Stabilization and Rehabilitation Needs in the Areas Affected by the Lord’s Resistance Army

Democratic Republic of Congo
Central African Republic
Republic of South Sudan

PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT • MAIN REPORT

June 2013
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<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFTCS</td>
<td>Africa Post-conflict and Social Development Practice Group, the World Bank</td>
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<td>AU-RTF</td>
<td>African Union Regional Task Force (on LRA)</td>
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<td>AU/AUC</td>
<td>African Union / African Union Commission</td>
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<td>AUBP</td>
<td>African Union Border Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bas Uele</td>
<td>Bas Uele District (DRC)</td>
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<td>BINUCA</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic</td>
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<td>CAF</td>
<td>Country Assistance Framework</td>
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<td>CAP</td>
<td>Consolidated Appeal (United Nations, humanitarian)</td>
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<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<td>CBSD</td>
<td>Cross-Border Stabilization and Development</td>
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<td>CES</td>
<td>Central Equatoria State (ROSS)</td>
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<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>EES</td>
<td>Eastern Equatoria State (ROSS)</td>
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<td>FACA</td>
<td>Armed forces of the Central African Republic</td>
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<td>FARDC</td>
<td>Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>Haut</td>
<td>Haut Uele District (DRC)</td>
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<td>ICGLR</td>
<td>International Conference on the Great Lakes Region</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<td>IWG</td>
<td>International Working Group</td>
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<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord's Resistance Army</td>
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<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo</td>
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<td>PO</td>
<td>Province Orientale (DRC)</td>
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<td>PSD</td>
<td>Peace and Security Department of the AU</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCI-LRA</td>
<td>Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the LRA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>REC</td>
<td>Regional Economic Community</td>
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<td>ROSS</td>
<td>Republic of South Sudan</td>
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<td>SPLA</td>
<td>Sudan People's Liberation Army</td>
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<td>SRSG</td>
<td>UN Special Representative of the Secretary General</td>
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<td>SSDDRC</td>
<td>South Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission</td>
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<td>TDRP</td>
<td>Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program</td>
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<td>ToR</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDAF</td>
<td>United Nations Development Assistance Framework</td>
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<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children's Fund</td>
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<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan</td>
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<td>UNOAU</td>
<td>UN Office to the African Union</td>
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<td>UNOCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>UPDF</td>
<td>Uganda People Defense Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA/USAID</td>
<td>United States of America / United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>WBGS</td>
<td>Western Bahr el Ghazal State (ROSS)</td>
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<td>WES</td>
<td>Western Equatoria State (ROSS)</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Program</td>
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Executive Summary

**Background:** The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) originally hailed from Uganda; but over the years has morphed into a regional menace. The LRA has not been active in Uganda since 2007 when its remaining fighters left northern part of the country as part of a since failed internationally supported peace process. This preliminary assessment covers areas affected since regional military action against the group resumed in 2008. Currently, affected and threatened areas are in the tri-border area of the Republic of South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Central African Republic.

On 22 November 2011, the AU Peace and Security Council authorized the implementation of the Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the LRA (RCI-LRA).

On June 29 2012, the UN Security Council endorsed the regional strategy developed by the United Nations to tackle the threat posed by the LRA, and called for the necessary support to be provided to ensure that it is implemented successfully. The strategy, developed by the UN Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA), focuses on five key strategic objectives to address the threat from the LRA (Box 1).

Concurrently with the development of this UN-AU strategy, in May 2012, the African Union Commission (AUC) requested senior management in the World Bank and African Development Bank (AfDB) to support the recovery and development oriented mandates of the RCI-LRA by conducting a regional assessment of the stabilization and rehabilitation needs in areas affected by LRA activity. Goal 5 of the UN strategy provides the entry point for this assessment. This goal highlights AU-UN collaboration in supporting initiatives on peace building, human rights, rule of law, and long-term development. Priority actions under this goal emphasize the importance of attention being given to meeting the needs of affected communities; the return and resettlement of displaced populations; improved basic services and infrastructure to promote economic activity and access, and the establishment of state territorial authority.

**Objectives:** The specific objectives of the assessment are: (i) to provide a basic understanding of the social, economic and governance conditions in the LRA affected areas, and (ii) to develop a vision, strategy and plan of action to respond to the reintegration, stabilization and development challenges in the area.

**Coordination and field missions:** In September 2012, the terms of reference for the assessment were agreed with the AU and AfDB and shared with the UN and other stakeholders in the International Working Group (IWG) on the LRA. Senior management tasked the Africa Post-Conflict and Social Development Practice Group (AFTCS) of the World Bank to respond to the AUC request, and teams drawn from AFTCS Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program (TDRP) conducted country missions to ROSS, DRC,

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Box 1: UN Regional Strategy on LRA (June 2012)

**Goal 1:** The African Union-led Regional Cooperation Initiative against the Lord’s Resistance Army is fully operational and implemented

**Goal 2:** Efforts to promote the protection of civilians are enhanced

**Goal 3:** Current DDRRR activities are expanded to cover all LRA affected areas

**Goal 4:** A coordinated humanitarian and child protection response is promoted in all LRA affected areas

**Goal 5:** Peacebuilding, human rights, rule of law and long-term development support is provided to LRA-affected governments to enable them to establish authority across their territory.
and CAR between October and December 2012.¹ The AFTCS/TDRP teams consulted widely and coordinated with other international partners and national stakeholders active in the respective counties.

At AU level, the AFTCS/TDRP coordinates the assessment with the AU Office of Special Envoy for the LRA Issue, Ambassador Francisco Madeira. This coordination is part of an ongoing AU-UN-World Bank partnership on the AU DDR Capacity Program (2013-2015) in the AU Peace and Security Department (PSD). The AFTCS/TDRP supports this program both technically and financially.

The senior point of coordination in the UN is Abou Moussa, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and head of the UN Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA). At Addis Ababa, the UN Office to the AU (UNOAU) acts as focal point for technical coordination between the AU, UN and the AFTCS/TDRP.

**Approach:** A three-stage assessment process has been adopted to cater for the existing lack of information, limited access to the affected areas, and the need to reconcile the views of multiple national, regional and international stakeholders and programs:

1. **Preliminary Assessment** (the current report) that will form the basis for Consultations with national and regional partners prior to the **Full Assessment** that will be planned and conducted together with the respective national authorities.

   **Geographical delineation:** The report highlights that at a political level in the AU and the affected countries consensus needs to be reached on what exactly is meant by the term LRA affected areas. At the technical level, the proposed design choice is to focus on areas affected since 2008, when regional military operations against the LRA were initiated. Weighing three main interrelated factors - the security situation, operational access, and administrative divisions and competencies - the preliminary assessment proposes a focus on the administrative areas identified in each country (Box 2).

   **Findings:** Priority needs identified include:

   i. Improving access, security and development through investments in infrastructure in transport and communications;

   ii. Enhancing local capacities for the implementation of stabilization and rehabilitation actions;

   iii. Increasing community cohesiveness and resilience;

   iv. Providing basic services and livelihood support to communities where possible, on a pilot basis;

   v. Concurrent national and cross-border trade and economic development and regional integration;

   vi. Prioritize area-based targeting and ensure equitable funding of strategic priorities, including cross-border coherence.

   **Ad (i) Addressing infrastructure development.** Priority needs identified by the preliminary assessment include:

   (a) connecting national trunk roads networks and the establishment of cross-border links; upgrading and maintenance of trunk roads connecting the affected areas to markets enhancing opportunities for trade with neighboring countries, including Uganda, as well as with the national transportation networks in DRC (Province Orientale) and CAR (Bangassu-Bangui) (see map of current trunk road (Map 3)); (b) Improving access to radio networks (FM and short wave), although there are many ongoing FM initiatives, receiv-

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¹ The AU Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program (www.peaceau.org). The AFTCS team includes: Abderrahim Fraiji (TTL & Mission Leader, AFTCS) Anton Baaré (Senior Stabilization Advisor, consultant AFTCS), Jorge Gavidia (Senior consultant, AFTCS) (Verena Phipps, AFTCS-ROSS mission), Magali Chelpi-den Hamer (consultant AFTCS- DRC and CAR mission). René Bauman (consultant AFTCS, DRC mission). Benjamin Burckhart (Social Development Specialist, AFTCS) and Doreen Thairu (team assistant AFTCS).

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**Box 2: Proposed Geographical Focus**

**Republic of South Sudan:** Western Equatoria State, in the areas bordering DRC and CAR

**Democratic Republic of Congo:** Dungu, Faradje and Niangara territories in the Haut-Uele district, Ango territory in the Bas Uele district (all Province Orientale)

**Central African Republic:** Haut Mbomou prefecture; Mbomou prefecture; Eastern part up to Bakouma and Rafai

**Source:** AFTCS/TDRP, 2013
ing support from NGO’s overall coverage is still limited (Map2) and radio stations are not economically viable; and (c) Improving mobile telephone coverage, with a need for private sector driven approach.

Ad (ii) Enhancing local capacities and institutions. Given the isolation of the affected areas, program delivery and follow up operation and maintenance has to rely to a large extent on local communities and authorities. A robust program approach is required to enhance the capacity of local authorities and communities to implement “community-driven” of rehabilitation activities. Improved local capacity needs to go hand in hand with an increased presence of the state through its institutions to ensure the protection of the population and the administration of justice and rule of law.

Ad (iii) Strengthening cohesiveness and resilience. There continues to be a pervasive atmosphere of fear in the area. This undermines social cohesion and prevents people from making future-oriented investments in improved livelihoods. In order to address this problem, there is a need to implement activities aimed at increasing community cohesiveness and resilience. Such activities would help create a base on which future recovery activities could be built, both through the improvement of livelihoods and access to services. A key component of this needs to be targeted interventions to help overcome trauma suffered by people directly affected by violence, and to support the effective integration of the displaced population and people formerly associated with the LRA.

Ad (iv) Providing basic services and livelihood support. There is a dire need for basic services and improved livelihoods in the areas. Comprehensively addressing these needs is challenging due to restrictions in access, security, delivery capacity and sustainability. Conditions for the cost-effective implementation of such programs are not currently in place. Implementation of such activities would require careful piloting combined with the mobilization of substantial resources to eventually set up full- scale regional and national program delivery structures in a post-LRA era.

Ad (v) Cross-border trade and economic development and regional economic integration. Concerted operational approaches for the stabilization and rehabilitation of LRA-affected areas is lacking at regional and national levels. This postpones and impedes the development of important national and cross-border strategies on security, reintegration, infrastructure and economic development. Unmarked borders, lack of national and regionally agreed border management strategies, and non-application of continental border management standards characterize the current situation. Moreover, RoSS, DRC and CAR are not members of a single AU Regional Economic Commission (REC): CAR and DRC are members of Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), while ROSS and DRC are members of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). However, all three countries are members of the International Conference for the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) that has a regional peace and security focus. While ICGLR does not have AU REC status, it is officially recognized by the AU as a Regional Mechanism and it is therefore an important potential platform for dialogue and discussion.

Ad (vi) Area-based approach and strategic, coherent and cross-border funding mechanism. There is a need to balance individual targeting including private benefits, with community- and area-based targeting including public goods. Country plans and programs of multiple bilateral and multilateral agencies in principle could be tuned to achieve this. However, there is considerable variation in the specific implementation strategies, processes, institutional arrangements and funding mechanisms to implement such activities. Moreover, current responses are almost all conceived and executed on a ‘country-by-country’ basis. Whilst national level coordination, development partner harmonization and alignment with national efforts and plans are important, the preliminary assessment finds that cross-border programming and financing is also crucial to ensure a strategically coherent response to stabilization and recovery needs across the region.

Agreements: On February 19, 2013, the AFTCS team met in Addis Ababa with the Special Envoy of the African Union for the LRA issue. Representatives from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the UN Office to the African Union (UNOAU) also attended the meeting. The purpose of the meeting was (i) to discuss the draft findings of the preliminary needs assessment and receive feedback and comments, and (ii) to discuss with the AU the next steps. It was agreed...
to proceed along two scenarios that require concurrent implementation.

**Scenario 1:** contributing to an immediate early recovery response that needs to occur under the present circumstances where the LRA remains a destabilizing factor and military operations against it are ongoing. This scenario requires close external coordination with the UN plans under preparation by the UN Special Representative (UNSR) for Central Africa and head of UNOCA, Abou Moussa.

**Scenario 2:** a longer-term development-oriented response premised on the assumption that current regional and international efforts will result in the ending of the security threats posed by the LRA. This scenario would be geared towards the promotion of Regional Economic Integration as an important strategy for addressing systemic state fragility through a cross-border stabilization and trade and economic development (CBSD) initiative based on AU Border Program (AUPB) principles. It would develop a package focused on building social cohesion, institutional development, and trade and economic development and growth based on a vision for stabilization and development shared between the three currently affected countries and Uganda.

These scenarios need to be pursued concurrently and both assume that the governments of DRC, ROSS and CAR are willing to fully engage in the assessment process. The AU Envoy for the LRA stated in February 2013 that African leadership will be provided on national programs and that he personally would take this forward together with the UN SRSG.

This would involve presenting the assessment’s preliminary findings at country-level in order to develop a shared vision for development of the affected areas by the governments involved (regional program component), and in order to, where feasible, incorporate LRA related recovery responses in national government programs and country-level portfolios of development partners (national program components).

The full assessment would be implemented once (i) the AU has ensured the required level of endorsement and technical cooperation from the affected countries, including formal identification of ministry-level national focal points who will be engaged in planning the final phase of the assessment. This would (ii) start with a technical planning meeting in Addis Ababa or the capitals of one of the affected countries.

**Status:** At the time of writing, the above two criteria for moving to the agreed next steps are not yet fully met. However, the AU and UN envoys have reached agreements in principle with the governments of RoSS and DRC that ministerial level national focal points will be appointed. These appointments are reported to be in process.

Unfortunately, the outlook and situation in CAR has significantly worsened during the first quarter of 2013 as a result of the Séléka rebellion and their seizure of power. CAR’s AU membership is currently suspended. This means that some of the findings presented in this report may be outdated. However, it is safe to assume that an already dire situation only has further deteriorated, that the needs identified remain fundamentally the same, but that national capacity to respond has waned even further. The current CAR leadership has declared the former national army (FACA) dissolved and its commitment to the RCI-LRA is unclear and the subject of debate.

**Next steps:** The following immediate next steps are envisioned:

- Consultations with UNOCA,
- Identification and organization of a meeting with national focal points of the DRC, ROSS and CAR under the auspices of the Office of the AU LRA Envoy. Meeting objective: presentation of preliminary findings and preparation of terms of reference for full assessment. The meeting will be supported by the AFTCS/TDRP.
- Implementation of full assessment pending availability of funds and clearance by senior management.
I. Introduction

A. Background

A crisis has been ongoing since 2008 in the tri-border region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Central African Republic (CAR) and Republic of South Sudan (ROSS). Activities of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) have caused the displacement of a large number of the population living in the area creating a serious humanitarian situation with widespread implications for stability and the ability of communities to remain self-reliant.

Areas affected and threatened by the LRA are among the least developed and isolated in the wider region, compounding the challenges faced by the countries affected in overcoming poverty and consolidating governance. LRA activity has also destroyed basic social infrastructure and facilities contributing to a further deterioration in the living conditions and wellbeing of people in the affected areas.

Insecurity generated by the operations of the LRA has intensified existing country-level stresses created by pervasive poverty, lack of livelihood opportunities, dismal access to basic services, isolation from infrastructure networks, and the absence of adequate government institutions and the rule of law. Conversely, such conditions act as triggers of conflict and the emergence of armed groups. It is expected that the amelioration of the situation will remove one of the factors contributing to the continued operation of LRA and, in conjunction with the implementation of parallel strategies in the political and military fronts, facilitate the stabilization and rehabilitation of the area.

On 22 November 2011, the AU Peace and Security Council authorized the implementation of the Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the LRA (RCI-LRA).

On June 29 2012, the UN Security Council endorsed the regional strategy developed by the United Nations to tackle the threat posed by the LRA, and called for the necessary support to ensure that it is carried out successfully. The strategy, developed by the UN Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA), focuses on five key strategic objectives to address the threat from the LRA (Box 3).

Concurrently with the development of this UN-AU strategy, in May 2012, the African Union Commission (AUC) requested senior management in the World Bank and African Development Bank (AfDB) to support the recovery and development oriented mandates of the RCI-LRA by conducting a regional assessment of the stabilization and rehabilitation needs in areas affected by LRA activities. Goal 5 of the UN strategy provides the entry point for the assessment. This goal highlights AU-UN collaboration in supporting initiatives on peace building, human rights, rule of law, and long-term development. Priority actions under this goal emphasize the importance of attention being given to meeting the needs of affected communities; the return and re-

Box 3: UN Regional Strategy on the Lord’s Resistance Army (June 2012)

| Goal 1: | The African Union-led Regional Cooperation Initiative against the Lord’s Resistance Army is fully operational and implemented |
| Goal 2: | Efforts to promote the protection of civilians are enhanced |
| Goal 3: | Current DDRRR activities are expanded to cover all LRA affected areas |
| Goal 4: | A coordinated humanitarian and child protection response is promoted in all LRA affected areas |
| Goal 5: | Peacebuilding, human rights, rule of law and long-term development support is provided to LRA-affected governments to enable them to establish authority across their territory |
settlement of displaced populations; and improved basic services and infrastructure to promote economic activity and access, and the establishment of state territorial authority.

The AUC request emphasized the attention to issues related to cross-border, stabilization and recovery responses in the context of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) initiatives; as well as the need for parallel efforts at the national and regional levels as postulated by its Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy (PCRD).

**B. Coordination and Harmonization with the AU**

In September 2012 Terms of reference (ToRs) for a collaborative assessment were agreed with the African Union and the African Development Bank. The ToRs were subsequently shared for information with the International Working Group (IWG) on the LRA that brings together UN, EU, AU and bilateral organizations.

At AU level, the AFTCS/TDRP coordinates the assessment with the AU Office of Special Envoy for the LRA Issue, Ambassador Francisco Madeira. This coordination is part of an ongoing partnership between the AU-UN-World Bank on the AU DDR Capacity Program (2013-2015) in the AU Peace and Security Department. The AFTCS/TDRP supports this program technically and financially.

The senior point of coordination in the UN is Abou Moussa, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and head of the UN Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA). At Addis Ababa level the UN Office to the AU (UNOAU) acts as focal point for technical coordination between the AU, UN and the AFTCS/TDRP.

The design of the assessment takes into account complementary issues related to the RCI-LRA and the UN Regional strategy in LRA affected areas of July 2012 that aims to support efforts led by the AU to neutralize the threat posed by LRA and address its impacts. The UN strategy focuses on international military, humanitarian, development and peacebuilding assistance to the LRA-affected areas. It aims at promoting cross-border mechanisms to improve the protection of civilians, early warning capacity and humanitarian access and response. It addresses issues related to reintegration support for returning internally displaced persons, abductees and former combatants and recommends international action to strengthen the capacity of the affected countries to extend state authority throughout the areas where the LRA has a presence.

**Goal 5 of the UN strategy provides the entry point for this assessment.** This goal highlights AU-UN collaboration in supporting initiatives on peace building, human rights, rule of law, and long-term development. Priority actions under this goal emphasize the importance of giving attention to the needs of affected communities; the return and resettlement of displaced populations; and improved basic services and infrastructure to promote economic activity and access.

The specific objectives of the assessment are:

- To provide a basic understanding of the social, economic and governance conditions in the LRA affected areas, and
- To develop a vision and strategy to respond to the reintegration, stabilization and development challenges in the area.

A three-stage assessment process has been adopted to cater for the existing lack of information, limited access to the affected areas, and the need to reconcile the views of multiple national, regional and international stakeholders and programs:

1. **A preliminary assessment** (this report) — that will form the basis for:

2. **Consultations** with national and regional partners on the formulation of the stabilization, rehabilitation and development strategy will be underpinned by the design of a Transitional Results Framework (TRF) and an action plan to guide the interventions of national and international partners.

3. **Full assessment** that will be planned and conducted as a next step together with the respective national authorities.
The preliminary assessment field missions were conducted between October and December 2012. These included field missions to ROSS, DRC and CAR and were coordinated with other international partners active in the respective counties and areas affected by the LRA.

On February 19, 2013, the AFTCS team met in Addis Ababa with the Special Envoy of the African Union for the LRA issue, Francisco Madeira. Representatives from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the UN Office to the African Union (UNOAU) also attended. The purpose of the meeting was (i) to discuss the draft findings of the preliminary needs assessment and to receive feedback comments, and (ii) to discuss with the AU the next steps. It was agreed to proceed along two scenarios that need concurrent implementation. These scenarios are described in Chapter H below.

At the time of writing, the above two criteria for moving to the agreed next steps are not yet fully met. However, the AU and UN envoys have reached agreement in principle with the governments of ROSS and DRC that ministerial level national focal points will be appointed. These appointments are reported to be in process. Unfortunately, the outlook and situation in CAR has significantly worsened during the first quarter of 2013 as a result of the Séléka rebellion and their seizure of power. CAR’s AU membership is currently suspended. This means that some of the findings presented in this report may be out dated. However, it is safe to assume that an already dire situation only has further deteriorated, that the needs identified remain fundamentally the same, but that national capacity to respond has waned even further. The current CAR leadership has declared the former national army (FACA) dissolved and its commitment to the RCI-LRA is unclear and the subject of debate.

D. Structure of the report

This report presents a summary of the main findings of the preliminary assessment of stabilization and rehabilitation needs in the areas affected by LRA activity in ROSS, DRC and CAR. The report is based on the review of available documentation and the findings of field missions conducted to the affected areas in the three countries between October and December 2012.

Section I, provides the background to the assessment and its linkages to wider AU and UN initiatives related to the LRA.

Section II, outlines the main premises for the conduct of the assessment, as well as the stages and principles applied for its execution:

Section III, presents the findings of the preliminary assessment on the main triggers of conflict in the area; priority needs of stabilization and rehabilitation; and a preliminary vision for action within the framework of the African Union (AU) Regional Cooperation Initiative against the LRA (RCI-LRA).

Detailed findings of the preliminary assessment, including social and economic conditions in the affected areas; delivery capacity of stakeholders; and activities by partners on LRA related issues are included in complementary individual country assessment reports for ROSS, DRC and CAR.

Section IV, outlines a proposal on the next steps to be taken for the completion of the assessment.
II. Approach

A. Premises and principles

The assessment is based on two main premises:

i. That current regional and international efforts will result in an end to the LRA security threat;

ii. That the governments of DRC, ROSS and CAR are willing to fully engage in the assessment process and to provide the required national leadership.

Selective coverage and results: The assessment and its recommendations will be focused on prioritized themes and geographical areas of focus in the tri-border state area:

- **Thematic coverage**: focused on conditions to facilitate return, reintegration needs as well as those for stabilization and development, including national and cross-border conditions and challenges.

- **Geographical coverage**: the assessment is focused on the tri-border zone of DRC, CAR and ROSS affected by LRA activity after 2008 when the most recent efforts to negotiate an end to the LRA threat failed and current military operations started. Areas previously affected are not assessed, either because LRA no longer poses a meaningful threat and responses to their earlier activity are already part of mainstream development interventions (Uganda), or are not any longer the determining factor in the assessment of overall stabilization options and planning (Eastern Equatoria, ROSS).

B. Guiding principles

The following guiding principles apply to the conducting of the assessment:

- **Regional and national ownership**: The assessment and any ensuing strategy and plan of action will be aligned with RCI-LRA and related regional policy instruments, as well as with national policies and priorities. It will be developed in conjunction with national partners ensuring their ownership and leadership in implementation.

- **Inclusive**: While the strategy will prioritize and focus on a few “key” stabilization and recovery goals and outcomes, the process of prioritization started with the consideration of a broader set of issues that were the subject of extensive dialogue with a range of national and international stakeholders.

- **Integrated**: Although the strategy is focused on stabilization and rehabilitation measures that place emphasis on the provision of basic services and infrastructure, due consideration is given to interrelated political, security, economic, social and cross-border factors. These elements will constitute the main clusters for the design of the strategy, and the Transitional Results Framework and plan of action.
III. Findings

A. Geographical delimitation

The proposed definition of the territory to be covered in the detailed assessment and ensuing strategy is based on three main interrelated factors - the security situation, operational access, and administrative divisions and competencies. It is proposed to include the following administrative areas:

**Republic of South Sudan:**
- Western Equatoria State, in the areas bordering DRC and CAR

**Democratic Republic of Congo:**
- Dungu, Faradje and Niangara territories in the Haut-Uele district, Province Orientale
- Ango territory in the Bas Uele district, PO;

**Central African Republic:**
- Haut Mbomou prefecture
- Mbomou prefecture, eastern part up to Bakouma and Rafai

![Map 1: Areas affected by LRA activities and administrative divisions, February 2013](image)
The preliminary assessment found that there are marked differences across the proposed areas of geographical focus in terms of the security situation and levels of access, with marked difference in the situation faced between even neighboring communities in some cases. This makes it difficult to easily identify and segregate geographical sub areas for condition-appropriate targeting of interventions. Given present restrictions in access, it is proposed that the detailed assessment will attempt to identify and group communities in the affected areas against a number of typologies identified (Box 4 and Chapter F).

The LRA started operating in what is now the territory of the ROSS in the mid-1990s, from where it continued incursions in northern Uganda. In 2002, the government in Khartoum gave permission for the deployment of the Ugandan army in South Sudan to fight the LRA and their engagement in South Sudan continued post South Sudan independence with the agreement of the Government of the ROSS. UPDF troops were still on South Sudan soil at the time of the assessment but are now operating under the AU-RTF umbrella.

Box 4: Area based targeting Typology of variation in security and community stabilization

Areas that have not registered incidents in the last years, with local communities and displaced population committed to local integration, and a measure of subsistence through agriculture or small businesses achieved. These conditions are found in areas of Western Equatoria State, ROSS.

Areas that have not registered incidents in the last years but where integration has not taken place or is ongoing, and tensions exist due to unequal access to resources. These conditions are found mainly in areas of Western Equatoria State, ROSS.

Areas left by IDPs and not fully resettled, with security concerns regarding the return of LRA activities and difficult access. These conditions are found in ROSS areas close to the DRC border as well as in DRC and CAR.

Areas with high security concerns, with practically no presence of the state, where a high percentage of the population is displaced, that are sparsely populated and difficult to access. These conditions are found in DRC and CAR.

Source: AFTCS/TDRP, 2013

The last reported LRA incident in ROSS took place in Western Equatoria State in April 2012 (South of Yambio and Nzara towns close to the DRC border). No LRA incidents have been reported in Eastern Equatoria or Central Equatoria States for close to two years. Two incidents were reported in Western Bahr el Ghazal State along the border with CAR in 2011. There seems to be a trend towards a diminishing number of LRA incidents in South Sudan and those that have occurred have increasingly moved further north-west along the border with the CAR.

The presence of LRA in northeast DRC has been reported since mid-2005, from where it used to coordinate attacks on the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (ROSS) and Uganda. Attacks on DRC soil intensified at the end of 2008, with the failure of the Juba peace talks and the launch of Operation Lighting Thunder. Recent incidents attributed to LRA concentrate in the Haut Uele and Bas Uele districts. Areas of operation roughly cover 3 territories in Haut - Dungu, Faradje, Niangara - and Ango territory in Bas Uele. The number of reported incidents has decreased since the beginning of 2012. However, it is difficult to ascertain whether this situation reflects a long-term trend or whether it is be attributed to other factors.

LRA activities in the CAR have been reported since early 2008, with raids in several localities in the south-east (Prefecture of Haut Mbomou). Raids intensified in early 2009, following the dispersal of the LRA forces into smaller units in response to military advances during Operation Lighting Thunder. Most of the recorded incidents in 2012 occurred in the Haut Mbomou Prefecture and on the eastern half of Mbomou Prefecture, up to Bakouma and Rafai. A small number of LRA-related incidents have been reported in the north-east in the Haute Kotto Prefecture.

Reported incidents in the three countries cover a variety of types of incidents, from simple sightings of armed groups, through direct attacks to households and villages plundering food and supplies, to abductions, killings and other abuses. Present incidents attributed to the LRA tend to be carried out by small groups of 3 to 5 that generally avoid direct confrontation with RTF or national armies and UN forces (MONUSCO in DRC). It has been reported that the LRA in CAR sometimes
regroup in larger numbers (20) but there are no known alliances with other armed groups.

The present strength of the LRA forces is unknown, with estimates of over 100 in ROSS (500 by certain accounts); 100 to 200 in DRC; and 300 in CAR (including abductees).

B. Triggers of conflict: Internal and external stresses

Table 1 below highlights some of the triggers of conflict and associated stresses identified by communities in the affected areas and their perceived importance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRIGGER</th>
<th>RoSS</th>
<th>DRC</th>
<th>CAR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policy – governance:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low national priority and allocation of resources for the development of affected area</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low priority given to military operations against LRA in relation to other national armed conflicts and demands</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Very High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No recognition of the presence of LRA in the country (DRC)</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak or absent state capacity to deliver basic services, political representation and administration</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Very High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absence of strategies to promote LRA desertions and facilitate repatriation/relocation and reintegration</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Very High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A weak police force and judiciary unable to discharge their duties</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Very High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High incidence of poverty and lack of social services and facilities</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unequal access to external support among displaced and local communities</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult or lack of access to land by the displaced population</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak community structures and organizations</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Very High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of infrastructure: roads and communications</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low productivity and support to improve livelihoods</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Very High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The presence of and/or continued incidents by LRA, insecurity, fear and limited access</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Very High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The operation of other armed groups under the name of LRA – delinquency</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mistrust of communities in, and/or lack of capacity of, the government armed forces</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of unregistered foreigners and delinquency</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
C. Findings: Policy and governance issues

Low priority and allocation of resources to the affected areas

People in the areas affected by LRA activity in the three countries share a common perception of neglect and isolation from central government authorities both in terms of the allocation of resources for basic social services and in the promotion of economic development and investment opportunities. This fuels a sense of resentment and could lead to conflict for the redressing of perceived grievances.

Republic of South Sudan: A strategic development plan formulated with the support of UNDP exists for Western Equatoria State in ROSS and some counties have set priorities against which to allocate potential external resources. However, there are in general no resources allocated for the implementation of this plan. At the national level the government is presently prioritizing the allocation of resources to the northern states particularly in need of stabilization after independence from Sudan and to areas where larger internal conflicts remain unresolved, such as in the east. Following the policy set by the government, the main focus of international development partners is also to target the northern and eastern states. The United States is the main international partner providing LRA-specific support in Western Equatoria State. It has deployed advisors to assist in the development of actions to support border communities.

Democratic Republic of Congo: A five-year development plan, 2010-2015 exists in Province Orientale in the DRC. The implementation of the plan rests to a large extent on the mobilization of external resources presently not secured, while the limited government resources committed to Province Orientale are mainly used to cover recurrent costs. No particular priority is given in the plan to the development of the Haut Uele and Bas Uele Districts or to the territories and border areas specifically affected by LRA activity.

Central African Republic: The increase of rural productivity and the strengthening of public sector capacity are among the main priorities of the Poverty Reduction Strategy 2011-2015 for CAR. However, it does not outline clear measures to maximize the comparative advantages of each region. Some actions in support of rural areas are included in the strategy for the agricultural sector; but they remain largely unfunded. Ongoing conflict and greater opportunities for the exploitation of natural resources in other regions of CAR have conspired to keep the south-east in a constant state of marginalization from the rest of the country. Following the overthrow of the CAR Government in April 2013 the wider environment for the implementation of the PRS is now unclear to say the least.

Public sector capacity

It is not feasible under present circumstances to implement stabilization and rehabilitation programs through the public sector in a cost-effective and efficient manner. Despite certain differences among them, there is a generalized lack of public sector capacity to deliver basic services or support development interventions in the affected areas of the three countries.

Republic of South Sudan: Western Equatoria State is administratively organized at the levels of state, county, payam, boma and village. States are responsible for planning and delivery of social services in their areas of responsibility while federal sectoral organizations have a policy-making, normative and national planning role. For all practical purposes, most of the civil service is concentrated at the state and county level. There is a dearth of qualified personnel in Western Equatoria State except for the top layer of state ministers and directors. The war triggered an exodus of qualified staff, however, few are coming back. Top political and management personnel appear committed towards the development of the young country and Western Equatoria State in particular. However low level of remuneration and lack of training and skills reinforcement programs contributes to a chronic situation of lack of qualified personnel at all levels.

Democratic Republic of Congo: There is a systemic lack of resources and operational capacity at all lower levels of public administration in Province Orientale. There are indications that the situation might not be too different at the District and Provincial levels given the observed limited presence and influence they bear on local conditions. Lack of public sector resources coupled with insecurity and restricted access contribute
to a chronic understaffing of social services (schools, health facilities, etc.) and infrastructure in the area is very poor. Low salary levels preclude the engagement of qualified personnel, including teachers and health workers. This situation contributes to the presence of an effective governance vacuum in which armed groups and bandits thrive exacerbating a sense of insecurity and absence of the rule of law.

Central African Republic: The capacity of the authorities in CAR to delivery services at the Prefecture, sub-prefecture and municipal/locality levels is for all practical purposes negligible. The Prefect is the representative of the central government and its sectoral ministries and agencies at the local level. However, this function is performed primarily at the political level to ensure the projection of the authority of the central government over the local population. There is an almost total absence of de-concentrated facilities or services provided by the central government. Under these conditions, the sense of abandonment of the population by the central government is compounded by the presence of delegated authorities that are perceived as not responsive to local needs and that do not share common interests in the development of the communities.

D. Findings: Social and economic issues

Poverty, access to services and infrastructure

With the exception of Western Equatoria State in ROSS, poverty, unfulfilled expectations, poor access to national economic networks and unequal distribution of wealth are common factors contributing to social fragility in the affected areas increasing the potential for conflict and violence.

In Republic of South Sudan, Western Equatoria State has the second lowest incidence of poverty in the country, which at 42.1% is well below the national average of 50.6%. With 86% of its population living in rural areas, the main source of livelihood is subsistence farming with some small surpluses produced for market sale, mainly staple food and fruits. Cash crops are not extensively cultivated despite the fertility of the land and high potential for food production. The years of war leading to the north-south Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005) and the subsequent activities of LRA severely disrupted production patterns and limited the provision of basic services in the region, particularly in the area bordering DRC. A lack of secondary/feeder roads hinders productivity and precludes the efficient marketing of local produce. Farming practices remain underdeveloped and inefficient and low levels of productivity are also found in the livestock, forestry and fisheries sectors.

Democratic Republic of Congo: Bas Uele and Haut Uele Districts in Province Orientale are amongst the poorest regions in the country, with 75.5% of the population living below the poverty line. Only 2% of the population has access to safe water and sanitation provision is almost non-existent. The recorded infant mortality rate was 89/1000 in 2009 and primary school attendance stands at 53%. With the exception of a few trunk roads along the east-west axis and from Dungu to the north and south, the area does not have a network of feeder roads and this seriously limits access to rural communities and hinders the provision of both services and security. The cellular telephone network covers only the main towns and has no penetration in rural areas. There are, however, several FM radio stations in operation supported by external organizations which often offer the only means of conveying information to those with access to radio receivers.

Close to 84% of the population of Province Orientale depends on subsistence agriculture and 10% on informal non-agricultural activities. Most subsistence farmers also produce a small amount of cash crops for trading (corn, rice, coffee). Farming practices remain underdeveloped and there is a chronic lack of agricultural inputs and opportunities for skills transfer fishing and livestock sectors remain largely under developed. Pastoralist groups, like the Mbororo, are also present in the area but are often in a state of conflict with settled farming communities.

Central African Republic: While the Prefectures of Haut Mbomou and Mbomou are close to CAR’s average

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3 UNDP, Province Orientale, Profil Resume, Pauvreté et Conditions de Vie Des Ménages, Mars 2009
in terms of monetary poverty (63.3% as compared to 62% for CAR as a whole), they are by far the worst in terms of poverty in living conditions, 95.1% as compared to an average of 75.1% for CAR as a whole. The percentage of women headed households is above the national average, standing at 26.4% for Mbomou and 31.1% for Haut Mbomou. Access to essential services is extremely limited. Road infrastructure is in an appalling state, presenting serious restrictions for the access to the south-east and contributing to the regions isolation from the rest of the country.

Most of the population in south-east CAR depends on subsistence agriculture complemented by game hunting and fishing. As in the other areas assessed, income generating activities, agriculture, fishing, hunting and forestry practices remain largely underdeveloped and there is a severe lack of inputs and opportunities for skills transfer.

**Displaced population and sources of tension – unequal access to resources**

Despite the generally positive acceptance of IDPs and refugees by the local population and authorities in the three countries, tensions do sometimes arise. These appear to be focused on complaints that unequal support is provided to some groups of displaced persons or as a result of issues related to social tensions arising from a protracted situation of displacement.

In South Sudan returnees from Sudan and IDPs in Western Equatoria State have received little or no support from the ROSS authorities and this has created tensions and negative comparisons with the assistance provided to returning refugees from Uganda or elsewhere. Some communities also complain of an increased prevalence of what they consider to be antisocial or delinquent behavior which they associate with the presence of ‘unregistered nationals’ from DRC, which is causing resentment and the rejection of some groups within communities.

Unlike in ROSS, humanitarian programs in CAR and DRC are of a limited scale or non-existent for large sections of the displaced population. As a consequence, there are not major conflicts arising from perceived inequitable allocation of humanitarian resources in these areas.

Overall, the relations between displaced populations and local communities in the three countries are relatively peaceful thanks in part to their ethnic homogeneity. Refugee laws and regulations in all three countries are relatively benign and tend to promote equal access to work and mobility for the whole population.

### Table 2: Estimates of Displaced Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population in affected areas (1)</th>
<th>ROSS</th>
<th>DRC</th>
<th>CAR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>620,000 (2)</td>
<td>2,800,000 (6)</td>
<td>222,000 (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs (LRA related mainly)</td>
<td>49,000 (3)(7)</td>
<td>350,000 (7)</td>
<td>22,000 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnees (LRA related mainly)</td>
<td>20,000 (4)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees (LRA related mainly)</td>
<td>10,500 (5)</td>
<td>1,300 (7)</td>
<td>6,000 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other displaced (10)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Rounded figures: census, OCHA, others
(2) Total Western Equatoria State
(3)From 75,000 max. recorded in 2011
(4) Returned to November 2012
(5) From DRC (9,000) and CAR (1,500)
(6) Total for HU and BU districts
(7) September 2012
(8) Total Haut Mbomou and Mbomou
(9) November 2012
(10) Figures do not include nomadic Mbororo pastoralists in DRC & CAR

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create uncertainty and breed conflict between displaced and host communities.

The displaced population in Western Equatoria State, ROSS, has not found many obstacles in accessing land, both for shelter construction and agricultural production. Given that the distance of displacement is relatively small, between 50 and 70 km, IDPs tend to have ethnic and kinship links with host communities. Land is allocated by the chief of the community and endorsed at the locality level. Most displaced households keep the land in their places of origin and conduct visits to ensure their tenure and collect produce. Some tensions over access to and use of land are reported in the eastern part of Western Equatoria State, between Dinka Agar groups from Lakes State (pastoralist) and the mainly agricultural communities of Western Equatoria State.

Given the fear of the LRA, it is not unusual to find households in the Haut and Bas Uele districts of Province Orientale, DRC reporting that they have been displaced five or six times. Displaced households normally move to other rural areas relatively close to their places of origin or to the fringes of the main towns in the region. One of the main problems faced by the displaced is access to land in their new areas of settlement. Some households manage to keep a foothold on their original land with the expectation of return. There are some reports of cases of returning IDPs finding their land occupied by another family, with ensuing conflicts regarding tenure. There are few records of formal land property, thus land issues tend to be dealt with through customary mechanisms of land allocation and conflict mediation and resolution.

IDPs in the areas affected by the LRA in CAR tend to move close to towns where they normally are able to access land for housing. Residential plots are awarded by the mayor or village chief depending on the availability of land in the locality. Presently, there are no formal land registries or title deeds. Access to agricultural land is more complex and IDPs generally face more challenges in securing access to land for farming. Some succeed through the use of kinship relations or acquaintances but this is not the norm. Some still keep a link to their original land, but, as opposed to the situation in ROSS and DRC, many others say that they have currently completely abandoned their original land fearing further LRA attacks.

In both ROSS and CAR there may be growing pressure on land if displacement becomes further protracted. Whilst some of those affected have been able to negotiate access to agricultural land through informal agreements, it is not clear whether these agreements can be sustained or how they will evolve if displacement becomes long term and as pressure on land increases.

Weak community structures

The weakening of community structures in the LRA affected areas increases their vulnerability to external threats and precludes the emergence of community driven initiatives for local development.

The Azande are the predominant group in Western Equatoria State in ROSS in what is considered as a relatively ethnically homogeneous area. The Azande are also one of the main groups across the border in CAR and within the Haut district of DRC. Other important groups include the Boa in Bas Uele, DRC, and the nomadic pastoralist Mbororos in DRC and CAR. There are not major ethnic tensions in the affected areas. Customary community practices are applied at the village level and used to ensure social cohesion and resolve disputes or tensions that do arise.

Despite the preservation of customary practices, these have been weakened by years of conflict, displacement and the intervention of government authorities. With some variations, communities across the region lack the capacity to embark on significant initiatives for their development. Many communities have very limited experience of day-to-day cooperation for the maintenance of social services or the promotion of income generation activities through associations or cooperatives. Their experiences of wide scale community collaboration work have been mainly related to reaction to an external threat or crisis, like the organization of self-defense forces, or to shared-labor for agricultural tasks such as land clearance.

E. (In)Security

The presence of LRA and other armed groups, insecurity, fear and access

The lack of verified information on the incidents of violence has led to situation of entrenched fear, where the population tends to attribute all incidents of violence to the LRA.
The dispersal of the LRA into small, mobile, groups of 3 to 5, makes it difficult for conventional armed forces to mount an effective response, especially those unfamiliar with the area. This heightens a sense of the group's omnipresence and invincibility. Fear and perception of lack of security preclude access to communities and limits the operations of national and international support organizations.

Despite the diminishing number of reported LRA incidents in ROSS, it is clear that a climate of fear and uncertainty is still present among the population of Western Equatoria State, particularly among those living along the border with DRC. This situation is reflected in the reluctance of the remaining IDPs, to return to their places of origin.

The probable operation of several armed groups under the name of LRA reinforces the perception of insecurity and mistrust among the people in the Bas Uele and Haut districts of DRC. Traditional patterns of rural activities have been disrupted and agricultural plots far from populated areas are being abandoned. New agricultural plots tend now to be located closer to the villages to reduce risks and work is often done in rotation by groups of households with protection from the security forces. Hunting and other activities that involve movement far from the villages have been reduced, as has been the movement of local produce to markets.

The state of fear induces the propagation of rumors and the passing of unfounded information on presumed LRA incidents. The sense of insecurity is further enhanced as such reports are broadcasted, unverified, on the local radios. Regardless of whether they are LRA related incidents or not, it is evident that the “perception” of insecurity in the area and its impact on the population is very real and response actions will need to take this into account.

The self-defense forces

Local self-defense forces established in LRA-affected areas have been a factor in increasing the perception of security among communities, however, the presence of additional armed groups not recognized by the governments is in conflict with the mandate of the regular armed forces and increases the risk of armed clashes among rival groups.

The activities of the Home Guards (Arrow Boys) in Western Equatoria State, ROSS, while presently contributing to a perception of security and stability among the local communities, could lead to future tensions related to the presence and eventual operations of the SPLA and AU-RTF military forces. The existence of some form of dialogue between the Home Guards and the Western Equatoria State authorities has been reported, although it is not possible to identify concrete measures of support to these groups.

Local self-defense groups have also appeared in DRC in response to the threat of presumed LRA groups. Their establishment, while could be a contributing factor to increased security, is also a potential source of conflict with the government and FADRC as the operation of armed groups is not allowed by law. It appears that they have strong support at the local level; however their relationship with formal authorities in the Bas Uele and Haut districts is uncertain.

Self-defense groups in the areas affected by the LRA in CAR received limited support from the government in 2010, after which it was discontinued. There was a recent initiative by the Ministry of Defense to assess the number of people currently engaged in self-defense forces in order to develop a policy regarding their operation. Nevertheless, it is not possible to report on the progress of this initiative or its expected outcomes. The current situation in CAR means that the situation will need to be reassessed.

Security and Justice Sector/Rule of law

The weak presence, and in certain places the total absence, of police forces and judiciary in the LRA affected areas creates a vacuum in the presence of the state and results in a sense of impunity.

In the ROSS, there is a moderate police presence in Western Equatoria State. UNDP is supporting a police capacity building program in Western Equatoria State. However, at present, police numbers and resources are unable to cope with security demands. There are parallel needs to reinforce the capacity and operation of the judiciary.

The police force in Haut and Bas Uele districts in DRC is extremely weak, with no effective capacity to ensure the rule of law or even project the presence of state au-
Authority. This situation is exacerbated by the low capacity of the justice law and order sector in general (there are 300 police officers for the whole of Faradje, Dungu, Niangara and Ango territories). To compensate for the limited presence of the police, some NGOs and CBOs are promoting the establishment of early warning systems as well as the dissemination of information through radios and other media.

The police (gendarmerie) in CAR has a token presence in towns like Obo and is practically absent in other smaller settlements. The presence of justice law and order actors and the state in general is weak and insufficient to guarantee the safety of the population even under normal circumstances.

Military forces

The national armies in the LRA-affected areas are not fully engaged with the local population and their presence is often not perceived as a response to the communities' security needs. The lack of official recognition of an LRA presence in DRC further compounds the sense of insecurity and fear amongst the population.

The presence of the SPLA in Western Equatoria State, ROSS, is relatively light in comparison to the larger concentrations observed in the northern and eastern parts of the country due to ongoing tensions and conflict. There are no reports on conflict fueled by the presence of the SPLA in the area, however the local population often sees them as a force dominated by people from other regions of South Sudan. A factor contributing to the decrease in the number of incidents of violence attributed to LRA in ROSS appears to be the deployment of the Uganda People Defense Forces (UPDF) in Western Equatoria State under the umbrella of the AU-RTF. The UPDF are in general well received by the local population.

In the DRC, the government and military commanders in the field do not acknowledge the presence of LRA forces within DRC territory. Armed incidents in the region are attributed to common banditry. Currently, there are no foreign military forces deployed in the Haut and Bas Uele districts with the exception of MONUSCO peacekeepers and the multi-national team at JIOC (Joint Intelligence Operations Cell) under MONUSCO umbrella. MONUSCO security personnel are deployed in seven bases and are a positive factor in promoting security; however the needs are beyond their present capacity.

The Armed Forces of DRC (FARDC) have a weak presence in the affected areas and its strength has been further reduced by the redeployment of some units to North and South Kivu Provinces. FADRC forces are mainly concentrated in towns and along important communication lines (Dungu-Faradje-Aru; Dungu-Duru; Dungu-Bengadi-Doruma) with limited capacity to mobilize in response to incidents. This situation has contributed to weak security and access in Bas Uele and Haut and has facilitated the operation of other armed groups and bandits. The operations of FADRC do not generate confidence among the local population due to the perception that they are pursuing their own interests and engaging in parallel security activities.

At the time of the field work, the low levels of deployment of the now defunct FACA (former Armed Forces of CAR) and their weak operational capacity, contributed to a widespread sense of insecurity and fear in the Haut Mbomou and Mbomou areas with LRA presence. At the time of writing, it was also unclear how the Séléka defeat of the FACA has affected human security; but it is assumed that an already dire situation can only have worsened.

Cross-border issues

The movement of LRA forces across the tri-partite border areas calls for concerted action among the countries in order to generate the security conditions required for rehabilitation and development. The preliminary assessment has not covered military-security issues. However, it is important to have a clear understanding of the military-security environment in which stabilization and rehabilitation interventions will need to be conducted within the three countries and across borders.

Regional cooperation is necessary to harmonize policies on the demobilization of foreign LRA recruits, in particular when the process of reintegration involves the return to the country of origin and the support that needs to be provided to the returnees and the host communities. Presently, there is no legal or operational framework in place that articulates how adult LRA recruits in DRC and CAR should be handled and reintegrated, and those who do come out of the bush can be arrested and subjected to trial at any moment.
There are to date no specific national policies or strategies to deal with the stabilization and recovery of LRA affected areas. The absence of national strategies to deal with the LRA threat and agreed modalities on how to approach stabilization and rehabilitation needs preclude the harmonization of approaches and the setting up of effective cooperation mechanisms among the three countries. It is also a stumbling block for the effective allocation of institutional responsibilities and resources to this task. The net result of the above is delayed action and increased vulnerability of the affected communities and countries in general.

The absence of a concerted operational approach for the stabilization and rehabilitation of LRA-affected areas postpones the development of cross-border strategies on security, reintegration, infrastructure and economic development. Due to lack of access, the mission was unable to make a direct evaluation of conditions along the actual borders between the three countries. As such, it was not possible to assess the strength of the controls, the actual demarcation of the borders, or the actual social and economic interactions among border communities. It is envisaged that these issues will be appraised in more detail during the detailed assessment mission if appropriate access can be secured. Thus, the findings below refer to the information obtained at the regional headquarters of the areas visited as well as a review of secondary documentation and other available information. The follow-up detailed assessment will aim to look at these issues in more detail, from the stabilization and rehabilitation perspective, and assess the potential for introducing improved border management and soft border principles as adopted in the AU Border Program (AUBP).

The AUBP includes soft-border principles aimed at supporting the strengthening of traditional ethnic social capital and informal and formal trading links between the affected areas in ROSS, DRC, CAR, as well as with Uganda, are of strategic importance for the stabilization and rehabilitation of the region. LRA activity, the breakdown of transport infrastructure and the limited coverage of telecommunications are an obstacle to the development of the region. Important transport corridors connecting the ROSS, DRC, CAR and Uganda need to be upgraded as part of an agreed and coherent cross-border strategy.

Natural resources

The preliminary assessment has not been able to substantially cover issues of natural resources, conflict and fragility. The planned full assessment will need to include a more detailed evaluation of the practices observed in the agricultural, forestry, mining and wildlife sectors, to determine the extent of the damage caused to the natural environment and the resulting increased fragility of local communities as well as potential options and approaches to address these issues.

Despite that the LRA-affected areas in the three countries are rich in renewable natural resources, water, land and wildlife, the absence of the state results in the continued application of ineffective and unsustainable agricultural, forestry and mining practices.

It must be noted that while LRA and other armed groups operating under its name are themselves responsible for using unsustainable practices for the exploitation of natural resources, environmental deterioration is also being brought about by the absence of the state and the use of inappropriate practices by the communities, and the operations of illegal entrepreneurs some with the direct support of organized armed groups.

F. Stabilization and rehabilitation priority needs

This section provides a first approximation of the priority needs faced by communities in the affected areas.

The context for stabilization and rehabilitation

Conditions in LRA-affected areas vary significantly. Based on observations made during the preliminary assessment and subsequent analysis and number of differing types of broad contexts can be identified as co-existing in the territory covered by the assessment.

The proposed working definition for area based targeting is as follows:

1. Areas that have not registered incidents in the last years, with local communities and displaced population committed to local integration, and a measure of subsistence through agriculture or small businesses achieved. These conditions are found in areas of Western Equatoria State, ROSS.
2. Areas that have not registered incidents in the last years; but where integration has not taken place or is ongoing, and tensions exist due to unequal access to resources. These conditions are found mainly in areas of Western Equatoria State, ROSS.

3. Areas left by IDPs and not fully resettled, with security concerns regarding the return of LRA activities and difficult access. These conditions are found in ROSS areas close to the DRC border as well as in DRC and CAR.

4. Areas with high security concerns, with practically no presence of the state, where a high percentage of the population is displaced, that are sparsely populated and difficult to access. These conditions are found in DRC and CAR.

Restrictions in access at the moment hinder the mapping of all communities and sub-areas of the LRA affected territory according to the above categories. If the current security and access conditions persist, the detailed assessment will aim to identify a set of selected communities under the above categories for eventual targeting by a stabilization and rehabilitation program.

Given the diversity of conditions found among the communities in the affected areas, program components would need to be applied selectively according to the specific situation in each community.

A challenging environment for the implementation of stabilization and rehabilitation programs. Identified areas of activity only include those that are considered feasible in terms of implementation under present circumstances and for which some form of demand has been expressed by stakeholders in the respective countries.

Limited implementation capacity in the affected areas. A realistic balance needs to be found between demand driven processes and the necessity to undertake appropriate assessments of community stabilization and recovery needs and formulate appropriate plans and funding proposals. Presently, these functions can only be performed with/by external support.

Priority needs

The table below presents the priority needs in the affected areas as identified by the preliminary assessment in consultation with national partners. They include only those whose implementation is considered feasible under the present conditions in the region. As mentioned previously, the Séléka rebellion and collapse of the former government of CAR has significantly changed the outlook in that country. However, the fundamental needs identified remain in an even more precarious and fragile overall situation.

Improved access to telephone and radio networks could maintain essential links between isolated communities and the rest of the region, promoting improved security and social and economic interactions. Additional support is required to make such networks accessible to the population by facilitating the acquisition of mobile telephones and radio sets and the design of affordable tariffs as well as structures to ensure their sustainable operation (Map 2).

Improved access, security and development through transportation and communications. Critical infrastructure interventions could be designed, particularly upgrading and maintenance of trunk roads linking the affected areas to markets and trade routes with neighboring countries, including Uganda, as well as with the national transportation networks in DRC (Province Orientale) and CAR (Bangassu-Bangui) (Map 3).

Enhance local capacities for the implementation of stabilization and rehabilitation actions. Given the isolation of the area, program delivery and follow-up operations and maintenance have to rely to a large extent on local communities and authorities. Therefore, it calls for the implementation of a robust program to enhance the capacity of local authorities and communities for implementation of “community-driven” type of rehabilitation activities. Improved capacity would need to go hand in hand with an increased presence of the state through its institutions for the protection of the population and administration of justice.

Increase community cohesiveness and resilience. At the present stage in the conflict-recovery process in the LRA affected areas, it is necessary to implement activities aiming at increasing community cohesiveness and resilience to cope with present threats and overcome fear. Such activities could contribute to creating a solid base on which to build future recovery activities, both through the improvement of livelihoods and the access to essential services. They need to be accompanied by
more targeted interventions to overcome the trauma experienced by people directly affected by LRA incidents and to support the effective reintegration of the displaced population and people associated with the LRA.

*Provide basic services and livelihood support to stabilized communities on a pilot basis.* There is a dire need for basic services and improved livelihoods in the areas. However, comprehensively addressing these needs is challenging due to restrictions in access, security, delivery capacity and sustainability. Conditions for the cost-effective implementation of such programs are not currently in place. Implementation of such activities would require careful piloting combined with the mobilization of substantial resources to eventually set up full-scale regional and national program delivery structures in a post-LRA era using the pilots to identify effective approaches for achieving this.

*There is value in exploring the feasibility of implementing one or two pilot projects.* Through small projects in scale, if appropriate communities are identified, support to the full chain of livelihood activities and service provision can be applied. If successful, such projects could irradiate good practices to neighboring communities and progressively increase the extension of areas under stable conditions.

*Establish an enabling policy and organizational environment for stabilization and rehabilitation as well as for cross border initiatives.* There is an urgent need for appropriate national institutional arrangements and responsibilities to be defined, given the multiple sectors and type of activities involved in implementing a stabilization and
rehabilitation program. Concurrently, at the regional level, dialogue between the countries of the tri-border area need to focus on cross-border trade and economic development. In principle, this could take place in the context of one of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs). However, it is noted that there is no existing REC to act as a forum for the three countries. For example, ROSS is not a member of ECCAS (but CAR and DRC are), and CAR is not a member of COMESA (but DRC and ROSS are). The assessment notes that the AU could play a convening role in this regard and that the detailed assessment should explore the possible application of the ‘soft border’ conflict management concept promoted by the AU Border Program.

All three countries are members of the International Conference for the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) that has a regional peace and security focus. While ICGLR does not have AU REC status, it is officially recognized by the AU as a Regional Mechanism and it therefore provides an important potential platform for dialogue and discussion on these issues.

Table 3 summarizes the priority needs for stabilization and rehabilitation for each country as identified during the preliminary assessment. The overview of needs "presents only those that the preliminary assessment considers as feasible implementation given current security and access restrictions, and that reflect actual demands as expressed by stakeholders in the three countries".

Despite the fact that some needs might be of relevance for more than one country, e.g. the “formulation of an operational strategy for LRA affected areas,” they are
shown only for those countries where specific demands were expressed, or consultations were held, on the issue.

**G. Additional factors for consideration in developing a strategy for stabilization and rehabilitation**

In addition to contextual issues that condition the actual implementation of stabilization and rehabilitation programs, there are other policy factors that would need to be addressed in defining a regionally and nationally owned strategy:

*Limited knowledge of RCI-LRA.* The interviews conducted during the preliminary assessment with national and regional authorities in the three countries show that there is in general a limited or no knowledge on the AU’s RCI-LRA and its objectives outside a selected group of organizations dealing primarily with DDR issues.

*Lack of clarity on national institutional responsibilities for LRA related stabilization and rehabilitation.* It was not possible to ascertain at what policy and decision-making level rest the responsibility for taking action

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTERVENTION</th>
<th>ROSS</th>
<th>DRC</th>
<th>CAR</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policy – governance:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Formulation of an operational strategy for LRA affected areas</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support to Security Sector Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>Build capacity at the county/sector/commune and state/territory/prefecture level for service delivery</td>
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<tr>
<td>Build the capacity of the police and judiciary: rule of law and presence of the state</td>
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<tr>
<td>Legal framework and protocols for escapees: reception-verification-relocation/repatriation-integration</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Social:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Delivery basic services: health, education, water, sanitation, and promotion of housing construction</td>
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<tr>
<td>Psycho-social support and counseling to ex-combatants and abductees in the process of reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>Psycho-social support to local communities affected by LRA - counseling on hosting displaced persons</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support community structures at village level to strengthen cohesion-resilience, and reduce vulnerabilities</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Economic:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Trunk roads linking affected areas to rest of the county and neighboring countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>Delivery of secondary transport infrastructure: rural productivity and security</td>
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<tr>
<td>Telecommunications infrastructure and access to telephones and radio sets</td>
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<tr>
<td>Livelihood improvement programs focused on agriculture, livestock, forestry and fishing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Promotion of private sector investment in the agricultural and forestry sectors</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support to the constitution of associations to increase productivity &amp; development activities</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Security:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Awareness, information dissemination and social support on LRA activities, build trust and eradicate fear</td>
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on LRA-related issues in the three countries. There is not a single national agency or institution in any of the three countries taking the lead in relation LRA related stabilization and rehabilitation. The only institutions presently engaged are the SPLA and FACA in the security-military area. This situation limits the ownership/commitment of the country with the strategy and follow-up. It is necessary to bridge existing gaps in national political ownership in preparation for the detailed assessment and the formulation of the strategy.

The limits of national DDR institutional competencies. Current DDR structures might not have the capacity, mandate or appropriate features to deal with LRA-related stabilization and rehabilitation activities. The mandate of national DDR organizations normally includes the implementation of individual reintegration initiatives. Some DDR organizations are further promoting the setting up of reintegration and recovery programs with the host communities. However, these actions are limited in coverage and scope. They do not amount to the implementation of a broad set of multi-sectoral activities required for stabilization and rehabilitation. The identification of an appropriate institutional counterpart and framework for LRA-related activities is necessary in each of the countries and for cross-border coordination.

No expectations on the cease of LRA-related violence in the short-term. Given the dispersed nature of LRA forces and its indicted leadership and barring a still elusive military victory or surrender, for all practical purposes all the affected areas in DRC and CAR continue to be subject to incidents of violence and armed conflict related. There are no initiatives to conduct a dialogue between the LRA and the governments of the countries where they are active. Thus, there currently are no immediate prospects of an end violence and arrangements for DDR of LRA forces - neither through military means nor through dialogue.

Need to deal with the effects of activities by armed groups and delinquents operating under the name of LRA. The perception of insecurity in the ROSS-DRC-CAR tri-border area, while primarily related to LRA, is also the result of the activities by other groups acting under the name of LRA, banditry, and miscellaneous armed groups in the region. Thus, the strategy needs to develop a broader view of insecurity and violence in the region, including those directly created by the LRA.

Participation of DRC in a stabilization and rehabilitation strategy. There is the risk of DRC not joining a broader stabilization and rehabilitation program in view that the government of DRC neither recognizes the presence of LRA in its territory nor has joined the command structure of AU-RTF. Negotiations need to be conducted to ensure the participation of DRC in the strategy and it might be necessary to find an appropriate approach to incorporate DRC’s views on the activities of other armed groups in the area.

Collaboration with international organizations and donors in the completion of the assessment. The implementation of stabilization and rehabilitation programs under the umbrella of the AU will require close collaboration with international actors as the UN and key donors. It is recommended that the detailed assessment is conducted following a collaborative process with the full engagement of national and international stakeholders to ensure ownership by national authorities and buy-in by donors.

Security and Justice sector reform. While it is not the specific objective of the assessment, ongoing initiatives for security and justice sector reform (SJR), particularly in CAR, should be taken into account in the design of LRA related strategies.

Political support for community-driven processes. Since the implementation of the activities proposed in the strategy would demand a strong element of community-based processes and the collaboration with local and international implementing partners, it would be necessary to ensure the full support of the national governments to this approach and the issuing of the necessary directives to decentralized authorities to facilitate this modality of work.

Area-based approach and strategic, coherent and cross-border funding mechanism. There is a need to balance individual targeting including private benefits, with community and area based targeting including public goods. Country plans and programs of multiple bilateral and multilateral agencies in principle could be tuned to achieve this. However, there is considerable variation in the specific implementation strategies, processes, institutional arrangements and funding mechanisms to implement such activities. Moreover, almost current
responses are almost all conceived and executed on a ‘country-by-country’ basis. This is a necessity to and even desirable to ensure national level coordination, development partner harmonization and alignment with national effort. However, the preliminary assessment finds that cross-border trade and economic development and financing are crucial to ensure a strategically coherent response to stabilization and recovery needs.

H. Vision and preliminary Transitional Results Framework (TRF)

A proposed vision for stabilization and rehabilitation in the affected areas

A medium-term vision for the improvement of conditions in the LRA affected areas of ROSS, DRC and CAR would consider an area where security has been achieved and illegal armed groups, including LRA, have been demobilized and its members reintegrated in their places of origin; with stable local authorities capable to manage development in their areas of competence; and self-reliant and cohesive communities with capacity to plan and take action for their development, and with national government collaborating for the development of the tri-border area.

Within this context, and as argued above, a three-year vision and TRF would ensure that the proposed actions can better adjust to the evolution of conditions on the ground. Therefore, the preliminary assessment proposes a three year vision for consideration by national governments and the AU:

Agreed Scenarios moving forward

On February 19, 2013, the AFTCS team met in Addis Ababa with the Special Envoy of the African Union for the LRA issue. Representatives from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the UN Office to the African Union (UNOAU) attended. The purpose of the meeting was (i) to discuss the draft findings of the preliminary needs assessment and receive feedback and comments, and (ii) to discuss with the AU the next steps. It was agreed to proceed along two scenarios that need concurrent implementation.

Scenario 1: contributing to an immediate early recovery response that needs to occur under the present circumstances where the LRA remains a destabilizing factor and military operations against it are ongoing. This scenario requires close external coordination with the UN plans under preparation by the UN Special Representative (UNSR) for Central Africa and head of UNOCA, Abou Moussa.

Scenario 2: a longer-term development-oriented response premised on the assumption that current regional and international efforts will result in ending the LRA security threats. This scenario would be tilted towards Regional economic integration as an important strategy for addressing systemic state fragility through a cross-border stabilization trade and economic development (CBSD) initiative that applies AU Border Program (AUPB) principles and develops package focused on social cohesions, institutional and economic development and growth based on a vision for stabilization and development shared between the three currently affected countries and Uganda.

These scenarios need to be pursued concurrently and both presuppose that the governments of DRC, ROSS and CAR are willing to fully engage in the assessment process. The AU Envoy for the LRA stated in February 2013 that African leadership will be provided on national programs and that he personally would take this forward together with the UN SRSG.
Immediate early recovery response

The proposed objectives and outcomes presented in the TRF below reflect the findings of the assessment and its evaluation of what can be done under present circumstances and while the military operations against the LRA are ongoing (Scenario 1).

The assessment is aware that the generic description of some of the outcomes can be similar to those presented in other programming and fund raising instruments, such as the UNDAF, CAF, humanitarian CAPs, and the country plans and programs of multiple bilateral and multilateral agencies. It is also understood that there might be a great variation in the specific implementation strategies, processes, institutional arrangements and funding mechanisms to implement such activities. As such, it has not been the aim of the preliminary assessment to provide detailed linkages between its proposed outcomes and other planned or ongoing initiatives that appear to have common aims, therefore:

Once the detailed assessment goes into the specific design of actions required to produce the proposed outcomes, it is recommended to ascertain their compatibility with other initiatives and assess the convenience of their implementation as part of such initiatives or in a complementary manner.

The conditions generally accepted for the engagement in transitional support measures are not fully present in the area of assessment: a sudden breakthrough in the political and peace transition and ongoing transition negotiations among involved parties that demand concrete stabilization measures.

On the other hand, lack of action can provide fertile ground to exacerbate existing conflicts and lead a further breakdown of community/social structures, as well as to the deepening of their alienation from the rest of the country(ies). Thus,

It is recommended to undertake priority actions in those limited areas and sectors where there is a window of opportunity for implementing programs that can contribute to create cells of stability from which further actions can irradiate to other areas.

Present conditions call for a practical and limited approach to the design of stabilization and rehabilitation activities until LRA activities have been contained or a cease of violence agreed upon, and the affected population is able to re-engage in longer-term social and economic development processes. Given the fluidity of the political and security situation in the three countries:

It is recommended: that a medium-term, 3 years, vision and strategy is designed “to lay the foundation” for broader stabilization and recovery interventions in the future

Long-term development and cross-border initiatives

An initial two-three-year vision and strategy will also facilitate the elaboration of longer-term development of Scenario 2 that would take into account the evolution of the situation on the ground. At this stage, conditions do not yet permit full access, however, preparing for longer-term development can proceed in a number of ways. Firstly, the AU can incorporate the LRA affected areas to its Post-Conflict Reconstruction (PCRD) and AU Border Program (AUBP), while the development partners could support such initiatives technically, including through economic sector work (ESW), spatial analysis and support to regional integration.

Towards a shared Transitional Results Framework

The proposed initial vision to support reintegration and development interventions in the LRA affected areas will be anchored in a Transitional Results Framework (TRF) that will be structured as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vision</th>
<th>Political (Priority Objective)</th>
<th>Security (Priority Objective)</th>
<th>Economic (Priority Objective)</th>
<th>Social (Priority Objective)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cluster/Sector/Theme</td>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>1st period</td>
<td>2nd period</td>
<td>Costs/Budget</td>
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<tr>
<td>Actions or Outputs at Key Intervals</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st period</th>
<th>2nd period</th>
<th>Costs/Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
The final TFF will (i) form the basis for the formulating cross-border and in-country programs responding to stabilization and rehabilitation needs in the areas affected by the Lord’s Resistance Army of the Republic of Congo, Central African Republic and Republic of South Sudan. Furthermore, (ii) fundraising under the auspices of the African Union.

To achieve national anchoring and African leadership, the detailed ToR will be prepared during consultations with national LRA focal points and under AU auspices (see page 9). A draft-for-discussion TRF that is intended to be the basis for initial discussion with national stakeholders. At this early stage, the draft TRF is a tool to structure dialogue and should not be used out of context or for other purposes. A number of transitional objectives are proposed as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4: Summary of Transitional Objectives (draft for discussion)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political &amp; Governance</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National operational strategies are applied to eradicate LRA related activities and for the stabilization and rehabilitation of the affected areas, and local authorities with an increase capacity to respond to stabilization and recovery demands.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IV. Next steps

The immediate next steps are as follows:

- Consultations with UNOCA
- Identification and organization of meeting with national focal points of the DRC, ROSS and CAR (Office of the AU LRA Envoy).

Meeting objective:
- Presentation of preliminary findings;
- Elaboration of TRF;
- Preparation of terms of reference for full assessment.

Implementation of full assessment pending availability of funds and clearance by senior management.