowed some international actors, under the aegis of MONUSCO, to continue limited DDR activities (of residual groups) in the context of the STAREC program\textsuperscript{35} in eastern Congo.

\textsuperscript{32} Implementation Completion and Results Reports, Report No ICR2168, World Bank, March 2012.


\textsuperscript{34} Although it appears difficult to support, it is supposed that the number of war wounded did not really address the needs. Part of the problem around that were due to a protracted legislation process along with rivalry over responsibility for the target group at the central administration level.

\textsuperscript{35} STAREC is the “Program for Stabilization and Reconstruction of areas emerging from armed conflict,” which has three basic components, security, social and humanitarian affairs and economic recovery, http://www.starec.cd/
In its entirety, the demobilization process could be characterized by the World Bank as “highly satisfactory” as 111,053\(^{38}\) were demobilized when 125,000 adult ex-combatants were targeted. A total of 45,837 were demobilized by the end of the first 14 months and 102,014 by the end of the second year, thus more than originally planned for. An additional 5,994 were demobilized during Phase II and 31,738 CAAFG were released. A total of 118,459 weapons were collected.\(^{39}\)

\(^{36}\) Report on the implementation of the component “Disarmament and demobilization”, NDDRP-Extension Phase, 15/12/2009, p.5.


\(^{38}\) The World Bank in its final report (No ICR2168) states that only 109,846 combatants were demobilized. The figures quoted here are the figures of the MIS Department of the Implementation Unit of the NDDRP at the time of the Final Independent Evaluation of the PNDDR (26/11/2011).

\(^{39}\) ICR 2168, op. quoted, para 59.
### Table 5. Consolidated Demobilization figures of the NDDRP (26/Sept. 2011)\(^{40}\)

#### EVOLUTION OF NDDRP FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of guns withdrawn</th>
<th>Integration</th>
<th>CAAFG</th>
<th>NDDRP</th>
<th>Total treated</th>
<th>CAAFG Total</th>
<th>Integration Total (Cumulative)</th>
<th>NDDRP Total (Cumulative)</th>
<th>Total Treated (Cumulative)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2004</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>151</td>
<td>3,177</td>
<td>2,435</td>
<td>5,763</td>
<td>3,177</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>2,435</td>
<td>5,763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2005</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>25,857</td>
<td>11,013(^{41})</td>
<td>43,402</td>
<td>80,272</td>
<td>14,190</td>
<td>26,008</td>
<td>45,837</td>
<td>86,035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2006</strong></td>
<td>104,324</td>
<td>32,561</td>
<td>13,483</td>
<td>57,384</td>
<td>103,428</td>
<td>27,673</td>
<td>58,569</td>
<td>103,221</td>
<td>189,463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2007</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>1,838</td>
<td>2,061</td>
<td>27,888</td>
<td>58,577</td>
<td>105,059</td>
<td>191,524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2008</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>27,898</td>
<td>58,577</td>
<td>105,059</td>
<td>191,534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2009</strong></td>
<td>14,224</td>
<td>8,236</td>
<td>3,135</td>
<td>5,862</td>
<td>17,233</td>
<td>31,033</td>
<td>66,813</td>
<td>110,921</td>
<td>208,767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2010</strong></td>
<td>131</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>627</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>760</td>
<td>31,660</td>
<td>66,814</td>
<td>111,053</td>
<td>209,527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2011</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>31,738</td>
<td>66,814</td>
<td>111,053</td>
<td>209,605</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{40}\) Ibidem, p.27.

\(^{41}\) CAAFG figures were put up to date by UNICEF.
With the technical, material, financial and institutional assistance of the program, the demobilized can seek to improve their situation of social vulnerability and ensure economic self-sufficiency. Reintegration support has, therefore, taken place in two phases: the delivery of a transitional safety net to ex-combatants, and individual assistance for their socio-economic reintegration within communities.

During reintegration, the project established provincial offices, bringing the NDDRP closer to ex-combatants. Local offices were able to react quickly to issues, thus mitigating potential volatile situations. Their presence was invaluable when working with host communities, which felt that the Government was directly involved with their issues. In Phase II, reintegration support was provided through 12 implementing partners compared with 42 originally managed by CONADER, which allowed for more streamlined implementation and coordination. Across both Phases, this working relationship not only met objectives but also had the effect of enhancing the capacity of local NGOs. During both Phases there were criticisms about the size of the reintegration package, the duration of assistance, and outreach and monitoring of activities, but this would be no different to that expressed throughout the MDRP period, and the package in the DRC was relatively comparable to that elsewhere. A notable change in the reintegration component took place during the Phase II when ex-combatants were encouraged to join economic associations. Over 800 associations received support; and research indicated the positive role in terms of building social capital, as well as economic livelihoods, thus facilitating reintegration on both fronts.42

Upon discharge from the OCs, demobilized combatants were provided support for a limited period following their return and transition to civilian life. It consisted of a basic needs kit to assist in the actual return and the first part of a Transitional Subsistence Allowance (TSA) to sustain the ex-combatant and his or her family until they had a chance to register for the reintegration program in their area. A second and third installment of the TSA was paid once the ex-combatant registered in the chosen area of reintegration and started participating in program activities.43

3.1 Transitional Safety Net

The transitional safety net offered by NDDRP is divided into two parts. A first tranche of transitional subsistence allowance ($140) enables the demobilized to return home and begin a return to civilian life. The second part, the “great safety net” of $300, aims, in twelve monthly instalments, to support the person in his/her daily survival.

A technical audit conducted in summer 2010 from a representative sample of 4,580 demobilized (or 4.9% of the total population estimated in 201044) indicates that 83% of ex-combatants surveyed had received all of the safety net proposed by the program, i.e., $440: ($140 for temporary allowances for subsistence and $300 for great safety net). Seventeen percent received only the small safety net of $140.45 Taking into account the mul-

42 ICR 2168, op. quoted, para 28.
43 ICR 2168, op. quoted, para 11.
44 In February 2010, the population of ex-combatants living within the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo was estimated to 96,322 – Rapport de l’étude technique sur l’utilisation du filet de sécurité par les ex-combattants, realized by M. Séraphin Ngondo a Pitshadenge, Kinshasa, August 2010.
titude of problems with the delivery and payment of safety nets in DRC (no banking networks, difficulties in identifying beneficiaries communicating with them, and reaching them, etc.), this proportion may seem satisfactory.

In Phase I, it is estimated that on average 86.7% of ex-combatants received their TSA and that once systems were fully operational, this rate increased to 100% carrying over into Phase II. A total of 107,974 ex-combatants who were demobilized by the Project received reinsertion payments.\(^{46}\)

Ex-combatants used their safety nets in various ways.\(^{47}\) Over half (54.16%) of the expenditures made with the safety net consisted of social spending (marriage, health care, school fees, subsidies to satisfy the needs of the family, daily survival), with a particular emphasis on health spending and education (33.22%), in an equal manner from one region to the other. By order of priority, social spending by ex-combatants is followed by the acquisition of durable goods (piece of land, commercial equipment, equipment for personal use) up to 26.90%, start-up funds to run a commercial business for a proportion of 14.35%, and leisure activities and entertainment (4.59%).

### 3.2 Socio-Economic Reintegration within NDDRP – From Individual to Associative Mode

Economic reintegration support was provided to all ex-combatants through the provision of agricultural and non-farm income-generating vocational and apprenticeship training, advisory services particularly for the promotion of income generating activities (IGA) and basic start-up goods, and education and scholarships for minors.\(^{48}\)

Socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants has proven to be more complex than anticipated. CONADER had gone through serious internal governance problems leading to its closure in 2007. This affected the continuity of the reintegration process, splitting the process into two distinct parts. At the end of 2007, CONADER had approved funding for a total of 42 economic reintegration projects for a total of 68,457 ex-combatants (out of 105,509) with most of the demobilized choosing agriculture, livestock and fishery over labor intensive or job training projects.

After the first economic reintegration phase, the first survey conducted among the beneficiaries of the program, based on a reduced sample of demobilized, revealed\(^{51}\) that “high percentages of demobilized were well welcomed into the community (95%), had good relationships with local authorities (95%) and were well included in the social activities of the community (79%), leading to a conclusion of “excellent social integration.” In economic terms\(^{53}\), “68% of the demobilized outside Ituri were able to support themselves (35% in Ituri).” In the seven provinces, an average of 75% of demobilized managed to meet their basic needs. Additionally, 39% felt they had an income superior to others in their community of reintegrations, 71% of them participated in the economic life of their

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46 ICR 2168, op. quoted, para. 59.
47 Technical Audit (2010), op. quoted, pp. 46-49.
48 ICR 2168, op. quoted, para. 11.
50 See Chart No 1 – “Staff to demobilize”.
51 Out of a total of 364 demobilized over seven provinces of DRC, Survey on the reintegration of ex-combatants, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Jan. to May 2007, conducted by the MDRP with the technical support of the CONADER, pp. 3, 9 and 10.
52 Ibidem.
53 Ibidem.
54 There were real differences in the management of DDR programs in DRC. Since 2003, UNDP – with the support of the MONUC – had been the main DDR implementing agency.
community, and 65% of them saw an increase of their income. In addition, 62% used their “safety net” to start a business. A more recent survey55 points “to some 50% of ex-combatants having improved their livelihoods since they had been demobilized, with much of the balance having assimilated within their communities at the same levels of their community peers.”

Among the strong points of the economic reintegration of the demobilized in DRC, the implementing agencies of the program confirmed the initial choices and options made by most of the demobilized (80%). The availability of local training centers facilitated investing in their experience although training such specific, and sometimes difficult, target groups such as the ex-combatants and ensuring its long term sustainability can be problematic. The existence of kits which helped in quickly meeting the needs of demobilized in most of the provinces also facilitated an easy local reintegration.

After the end of the Recovery phase (2008-2010), the six implementing partners of NDDRP had managed to support almost all the remaining demobilized individuals to be reintegrated, e.g. 95% of the demobilized included in the conventions signed between NDDRP and the implementing partners.

In total, four years after receiving their final payment, it is believed that 75% of male and 69% of female ex-combatants were reintegrated into their communities and engaged in productive economic activities or schooling. Additionally, 80.7% of the demobilized benefited from reintegration assistance.56

The main weaknesses and resistance factors to a good personal socio-economic reintegration were related to weak professional skills capacity of most of the demobilized in relation to their sector of reintegration. Other problems included the influx of demobilized in certain sectors and the lack of training opportunities for all businesses selected by the demobilized. More simply, some initial choices of demobilized did not always reflect real opportunities for community reintegration, thereby leading to multiple changes in the final orientation of the latter. At the structural or local levels, it often proved difficult to reach all beneficiaries (implementation was often delayed by rough logistics conditions, administrative delays or the late distribution of financial allocations) and therefore, the program ensured sufficient technical support at the field level with equal enforcement throughout the life of the project.

At the end of the life cycle of individual reintegration projects, the economic reintegration model showed limitations and all NDDRP stakeholders realized that the demobilized who had decided to regroup themselves with members of local communities had greater success in economical terms. Therefore the last phase of World Bank’s support to NDDRP was to support “sustainable reintegration through human, technical and material capacity building of the demobilized, through their organization into associations of producers and the inclusion of members of host communities.”57

NDDRP objectives in relation to the development of economic reintegration in associative mode were to58:

- Structure demobilized community members in sustainable association of producers;
- Strengthen the quality of services granted to the associations through the provision of:
  1. Job training: quality of the training, duration, good combination between training and skills;
  2. Professional Kit: common standard kit, strength, functionality, distribution period;
  3. Close monitoring: individual attention, follow-up documentation, support for the implementation of micro projects;
  4. Technical support: quality of the coaches, longer duration for support and monitoring.
  5. Strengthen the technical, human and material skills and capacities of the implementing agencies and their contractors for an effective and sustainable support of the associations and so that they can guarantee their access to inputs.

In 2010, around 709 producers associations grouping demobilized members and members of local communities were coached and strengthened,

55 Bouvy, op. quoted, in ICR 2168, para. 56.
56 ICR2168, op. quoted, para 60.
57 Ibidem.
and 10,714 demobilized and 1,192 members of local communities were integrated into producers associations benefiting from a collective capacity building process. Close proximity support of some weeks or even months was provided. At the end of the project, 821 associations were formed and an empirical research\(^59\) led by the Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (TDRP) indicated the positive role of these associations in terms of building social capital as well as economic livelihoods, and therefore, facilitating reintegration on both economic and social fronts. Overall, economic reintegration was successfully completed for the overwhelming majority of the ex-combatants.\(^60\)

Also, the local NDDRP Liaison offices noticed a level of involvement and positive engagement of local authorities vis-à-vis the NDDRP and the demobilized, one of the most important being facilitating access to land as shown on graph 6.

### Table 6. Number of Demobilized supported in individual mode – Year 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expected figures conventions/endorsements</th>
<th>Demobilized supported</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
<th>Reinsertion sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T. Fund</td>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Trust fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARITAS</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>6,180</td>
<td>13,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADEKOR</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INPP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3,790</td>
<td>3,790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7,100</td>
<td>7,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIT</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6,667</td>
<td>6,667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDW</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>7,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>24,237</strong></td>
<td><strong>31,237</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Graph 6. Commitments of local authorities in support of NDDRP Demobilized (NDDRP Liaison offices)\(^60\)

- Help in identifying demobilized: 7%
- Accessibility to employment of ex-combatants: 7%
- Safety during implementation: 21%
- Positive perception and programme ownership: 22%
- Community Awareness: 14%
- Facility access to land: 29%

### 3.3 Social and Community Reintegration

Social reintegration support through community level programs promoting reconciliation and strengthening


social cohesion through the provision of technical advisory and outreach services was undertaken in most communities receiving ex-combatants. Special programs for female, disabled and chronically ill ex-combatants were also implemented, albeit limited. Special assistance was also provided to children associated with armed forces and groups with family tracing and reunification, counseling, psychosocial care, facilitation of access to education and skills training in communities of settlement through the provision of goods and technical advisory services. A number of special projects were set up to deal with vulnerable groups, three of which were related to reintegration activities: a Gender-based Violence Trust Fund, a Social Action Fund and HIV/AIDS supported projects.

Qualitative research conducted at the local level tend to show that the return of ex-combatants have caused a generalized feeling of fear within communities: nearly half of the civilians (42%) admitted feeling some fear when former combatants started returning home, the feeling being more pronounced with men than women. The fears expressed by civilians is mainly due to fears of aggression, misbehaviour, and mentality (68% of respondents), but also due to fears of increased insecurity and crime (armed robbery), in 32% of cases. Stigma of the demobilized also seems much more pronounced on men than on women or children. 40% of respondents believe that male ECs are “different” while the rate drops to 25% in the case of women and children. Among respondents who say that the demobilized have had a different behaviour upon return, 30% cite harassment and theft committed, 20% cite the fighting, insults or arguments provoked by demobilized, while another 20% stressed their conflicting nature.

In general, the degree of tolerance and consideration for the demobilized from the members of the community is relatively good and positive. For example some 80% of the respondents felt that the community tolerates the demobilized without difficulties, 70% of those surveyed believe that the demobilized are now part of the community. Additionally, only a quarter of civilian respondents believe that demobilized are more heavily involved in criminal activity than other members of the community (as opposed to 36% who think they are rather less involved). Also, 70% of the respondents recognize the participation of demobilized in community work. While this is often decried as a motive of jealousy, 80% say there is no discontent vis-à-vis the demobilized about the help or the support that they may have received from NGO partners of NDDRP.

Two thirds of the respondents felt that the presence of demobilized in the community is a positive factor. Among the positive factors cited include their participation in community service (30% of respondents), bringing new experiences and skills (28%), their protection capacity and their role in the establishment of a lasting peace (20%), dynamism and courage (12%), and their capacity for integration (10%).

In the contrary, despite relatively positive perceptions in general, meetings and relations between civilians and demobilized remain extremely rare, a sign of separation of the demobilized from the other civilians as well as a certain indifference to people who seem to have lived something “particular” in the past. Eighty percent of respondents say they have never had to meet and talk in depth with demobilized. Only 10% of respondents said they frequently meet with the demobilized and another 10% say they have had few encounters with them.

![Graph 7. Two thirds of local communities support the reintegration process](image-url)
4.1 Women Associated to Armed Forces and Groups

The program aimed to mainstream gender issues. While the program supported the reintegration of four out of five of the registered for demobilization, this ratio is lower when it comes to women. Slightly more than three female ex-combatants out of five (67%) benefitted from the program’s reintegration projects. Finally, only a quarter were able to benefit from the specific programs launched by NDDRP to support female ex-combatants in its recovery phase. NDRRP was targeting any person involved in combat, who could prove to be of Congolese nationality, to be an arms bearer or who held a certificate of disarmament and could demonstrate his or her membership in an armed force or an armed group recognized by the government. Demobilized women, therefore, needed to be in possession of a weapon to be eligible. One could, therefore, define a female ex-combatant as one who was active in combat through her membership in armed forces or armed groups, had been recruited, was equipped with a weapon and had served in a particular function. This definition largely excludes all the women who, for one reason or another, did not appear on any official lists of the armed forces or armed groups or who were part of the armed forces or armed groups in support, administrative or service roles.

A gender strategy was developed with CONADER incorporating gender into all aspects of demobilization and reintegration. There were separate spaces and kits in the demobilization and orientation camps. Owing to the low number of women, there were no specific female activities, but female ex-combatants benefitted from all aspects of the project. In December 2007, MDRP launched the Learning for Equality, Access and Peace Program (LEAP), which provided technical assistance to the Project, resulting in: (i) a greater understanding of vulnerability among ex-combatants and how to provide for additional assistance to the most vulnerable (including enhanced social integration); and (ii) a gender action plan. In Phase II, a strategy document was developed in a joint effort with stakeholders, named “Women Associated with the Forces and Armed Groups.” A budgetary provision was also made for a maximum of 10,000 female beneficiaries. LEAP funded six projects assisting women ex-combatants, implemented by Caritas. Generally, most women either preferred to stay in the army or simply self-reintegrate back into their communities and were not interested in what the Project offered, resulting in a reallocation of funds.

The recovery phase was an opportunity missed in many ways to rethink the gender component of NDDRP. In Phase I, 3,478 female ex-combatants were demobilized, representing 3% of the total number of ex-combatants of which 1,520 benefited from reintegration assistance. The objectives of the recovery phase were in favour of ensuring that “10,000 WAAFG received specific support.” Eventually, the demobilization and orientation camps. Owing to the low number of women, there were no specific female activities, but female ex-combatants benefitted from all aspects of the project. In December 2007, MDRP launched the Learning for Equality, Access and Peace Program (LEAP), which provided technical assistance to the Project, resulting in: (i) a greater understanding of vulnerability among ex-combatants and how to provide for additional assistance to the most vulnerable (including enhanced social integration); and (ii) a gender action plan. In Phase II, a strategy document was developed in a joint effort with stakeholders, named “Women Associated with the Forces and Armed Groups.” A budgetary provision was also made for a maximum of 10,000 female beneficiaries. LEAP funded six projects assisting women ex-combatants, implemented by Caritas. Generally, most women either preferred to stay in the army or simply self-reintegrate back into their communities and were not interested in what the Project offered, resulting in a reallocation of funds.

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---

According to the data base of the NDDRP (Final Independent Evaluation of the NDDRP): Number of women demobilized registered: 3,382; Number of women ex-combatants beneficiaries of at least one support from the NDDRP: 2,280; Number of women benefiting of the special support program of women ex-combatants: 860.
zation process of the recovery phase (Phase II) registered only 1,046 women who chose to participate in the reintegration program in the military or in the socio-economic reintegration process of NDDRP.

The adoption of specific support programs for female ex-combatants has also shown that a focused strategy, with particular emphasis on the implementation of special projects, provided a better economic integration of the latter.

### Table 7. Special projects in support of demobilized women developed by CARITAS Congo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SITE</th>
<th>Total Number of women to be supported</th>
<th>Total number of women supported</th>
<th>Total number of beneficiaries who received their individual package and collective support</th>
<th>Channel support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kalemie</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>Agriculture, Livestock, Bakery, Soap making, Tailoring, Hairdressing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>Agriculture, Tailoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boma</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bukavu</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>Agriculture, Livestock, Bakery, Cooking, Basket manufacturing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uvira</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>Livestock, Cooking, Bakery, Basket manufacturing, Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunia</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>Bakery, Tailoring, Cooking, Hair cosmetic, Bakery, Juice making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kisangani</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>Agriculture, Livestock, Bakery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>876</td>
<td>876</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Caritas Congo, 01/11/2011.

### Graph 8. Main Motivations for Gender Demobilization (ex-FARDC, DRC)

4.2 War Wounded and Handicapped

At the outset, CONADER created a synergy with the Social Action Fund which would take care of the disabled ex-combatants. CONADER, therefore, did not have a special program for the disabled. In 2007, CONADER organized a workshop to categorize physically and mentally disabled ex-combatants. When the Social Action Fund project concluded, CONADER had to design a special project for the disabled. However, most disabled did not come forward for demobilization. One underlying problem lay in the failure of the legislative authorities to clarify the legal basis for compensation and the lack of transfer in responsibility from Defense to Social Affairs. In addition, being disabled in Congolese society carries a stigma, which is lessened if one is disabled but in uniform.\(^{71}\)

Therefore, in the early days of NDDRP (2006), the expected number of disabled and handicapped to benefit from some kind of specialized support was estimated at 9,000, of which the program identified 2,221 disabled. A total of 1,239 were demobilized, 262 (or 3% of estimated total) received reintegration

\(^{71}\) ICR2168, op. quoted, para. 32.
assistance and 347 received medical rehabilitation\textsuperscript{72}. A total of 4,377 war wounded were registered, out of which 347 (7.9\%) received psychosocial rehabilitation, accompaniment and vocational training (but no medical rehabilitation)\textsuperscript{73}.

The new NDDRP strategy towards these different groups is organized around:

- Awareness of the war wounded as well as of the military hierarchy and their dependents;
- Demobilization-deployment of identification and orientation teams for issuing demobilization cards;
- Identification by the Medico-Social Commission, confirming the diagnosis, evaluation of impairment, definition of treatment, triage and referral of demobilized war wounded to supporting centers for specific intervention (financial support is limited from $700 to $1,000 per capita);
- The reference to the medical facility in partnership with the NGO selected by the IU-PNDDR in charge of medical and psychological support.

Services offered to the demobilized or CAAFG war wounded or disabled ex-combatants are:

- Surgical repair;
- The physical therapy for a maximum of three months;
- The provision of prostheses and wheelchairs as needed; and\textsuperscript{74}

Table 8. Number of War wounded to be demobilized in the Recovery Phase\textsuperscript{74}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objectives of the “Restart” Phase</th>
<th>Initial</th>
<th>Adjusted objectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number to be treated initially:</td>
<td>98,703 combatants</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number to demobilize:</td>
<td>35,700 demobilized</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War wounded to demobilize:</td>
<td>10,000 demobilized</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{72} IE-NDDRP report, Jan.-June 2009.
\textsuperscript{73} Final Independent Evaluation, pp. 93-99.
\textsuperscript{74} Quarterly Report, IU-NDDRP, July 2009, [N° 03/ADM/RDC/09], p.3.

- Psychosocial support.

The war-wounded and disabled ex-combatants did not receive the attention that was expected in their favor, both in terms of the number of war wounded demobilized and the attention they received at the national level as shown on Graph 9.

In 2009, a National Workshop recommended that the government “create a specific structure in support of the disabled veterans demobilized”\textsuperscript{75} to “perform a con-

Conceptual definitions used by the PNDDR

- War Wounded - Any adult or demobilized CAAFG suffering from traumatic lesions (wounds or fractures) resulting from its participation in armed forces.
- Bearer of disability - all demobilized bearing scars of his injuries following his participation in hostilities. These are injuries or sequels that lead to disabilities and physical disabilities, sensory or mental limiting the chances of reintegration of these groups and to justify their vulnerability to other demobilized.
- Chronically ill - The category of chronic diseases (tuberculosis, leprosy, sleeping sickness and HIV/AIDS is not supported by this strategy.

Graph 9. Geographic distribution of war wounded and handicapped through the territory of DRC (2007)\textsuperscript{76}

72 IE-NDDRP report, Jan.-June 2009.
74 Quarterly Report, IU-NDDRP, July 2009, [N° 03/ADM/RDC/09], p.3.
75 Atelier d’assistance aux blessés de guerre, 17-18juillet 2009, UE-PNDDR, Cassioppee, Kinshasa.
76 Ibidem.
Table 9. Balance of support granted to war wounded (of Kinshasa) (2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Adults</th>
<th>CAAFG</th>
<th>Sub-total</th>
<th>Expected number</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Girls</td>
<td>Boys</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultations by the Medical Commission</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultations to the Rehabilitation Center for Physical Handicapped (CRHP)</td>
<td>105 (113 in 2011)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physiotherapy</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosthetic Support</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthopaedic assistance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surgical procedures</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counselling</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference to other specialized structures</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other type of assistance</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Continuous monitoring of the disabled veterans referred to it”. NDDR, as well as the Congolese government, however, still lack a proper mapping of the target populations as an in-depth analysis of the needs of the people injured and disabled by war as a result of the conflicts that have ravaged the country in 2011. There is a mitigating argument as to why numbers were so low. Respondents, who chose to stay in the army, when interviewed, said that there was resistance to demobilize due to the lack of pensions, coupled with the general feeling that at some stage in the future these would be made available to the FARDC.

Finally, one unique convention has been signed in 2009 for the provision of medical care and rehabilitation that covered only 600 war wounded ex-combatants in Kinshasa. The balance remains very small compared to the magnitude of prospective cases of demobilized disabled across the country.

4.3 Children Associated to Armed Forces and Groups

Before the start of the demobilization process for adults, some initiatives to get children out of armed forces and groups had been undertaken, since 2001, with the predecessor of the CONADER, BUNADER and other specialized agencies. BUNADER and the Congolese army were facilitating contacts with high ranking military officials, in order to allow such demobilization. UNICEF played a role in the release of CAAFG since early 2003 and had received a specific mandate from UNDP to manage the initial DDR program for children in collaboration with the transitional government. A management plan was developed for the implementation of OCS across the country that would be the entry point in the DDR program. The Cape Town Principles were then embedded in the interim operational framework, including an expanded definition of

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77 Source: Brother Musawa, Director CRHP.
78 ICR2168, op. quoted, para. 62.
80 BUNADER.
81 Before the creation of the PNDDR and the CONADER, UNDP has initiated DDR activities in support of the Government.
Once the demobilization of adult combatants started, each OC established in the country had set up a specific space where CPAs would work with children.

Within the specific space for children, CPAs conducted child registrations as well as imparted information and sensitization about the next steps to come. Agencies had to proceed quickly in order to minimize the duration of the passage of the child within the demobilization structure. Once at the Orientation Transitional Center (OTC), freshly demobilized children were informed about the next steps to come. The staff and CPAs were present to provide the children with attention. The children then had to change and remove their clothing associated with their military life. They were given an entry kit (first in a series of three sets) with different clothing, daily-use goods (cup, spoon, bowl, etc.) and hygiene products (soap, toothpaste, tooth brush, etc.).

The World Food Programme (WFP) was supporting the OTCs with food aid for the CAAFG. Medical and social assessments were undertaken, and interviews and listening sessions were to be systematically organized during the stay of the children in the center. Social assessment allowed documenting the origin of the child and obtaining the necessary information to begin family tracking. Many children did not trust the process and altered information as to where their families could be found. A number of family researches were delayed until the child provided more accurate or precise information on his family.

According to international standards and the DDR operational framework for children, child living in an OTC’s stay should not exceed three months. However, due to the complexity of family researches and because of the insecurity prevailing in certain areas of reunification, many children remained in the OTC well beyond the period of three months. Upon leaving the OTC or their foster family, and before being reunited, children received an exit kit (the second kit in a series of three) including light equipment for food, transportation support and clothing.

During the first phase of the program, between 2004 and 2006, the socio-economic reintegration of children was part of the obligations stipulated in the agreements signed with the six partners in charge of the special projects for children. However, significant delays occurred in starting the reinsertion initiatives. Several agencies rushed the organization of income-generating activities since they were relatively easy and quick to implement. These activities, however, were not always suitable for the reintegrated children as many of them had no basic education or were illiterate and could not innumerate.

The situation was somewhat corrected in the second Recovery phase, with more attention and resources devoted to socio-economic reintegration efforts. Between January 2009 and June 2011, UNICEF and its partners supported the socio-economic reintegration of 7,619 children (2,011 girls and 5,608 boys) released from armed forces and groups. In June 2011, UNICEF stated that “These figures taken together clearly demonstrate that the activities have achieved 95% of its initial objectives specified in the agreement signed between UNICEF and IF-PNDDR in order to support the reintegration of 8,000 Children. And that 27% of girls received reintegration support against 73% of boys are very encouraging figures and represent an overtaking of efforts and standards of the operating players.”

Among them, 2,448 (including 483 girls) were supported primarily in the context of their reintegration into school. According to the NDDRP database, the remaining 5,171 children reintegrated, received vocational training or were supported with an income generating activity. UNICEF reports that “a clear preference toward income generating activities and that the children were justifying it as (1) a willingness to quickly earn money from their income generating activity, (2) the immediate needs they must meet with the power that comes with money now that the army and its symbols of power no longer exist. This was also unfortunately coming

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83 Final independent evaluation, op. quoted, p. 68.
84 Children were placed within foster families where OTC would not exist.
along the disappointment with certain child protection agencies who found themselves unable to monitor the children who had moved with their families because of conflict and insecurity. Children living in uncertainty refused (perhaps rightly) to consider any other possibility of reintegration.”

87 Child associated with armed force or armed group. See Paris Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Groups (CAAFG) [http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/ParisPrinciples310107English.pdf]


89 Ibidem.
Throughout NDDRP’s existence, expected to last three years, NDDRP saw its life stretching over seven years—the National DDR Program has comprehensively fulfilled its objectives in an often challenging political, security and operational context. Demobilization has achieved many of its objectives, although the official decision to stop the national process of demobilization in 2009 by DRC’s Government questions the subsequent DDR initiatives that have been undertaken in eastern DRC in 2011/2012. The reintegration process has, in Phase I program (CONADER), suffered from various political and organizational hazards despite the different methodological changes (from an individual reintegration mode to an associative one) that have strengthened the economic and social reintegration of most of the demobilized in a sustainable manner. Overall, the implementing agencies selected, later supported and supervised by the project, have achieved most of their objectives, particularly in the area of economic rehabilitation and social reintegration despite significant constraints (logistical, temporal, geographical and financial) they had to face.

The physical and social rehabilitation of injured and disabled veterans also remained marginal compared to the initial objectives and was confined only to the national capital. The same applies to the attention paid to demobilized women, particularly in Phase I. Finally, the objectives related to the research, identification, reunification and reintegration of DRC CAAFG were globally achieved. NDDRP, however, has not completely managed to consolidate and validate its data.

NDDRP experienced a radical change of governance between the regime of CONADER and the creation of the IU-NDDRP. Without reconsidereing the underlying governance causes of the NDDRP restructuring, it is clear that the transition of a heavy superstructure to a small and light technical structure has influenced the coaching and monitoring and evaluation methodology of the project liaison offices on the field without being granted more authority and resources to perform their functions in an optimal way. Lack of awareness and information activities in much of the country has affected the course of the program in many places.

NDDRP succeeded mainly to work with partners having both national strategy and capacities. They have demonstrated a strong sense of drive and initiative to adapt from a strategy focused on the individual reintegration of the demobilized to a new strategy supporting reintegration in an associative or cooperative mode. The methodological and programmatic transformation of individual reintegration into an associative mode has considerably raised the level of satisfaction of the beneficiaries. This approach should be a model for future DDR programs in DRC, as well as in other countries.

Given its initial objectives, NDDRP has definitely had a positive impact on peace building in DRC, both in regards to the number of caseloads treated, the number of weapons collected as well as the number of demobilized returning to their home communities and actively contributing to social and economic activities, and the number of CAAFG getting out of armed groups. The work of NDDRP contributed strongly to the peaceful implementation of the 2006 elections and that the vast majority of demobilized no longer considered using weapons as a political tool.

In conclusion, DRC’s national DDR Program treated
close to 210,000 ex-combatants demobilized more than 111,000 of them, while allowing more than 31,000 CAAFG to leave the military ranks and to recover a normal family and social life. NDDRP also allowed 89,000 demobilized individuals to be economically reintegrated in their host community, which represents four out of five of the demobilized registered by the program. Support for the creation, establishment and strengthening of economic associations of the demobilized constitutes a model of joint economic and social reintegration of NDDRP and should be a lesson for future reinsertion/reintegration processes in DRC and in other countries.

NDDRP, which aimed in reaching the goals of “consolidating peace, national reconciliation and economic reconstruction of the country” was able to achieve these objectives in association and partnership with other national and international partners, participating in the recovery of the political, economic and social situation in DRC throughout the 2000s. Its overall satisfactory assessment, however, should not overlook the fact that a significant number of members of vulnerable groups (women demobilized, wounded and disabled veterans, CAAFG or other “demobilized” to come) may still need special assistance for their physical, psychological or material rehabilitation in the future.

90 ICR2168, op. cité, Table A.1.2, Annexe I, p.27.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>PHASE I</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>PHASE II</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demobilization</td>
<td>67,5</td>
<td>36,1%</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,1</td>
<td>4,4%</td>
<td></td>
<td>69,6</td>
<td>29,6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinsertion</td>
<td>43,8</td>
<td>23,5%</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,6</td>
<td>5,4%</td>
<td></td>
<td>46,4</td>
<td>19,8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reintegration</td>
<td>21,1</td>
<td>11,3%</td>
<td></td>
<td>26,3</td>
<td>54,7%</td>
<td></td>
<td>47,4</td>
<td>20,2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Groups</td>
<td>2,3</td>
<td>1,2%</td>
<td></td>
<td>6,5</td>
<td>13,5%</td>
<td></td>
<td>8,8</td>
<td>3,8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Management</td>
<td>52,1</td>
<td>27,9%</td>
<td></td>
<td>10,6</td>
<td>22,0%</td>
<td></td>
<td>62,7</td>
<td>26,7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>186,8</td>
<td>100,0%</td>
<td></td>
<td>48,1</td>
<td>100,0%</td>
<td></td>
<td>234,9</td>
<td>100,0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annexes
Annex I. Map of DRC
Annex II. Bibliography

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FAO


**Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo**


**Institute for Security Studies**


**MDRP – Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program**


**UNDP**


**UNICEF**


**Internet**


**TDRP - Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program**

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- TDRP - Oct - Dec. 2010 (6)
– TDRP - Jul - Sept. 2010 (5)
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– TDRP - Jan - March 2010 (3)
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World Bank


