DDR 20 Years Later

Historical review of the long-term impact of post-independence DDR in Southern Africa

Guy Lamb
Safety and Violence Initiative
University of Cape Town

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INTRODUCTION

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programmes in Southern Africa have had diverse results since the end of World War II. Some have been innovative and remarkably successful. Others have been glaringly ineffective, with the result that many ex-combatants have been unable to secure employment, and/or make the necessary social and psychological adjustments to make the successful transition to civilian life. As a result, these individuals have become marginalised members of society, and live in conditions of abject poverty. To date there has been no thorough comparative analysis of the successes and challenges of African DDR programmes and their long-term impacts.

The majority of Southern African post-independence DDR processes took place between the late-1970s and the late-1990s. Given that more than two decades have past since establishment of these programmes, a review of these Southern African DDR initiatives has the potential to provide useful insights into the possible long-term outcomes of current TDRP supported DDR initiatives. Such a review could also inform the development of supplemental TDRP programmatic options for the World Bank’s Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program (TDRP), especially with regards to the role, functions and sustainability of national DDR commissions and reintegration programming.

There have essentially been two categories of demobilisation and reintegration in the post-independence Southern Africa. The first and most significant have been established within the context of peace processes following a long period of armed conflict or civil war. The specific countries in this regard are: Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe. Central to these armed conflicts were liberation movements either pitted against a racist and authoritarian government (Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe) or against rebel groups that had support from other governments or domestic sources of sustenance (Angola and Mozambique). The second category of demobilisation and reintegration was part of a process of security sector reform and/or military downsizing, which took place in the following Southern Africa countries: Lesotho, Malawi, Tanzania, Swaziland and Zambia.

This paper will provide an examination of the demobilisation and reintegration processes in post-independence Southern Africa, which will be informed by publicly available information and publications. The objective of such an exercise is to establish if there are any common developments or trends that have implications for current DDR programming. However, the quality of quantity of publications and documentation varies considerably from country-to-country, and in a number of cases there is very limited information available about the welfare of demobilised former combatants decades after the conclusion of the DDR programme. Inevitably, this will result in an uneven comparative analysis.

DEMOBILISATION AND REINTEGRATION IN THE AFTERMATH OF CIVIL WAR AND/OR LIBERATION STRUGGLE

Angola

Historical background

Angolans had to fight for their independence from Portugal. This involved armed struggle with the Portuguese colonial forces from 1961 until 1975 when Portugal eventually abandoned its Southern African colonies due to a domestic political and economic crisis.
Three distinct Angolan liberation movements had been pitted against the Portuguese colonial administration, namely: the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola – Party of Labour (MPLA); the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA); and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).

Shortly after independence civil war broke out between the three liberation movements, which also saw the direct combat involvement of Cuban and South African troops, as well as material and financial support from the United States of America (USA) and the Soviet Union. Angola also became an area of operation for a number of liberation movements from other Southern African countries, such as Namibia and South Africa.

During the 1990s there were two brief episodes of respite from civil war with the signing of two peace agreements, in 1991 and again in 1994. However, full-scale armed conflict resumed in 1998 between the MPLA and UNITA. In 2002, the assassination of Jonas Savimbi, the leader of UNITA during a military operation brought closure to more than four decades of armed conflict in Angola.

Failed DDR: 1991-98

In 1991 the Bicesse Peace Accords were brokered between the main conflicting parties in Angola, with national elections and disarmament and demobilization being a key component. Approximately 135,000 combatants were earmarked for demobilisation. Nonetheless there was a distinct lack of trust between the MPLA and UNITA, which resulted in both parties not being fully committed to actively reducing the size of their military capacity. Both sides maintained clandestine armed forces and arms caches, with the MPLA openly establishing a paramilitary police force. These developments, combined with inadequately resourced and dysfunctional logistical arrangements for demilitarisation, did not bode well for DDR in Angola at the time. Many ex-combatants absconded from the demobilization camps along with their weapons (Kingma, 2004: 138). National elections were held in 1992, with the MPLA receiving the majority vote. UNITA rejected the election outcome and remobilised its armed forces, resulting in the return to full-scale war.

The second peace agreement, the Lusaka Protocol, was negotiated in 1994. This agreement also entailed a significant demobilization commitment, with a total of some 76,000 individuals from both the government (MPLA) armed forces and UNITA being targeted for demobilization within the context of a UN mission. By April 1998, close to 50,000 combatants had been demobilised, and 11,000 UNITA cadres had been incorporated into the newly created Angolan armed forces (Kingma, 2004: 138-139).

However, there was speculation that a large number of individuals that underwent demobilization were actually surrogates for authentic UNITA combatants, with Jonas Savimbi retaining his key military assets (Human Rights Watch, 1999: 33). In addition, it has been suggested that many of the other demobilised UNITA combatants continued to retain strong links with UNITA military commanders. The MPLA-government forces were only also non-compliant with the demobilization process and deployed substantially fewer soldiers for demobilization than the Lusaka Accords prescribed. Political tensions between the leadership and UNITA in 1998 lead to sporadic armed incidents between both parties, which eventually escalated into renewed civil war in December 1998, shattering the fragile Lusaka Accord.
**DDR post-2002**

Following the end of the civil war in Angola in 2002 a DDR programme for UNITA ex-combatants was initiated. The General Programme for Demobilization expedited the post-2002 DDR process and Reintegration (GPDR), with the Institute of Socio-Professional Reintegration for ex-Combatants (IRSEM) being established to be the government body to assist ex-combatants with their reintegration into society.

Close to 80,000 ex-combatants, together with 30,000 dependents, were unilaterally demobilised and relocated between April and June 2002. Approximately 5,000 UNITA personnel were incorporated into the national police force. However, the DDR approach has been described as being “ad hoc” and there were challenges with regards the delivering of the demobilization kits (Gomes and Parsons, 2003: 38-39). At this time the government armed forces were left largely untouched.

Between 2002 and 2008 the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) facilitated a DDR process in Angola through a national DDR commission that targeted the national armed forces. 97,390 beneficiaries received demobilisation support, while 52,721 and 92,297 beneficiaries received reinsertion and reintegration support respectively. On average, each ex-combatant received US$700 in direct financial reintegration assistance. A 2008 study by the MDRP revealed that 61% of ex-combatants were self-employed; 35% were unemployed, 4% were formally employed; 95% had access to agriculture land; 98% had established families and 93% considered themselves reintegrated into their communities of destination (MDRP, 2008).

A Ministry of Ex-combatants and Motherland Veterans has been established to oversee the reintegration process, which included the administration of government pensions for eligible former combatants. However, officials responsible for the disbursement of the pensions, particularly in rural areas have been implicated in corrupt practices. For example, in August 2011 it was reported that the Minister of Former Combatants and Motherland Veterans, Kundi Paihama (Angola Press Agency, 2011):

> “Called for a major transparency in the granting of pensions to former combatants...[and] appealed to members of the provincial departments of his sector to put an end to embezzlement of funds and goods for ex-combatants on excuses of banking systems and delay in salary processing...He recommended the officials in charge to cooperate with the Ministry in creating technical conditions for an appropriate assistance to ex-combatants. The minister pledged to strictly monitor the sector in order to meet the purposes of improving the social condition of the ex-combatants, vowing that strong action will be taken against those caught in wrong doings. He also recommended those in charge to help ex-combatants to fill up the documents required in the process and release all information on the step for access to the pension.” (sic)

The pension issue appears to have not been adequately resolved following the Minister’s appeal, as in mid-2012, hundreds of disgruntled ex-combatants and war widows staged protests in Luanda over non-payment of government pensions. According to one protestor: “Either they pay or don’t pay. We're tired of talking.” Some ex-combatants marched on the US embassy, with one military veteran being quoted as saying: “We came to demonstrate in
front of the American embassy because our government is not hearing us.” The police who used tear gas, dogs and water cannons eventually dispersed the protestors (De Morais, 2012).

**Mozambique**

*Historical background*

Like Angola, Mozambique had to resort to violence to achieve independence, and in 1962 the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Frelimo), which was the entity that unified three Mozambican liberation movements, initiated armed struggle against Portuguese forces. A military coup d’etat in Portugal resulted in the colonial administration granting Mozambican independence in 1975.

Directly following the process of decolonization the Mozambican government established a new military. Such a move was deemed imperative given the hostile approach that the governments in South Africa and Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) had towards the new government in Mozambique. Given concerns around command-and-control the new Mozambican government opted for a force entirely constituted from 10,000 Frelimo cadres. In addition, universal military conscription became mandatory for all citizens between the ages of 18 and 35. By 1980 the size of the Mozambican military had swelled to 70,000. However, approximately 30,000 individuals that had served in the Portuguese armed forces were excluded from the new military and were demobilised without benefits (Malache et al, 2005: 162-165).

In 1975 a rebel group emerged, the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Renamo), which drew its manpower mainly from disgruntled demobilised soldiers from the colonial military and Frelimo dissidents. For all intents and purposes, Renamo was created by the Rhodesian security forces to destabilise Mozambique as a response to the Frelimo government support of the Zimbabwe liberation movement and its armed struggle. After Zimbabwe achieved independence Renamo’s principal benefactor became the apartheid government in South Africa (Vines, 1991). Civil war continued in Mozambique until 1992 when a peace agreement was reached between the warring parties (General Peace Accord).

**Post-1992 DDR**

The DDR programme in Mozambique was established as part of the General Peace Accord (1992), in which the UN played a facilitation role through the specific UN Mozambique mission (UNOMOZ). By 1994 92,890 individuals had been demobilised of which 70,910 were from Frelimo/government armed forces and 21,890 from Renamo. There were also approximately 215,000 dependents linked to the demobilised ex-combatants (Kingma, 2004: 140).

The Commission for Reintegration was established to co-ordinate the reintegration process, which focused predominantly on providing basic vocational training. Cash payments were also provided to ex-combatants for an initial period of two years. Pensions were provided to disabled soldiers and to the war veterans that had served under the colonial administration (and then joined Renamo) (Kingma, 2004: 141). It was clear from the onset that the Mozambican economy, which had been depressed by the civil war, would not be able to absorb the vast majority of ex-combatants. Hence, given that most ex-combatants intended to settle in rural areas, the reintegration programme encouraged ex-combatants to engage in
subsistence agriculture and provided them with farming equipment in this regard (Coelho and Vines, 1994).

**Lingering reintegration challenges**

A September 2010 study by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) reported that almost 20 years after the end of the civil war, “a large number of these ex-combatants remain unemployed and live in dire poverty, never having acquired sufficient skills to obtain work or become self-employed”. The ISS study also revealed that in 2009, on the eve of a national election, the Mozambican government established a new reintegration directorate (in the Ministry of Women and Social Action) in attempt to assist with further reintegration of ex-combatants (who had been agitating for better benefits). A key issue that this directorate has had to deal with is that of dissatisfaction over access to, and the value of ex-combatant pensions (Alusala and Dye, 2010).

Since 1992 Renamo’s leader, Afonso Dhlakama has frequently threatened that the former rebel group would once more take-up arms against the Mozambican government. Such statements have typically been linked perceived political dominance of Frelimo and Renamo’s increasing marginalisation in this regard. Tensions between Frelimo and Renamo intensified in late-2012 following the establishment of a Renamo military-style camp in the Gorongosa Mountains, which was subsequently cordoned-off by government security forces. In the first quarter of 2013 Renamo allegedly staged a series of attacks on civilian and police targets, including a passenger bus. At the time of writing, Frelimo was seeking to enter into discussions with Renamo to find a peaceful solution.

**Namibia**

**Historical background**

The Namibian territory was annexed and colonised by Germany in the 1880s, with the German colonial administration using violence and repression to subjugate the indigenous population. During World War I South Africa, at the request of Britain, invaded the Namibian territory and overthrew the German authorities. At the Treaty of Versailles (following the end of World War I), it was determined that German colonies would become the responsibility of Britain, France or their allies, under a mandate system administered by the League of Nations. In 1920 Namibia was entrusted to South Africa on the behalf of Britain as a mandated territory. With the creation of the United Nations (UN) in the mid-1940s, the South African government lobbied for Namibia to be incorporated into South Africa, but the UN rejected this request.

South Africa continued to occupy Namibia (and implement apartheid policies) until the late-1980s despite international pressure for it to relinquish control over the territory. From the early 1960s resistance to South African rule was largely driven by the South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO), which initiated insurgent military action in the mid-1960s. It established an armed wing: the South West African Liberation Army, which was renamed the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) in 1973. In response, South Africa militarised its governance of Namibia (particularly in the northern regions), created a surrogate military force, the South West African Territorial Force (SWATF), and implemented a comprehensive counter-insurgency strategy.
In 1975 Angola became independent and a Marxist government was installed that was hostile to South Africa and its occupation of Namibia, as well as highly supportive of SWAPO. South Africa subsequently launched a series of military operations into Angola, which lasted from 1975 until 1988. By 1988 with neither conflicting party able to achieve significant military advantage, and the Cold War drawing to a close, the conflict over Namibia’s independence was brought to end via a ceasefire and negotiated settlement.

Namibia achieved independence from South Africa in 1990, which saw the withdrawal of all South African military and administration personnel. Following the process of drafting a Constitution, democratic elections were held in which SWAPO received the majority of votes.

**Creation of the Namibian Defence Force**

During the period of political transition in Namibia it was decided that the integration of PLAN and SWATF forces into a new military, the Namibia Defence Force (NDF) would take place on the basis of parity (50-50). This agreement was realised at the top echelons of the military structure, with two of the four heads of directorates at the Ministry of Defence, originating from PLAN, and two from the former SWATF forces. The commanding officer of the 1st Infantry Battalion was a former PLAN commander, and the second in command was a former SWATF captain (Nathan, 1990: 9). Du Pisani (2004: 82) summarises the significance of the manner in which the NDF was created:

“Symbolically, [the NDF’s] founding legitimised the politics of national reconciliation and nation-building. It was within the NDF that former adversaries were able to interact peacefully as Namibians, citizens of the new state. In addition to its important symbolic role, the NDF also provided the state with coercive capacity, which in turn helped the newly-elected government to consolidate power”.

The selection of personnel for the NDF was based on both theoretical and practical examination methods. This proved to be a major barrier to entry for many illiterate former PLAN insurgents. It seemed as though only those who had been given the opportunity to study and train abroad achieved attractive appointments in the NDF or elsewhere in government. This led to a growing sense of resentment among many ex-combatants (Preston, 1997: 457).

After 1990 the parity agreement was set aside. The Ministry of Defence adopted an unofficial policy limiting the numbers of former SWATF members in the NDF to ten per cent. By 1993, the only NDF commander with a SWATF background was the Director of the military school (Preston, 1997: 459-460). By the end of 1994 approximately 80% of the 6,500 strong NDF were former-PLAN cadres. The remaining NDF members were either new recruits or former-SWATF, whose expertise and professionalism was valued (Colletta et al, 1996: 149).

**Demobilization and reintegration**

Given the relatively small size of the NDF, an approximate 65,000 ex-combatants from PLAN, SWATF and Koevoet (the former police counter-insurgency force) were earmarked for demobilization. However, neither the international community nor the new Namibian
government envisaged that any reintegration assistance would be necessary for those ex-combatants that had not been included in the NDF. It was naively assumed that civilian and military returnees (from exile), and former SWATF and Koevoet personnel, would re integrate into civilian life on their own accord (with the exception of disabled veterans who received specialised assistance). Consequently many former combatants express their grievances through public demonstrations.

The Namibian government, realising the potential security threat that a large group of unemployed and dissatisfied individuals with military training represented, devised a cash payment scheme and vocational training programmes (in the form of development brigades), and including ex-combatants in the general refugee resettlement programme (Colletta et al, 1996: 129). The aim of the Namibian Development Brigade was to provide training for, amongst others, unskilled former combatants, in agricultural production and construction.

In 1993 the Development Brigade was converted into a parastatal, the Development Brigade Corporation (DBC), which branched out into the realm of small business development, but has had limited success, and has been embroiled in scandals involving financial mismanagement and corruption. Many of the DBC subsidiary companies were eventually declared insolvent and the corporation was disbanded in 2001 (Metsola, 2006: 1121). In 1995, the funding of ex-combatant reintegration became the responsibility of the National Planning Commission (NPC), which established the Socioeconomic Integration Programme for Ex-Combatants (SIPE).

These reintegration efforts only had limited success in addressing these grievances, and by the late-1990s, many of the former rank-and-file combatants who had not been incorporated into the NDF remained unemployed. Between 1997 and 1998 there were a series of ex-combatant protests. Dissatisfied former PLAN combatants staged a sit-in in the parliamentary gardens, while former-Koevoet members threatened to destabilise the country if their demands were not met.

In response the Namibian Cabinet set up a technical committee to address the ex-combatant problem, and recommended that government employ all eligible ex-combatants. This process was widely referred to as the ‘Peace Project’. Some 9,188 were given posts in the military, and others were assimilated into the Ministry of Home Affairs, mainly the Special Field Force (SFF). The Ministry of Prisons and Correctional Services and the Ministry of Environment and Tourism employed 2,058, primarily as prison and game wardens. Five other ministries absorbed 3,446 ex-combatants and fighters (Metsola, 2006: 1122). In 2006 the Ministry of Veterans Affairs was established, which, according to its website, seeks: “to promote and implement projects and programmes, which address the socio-economic needs of the veterans, including keeping the history of the national liberation struggle alive.”

Some ex-combatants that were part of the SFF have been implicated in cases of excessive use of force and human rights violations. These took place in the in the Kavango and Caprivi regions in the late-1990s during a security force crackdown on insurgencies by a secessionist groups. The government established inquiries into allegations of abuse and disciplinary actions were taken against some of the perpetrators (Lamb, 2002). Curiously, in 2007 members of the SFF were implicated in the assault of 14 protesting former-PLAN combatants. These ex-combatants had staged a protest outside the office of the Ministry of Veterans Affairs demanding NS$500,000 in compensation for their contribution to Namibia’s liberation struggle (SAPA, 2007).
The Veterans Act (No. 2 of 2008) was promulgated in 2008 with the key objectives being (amongst others): “the establishment of projects for the benefit of and assistance to veterans and dependants of veterans; to provide for the integration of pension benefits of veterans”. The ex-combatant target group in terms of this Act unemployed or destitute: ex-PLAN combatants; former SWAPO political prisoners; and those who “consistently and persistently participated or engaged in any political, diplomatic or under-ground activity in furtherance of the liberation struggle; (and dependents of deceased veterans as defined in the Act).

By February 2013 the Ministry of Veterans Affairs deemed that 24,457 persons who had registered with the Ministry were entitled to government benefits, including funding for economic projects (Nyangove, 2013). However, veterans from SWATF and Koevoet did not qualify for benefits in terms of this legislation, and consequently the Old South African Soldiers in Namibia organisation and the Namibia War Veterans Trust (with more than 20,000 registered ex-combatants) have lobbied the South African government for benefits and compensation (Nkala, 2012). To date their efforts have been unsuccessful.

South Africa

Historical background

South Africa has a long history of disenfranchising black people dating back to the colonial era. Racial policies of segregation gave way to an official policy of apartheid in 1948. In 1961, the African National Congress (ANC), a popular political movement announced its decision to adopt a strategy of armed struggle (as one of the strategies to bring down the apartheid regime). The ANC’s armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), was subsequently established, however, it was relatively small and unsophisticated in comparison to the South African military – the South African Defence Force (SADF). However, MK operatives did, to a large extent, engage in active military combat and collaborated with the armed factions of like-minded liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe.

A radical youth faction that had broken away from the ANC formed the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) in 1959. In September 1961 the PAC made the decision to establish underground cells and engage in armed struggle. The PAC’s armed wing, Poqo, was subsequently established. Poqo was later renamed the Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA). In the 1960s the PAC’s armed wing engaged in armed attacks against policemen, representatives of traditional authority in the former black homelands, perceived PAC dissidents and white civilians (TRC, 1998: 370-71).

In December 1991, nineteen parties gathered at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa to negotiate the political future of South Africa. Given their differences, negotiations proved difficult, but by the end of 1993, parties had reached consensus on a number of critical issues, including a date for the first democratic elections. In April 1993, formal military negotiations between the SADF and MK were initiated. The negotiations focused on the control of the defence force during the transition, the creation of a new defence force and the integration of the various armed forces into this new defence force (the South African National Defence Force - SANDF). APLA did not participate in the military negotiations and only formally suspended the armed struggle in 1994.

These military negotiations envisaged that South Africa’s post-liberation military, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), would be an amalgamation of statutory forces
(SADF and homeland militaries) and non-statutory forces (MK and APLA). It was also agreed that a process of demobilization and reintegration of thousands of ex-combatants would follow on the military integration process from the SANDF.

This was not the first example of twentieth century demobilization in South Africa, as the South African government had deployed troops during both the First and Second World Wars to support the war effort against Germany and her allies. Limited reintegration assistance was provided to servicemen on their return to South Africa.

**Military integration: Creation of the SANDF**

Between 1993 and 1994, all South African statutory (conventional military formations) and non-statutory (armed wings of liberation movements) forces were required to submit a list of their personnel to a centralised list called the Certified Personnel Register (CPR), which was administered by the South African Department of Defence. This list was to form the basis of the military integration, as well as the demobilisation and reintegration of targeted ex-combatants. However, MK and APLA experienced difficulties in compiling their relevant lists as they had not kept detailed records of their members, many ex-combatants had used pseudonyms during the armed struggle, and MK and APLA experienced difficulties in determining those categories of members that could be defined as “combatants”.

The content of the CPR was controversial as thousands of ANC and PAC members who had not been included on the list claimed that they had served in MK or APLA. Consequently, these individuals were not entitled to any financial payments or other benefits, and in effect had to self-demobilize. According to Motumi and McKenzie (1998: 189-190) the final numerical breakdown of the CPR by type of armed force at that time was as follows:

**Table 1: Certified Personnel Register Data**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Armed Force</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Statutory forces:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former SADF (excluding part-time forces, but including civilians)</td>
<td>90 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former TBVC (homeland) defence forces</td>
<td>11 039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>101 039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-statutory forces:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK</td>
<td>28 888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APLA</td>
<td>6 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>34 888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>135 927</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Following the completion of the CPR, integration of the former combatants into the SANDF was initiated. It consisted of four stages (Mokalobe, 1999: 13):

i) Ex-combatants were regionally mustered and then assembled at specified military bases.

ii) Ex-combatants then appeared before the placement board that consisted of different armed forces and the British Military Assistance Training Team (BMATT). Those without formal military training or sufficient military qualifications did not undergo integration and were released from the military.

iii) If required, ex-combatants were provided with bridging training and orientation.
iv) Ex-combatants were placed into different arms of service.

The official integration process of personnel into the SANDF began in April 1994, following intensive negotiations between the leadership of the various armed forces. During these negotiations it was decided that the SANDF would include the following numerical breakdown of armed forces: MK (17 000), APLA (6 000), Homeland militaries (10 000) and the SADF (85 000) (Creative Associates, ND).

The integration of MK and APLA was characterised by dissatisfaction over ranks, conditions of service and salaries. MK and APLA soldiers received lower salaries and ranks compared to their white counterparts. In addition, former non-statutory soldiers were not initially issued with uniforms, had to endure substandard living conditions, and were not provided with pensions as had been previously promised (Creative Associates, ND). Consequently, it is plausible that a significant number MK and APLA members may have been dissuaded, or even prevented from pursuing military careers, and therefore opted for demobilisation packages.

**Demobilization**

The official demobilisation process was initiated in April 1995. The aim of this process was the voluntary release of ex-combatants (principally from MK and APLA) who were members of the SANDF, but either did not wish to or were unable (due to physical disability) to serve in the full-time force. It involved the provision of gratuities, which varied according to the number of years of military service, from a minimum of R12,734 (US$3,499) to a maximum of R40,657 (US$11,156). Soldiers undergoing demobilization were also encouraged to participate in two weeks of voluntary counselling and eighteen months of vocational training through the Department of Defence’s Service Corps (SC). Most demobilized soldiers however, refrained from entering the SC and rather returned to impoverished communities where opportunities for employment were severely limited (Motumi and McKenzie, 1998: 194).

It was anticipated that the SC would train close to 22,000 personnel between 1995 and 2001. However, the SC was plagued by numerous problems. Firstly, it was established without effective planning and training programmes were designed without an adequate analysis of existing skills among demobilised soldiers, as well as their career aspirations. Secondly, no labour market analysis was undertaken, which resulted in many trainees acquiring skills with which they could not secure jobs in their place of residence. Thirdly, tensions existed between the SC Head Office, which was administered predominantly by former MK soldiers, and regional offices, which were run by former SADF and TVBC soldiers. Fourthly, the maintenance of a military culture within the SC undermined the culture of learning. There were a number of official inquiries into the performance of the SC, all of which have found the SC to have significantly under-performed and been ineffective in fulfilling its mandate.

In December 1996, the South African Parliament passed the Demobilisation Act, which extended demobilisation to SANDF members who could not be integrated because of their age, level of education, health, or individuals who chose not to continue in the employment of the military because of dissatisfaction with their rank after placement in the SANDF. It involved the provision of gratuities, which varied according to the number of years of military services. (DOD, 1998: 72). At this time, a total of 3,770 soldiers had been formally demobilised from the SANDF.
Also in 1996 the Special Pension Act No. 69 of 1996 (which specifically targeted MK and APLA military veterans) was enacted to provide a modest pension to those former combatants were 35 years or older on the commencement date of the Act, with monthly payments ranging from R500 to R5000 depending on the age of the beneficiary. The Centre for Conflict Resolution study (2003) (see below) found that only 8% of their sample received special pensions.

Following these processes of integration and demobilisation, the SANDF initiated a process of downsizing or rationalisation in which it sought to reduce its personnel numbers by an additional 20,000 to a total force of 70,000. This rationalisation process also included a noteworthy demobilisation and reintegration dimension where voluntary retrenchment or severance packages combined with Service Corps training.

By 2006 it was estimated that the total ex-combatant population in South Africa was 80,000. However, poor record-keeping by the ANC and PAC of information on their combatants, combined with a lack of consensus over the definition of a combatant, particularly with regards to non-statutory forces, has made it impossible to verify this estimated figure.

**Reintegration**


Cock (1993) found, from a survey of 180 respondents during the informal demobilisation process of the period of transition, that most were unemployed. Many indicated that they had been unable to find employment due to poor education and/or no skills base, and a lack of work experience. Cock also found that a substantial number suffered from psychological problems.

Liebenberg and Roefs (2001) undertook a questionnaire based study, and used a sample of 307 ex-combatants (of which 66% of their sample stated that they were from MK or APLA). They found that 37% of respondents to be unemployed. Gear (2002) undertook a study that was based on in-depth interviews and focus group discussions. Gear concluded that many ex-combatants were experiencing major difficulties integrating into civilian life, and perceived themselves to have been “wished away,” as “former superiors and respective communities now tend to distance themselves from the people who not so long ago, they urged into armed action.”

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (2003) used a representative sample of 410 MK and APLA ex-combatants from all nine of South Africa’s provinces. The survey found that 66% per cent of respondents were unemployed, with most either being dependent on family members to provide them with money, food and shelter, or engaged in *ad hoc* informal sector activities such as hawking. Nine per cent were directly dependent on some form of pension or government grant. Only 16% were involved in income generating projects, such as wage/salary employment or are entrepreneurs. Close to 40% had their own accommodation, but many of these homes were in fact shacks in informal settlements, with some being in the backyards of their parents’ or relatives’ houses. Approximately 40% stayed with their parents or relatives, and the remainder stay in rented accommodation. Approximately a third of the respondents indicated that they suffered from psychological problems. A number of
respondents indicated that they abused alcohol regularly. Of this number, many claimed that they did this in an attempt to forget about past traumatic events. None of the respondents experiencing psychological problems had received treatment and/or counselling for their problems. In addition, many ex-combatants had developed a type of “dependency syndrome”, where they lose the ability to fend for themselves, and have tended to wait for others to assist them rather than taking the initiative themselves.

Everatt et al (2006) surveyed 1,200 ex-combatants from most former armed groups, but were limited to Gauteng Province. They found that 80% of their sample to be unemployed, with most living in female-headed households and that these households that are relatively overcrowded, which survive on less than R3,000 a month. Four in ten ex-combatants that were interviewed indicated that they knew of other ex-combatants that had engaged in criminal activities. There were also reportedly high levels of ex-combatants living with HIV/AIDS, with one in eight reportedly suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder. The majority of ex-combatants indicated that they felt betrayed by their political leaders.

There have been a variety of civil society reintegration initiatives geared towards supporting the reintegration process in South Africa, which have had mixed results. Some examples are outlined below:

- The 17 Shaft Conference and Training Centre was established in 1992 by former MK members and is situated in a disused gold mine south of Johannesburg. This facility was used to host conferences, but also branched out to establish the Trans Sizwe Security Company, a private security guard training programme for unemployed former MK soldiers.
- The Khulumani Support Group was created in 1995 to support the survivors (including ex-combatants) and families of victims of the political conflict in South Africa. Some of its key activities include: Livelihoods skills development projects for survivors; and programmes in healing and memory.
- The MK Military Veterans Association (MKMVA) was set-up in December 1996 to: provide assistance to MK veterans; to create and develop income generating community-based projects which will involve veterans; to assist in terms of vocational training, education and re-integration of veterans into civilian society; to provide assistance to dependants of veterans who died during the liberation struggle.
- The Azanian People’s Liberation Army Veterans Association (APLAVA) was established in 1997 with the aim of addressing the socio-economic needs, as well as problems encountered by APLA veterans, such as gaining access to government pensions.

Up until 2008 both government and the ANC, despite rhetoric references to the “heroes of the struggle” in political speeches, largely disregarded the plight of ex-combatants. In addition, the DOD paid very little attention to calls to reform the Service Corps. The fortunes of the military veterans nonetheless changed with Jacob Zuma’s rise to pre-eminence within the ANC. The reason for this is that Zuma had secured invaluable political and symbolic support from MKMVA during his campaign to depose Thabo Mbeki as President of the ANC. After Zuma’s election as President of South Africa in 2009 a military veterans department was created (with 169 posts being created in 2012). The Military Veterans Act, 2011 (Act no. 18 of 2011) was enacted in Parliament for implementation as from 1 April 2012, and was established to provide military veterans in need with additional financial, medical, education, burial and housing support.
Zimbabwe

**Historical background**

Zimbabwe was formerly the British colony of Southern Rhodesia, which was established through annexations in the late-1800s. A profitable economy was developed through the growing of tobacco and maize, mining copper and gold and cattle farming. However, black Zimbabweans, who constituted the vast majority of the country, were excluded from benefiting from this economic prosperity. They were forced off productive farming land, their labour was exploited, and they were denied fundamental human rights and freedoms. In response, Black Zimbabweans established a series of nationalist movements to articulate the common grievances, and called for universal suffrage, parliamentary democracy and an end to racial discrimination. The most prominent was the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), which engaged in armed struggle.

Internal conflicts and leadership disputes in the early 1960s resulted in a group splitting from ZAPU to establish the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). Both organisations developed their own armed wings: ZANU’s armed component became known as the Zimbabwean African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), while ZAPU’s armed wing was called the Zimbabwe People’s Liberation Army (ZIPRA). The white minority Rhodesian government banned both organisations in August 1964. This brought a temporary end to the inter-organisational squabbles (Bhebe, 1999:10-12; Kriger, 1992: 82-85).

In 1965, after several attempts to persuade Britain to grant the colony independence, the Rhodesian government announced the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). In response, ZANU and ZAPU escalated and intensified their strategy of armed struggle against the government (Dabenga, 1995: 24-27). In October 1976 ZANU and ZAPU formed a tactical political alliance – the Patriotic Front – in their efforts to overthrow the Rhodesian government, and consequently were able to intensify their military operations inside Zimbabwe. By the end of 1979, there were approximately 20,000 ZANU and 8,000 ZAPU guerrillas operating inside Zimbabwe (Bhebe and Ranger; 1995: 6-23; Kriger, 1992: 89-93; Tungamirai, 1995: 36-45).

The cost of the war, in conjunction with external pressures such as sanctions, forced the Rhodesian government to enter into negotiations with black Zimbabwean political leaders in the late-1970s. In 1979 the war was concluded with the signing of the Lancaster House Agreement, which made provision for a cease-fire agreement, the creation of a new national military structure, and the demobilisation and reintegration into civilian life of former combatants. The Lancaster House Agreement paved the way for democratic elections and the independence of Zimbabwe, which was officially declared in April 1980.

**Creation of the Zimbabwe National Army**

The Zimbabwe DDR process was directly linked to a process of security sector transformation where all combatants would be incorporated into one military structure, which would them be followed by a significant demobilization and reintegration process. That is, the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) was established through the integration of personnel from the Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF), ZANLA and ZIPRA, which was called ‘Operation Merger’. At its inception the ZNA comprised 100,000 personnel (Musemwa, 1995).
The process of integrating these three armed forces into the ZNA was facilitated by the British Military Assistance and Training Team (BMATT), in collaboration with the Joint Military Command (JMC), which comprised high ranking officers from all three armed forces. The reason for the involvement of BMATT was that after fifteen years of civil war there were intense feelings of animosity, distrust and hostility between the three armed forces, and an ‘impartial broker’ was required to ensure that integration of personnel into the ZNA was undertaken in a fair, transparent, inclusive and professional fashion. BMATT’s primary integration methodology was the training of senior, middle and junior officers (Dennis, 1992; Nyambuya, 1996). The use of BMATT was a prudent move, as according to the World Bank (1993):

“In politically tense situations, a neutral monitor has been instrumental in verifying the numbers of combatants demobilised from each force (often a subject of contention by each side), in enforcing disarmament in camps, and in assuring the equitable distribution of benefits. Without such a neutral party, the demobilisation and reintegration programme process can succumb to factional disputes on these issues.”

The integration process faced the following three challenges. First, the RSF was the only armed force that had the administrative as well as command and control structures and processes on which the ZNA could be constructed. Second, all three armed forces had a different ethos, tradition and structure. For example, ZANLA cadres had significantly more combat experience than members of ZIPRA, and ZANLA’s recruits were largely drawn from the peasantry, while ZIPRA had been more successful in attracting working class and educated recruits (Bhebe and Ranger, 1995; Brickhill, 1995a). Third, Zimbabwe, as well as the rest of the southern Africa, was politically volatile at the time.

Hence large numbers of personnel could not be released from the national military into civilian life without the creation and maintenance of the necessary mechanisms and support structures (Dennis, 1992). A complicating factor was that both ZANLA and ZIPRA retained portions of their personnel and weaponry outside Zimbabwe during the ceasefire period and well into independence as a precaution in the event that the independence process was sabotaged or did not suit their particular aspirations (Rupiah, 1995, 31).

Prior to being integrated into the ZNA, the approximately 100,000 combatants were confined to areas known as Assembly Points (APs), where they were provided with basic food, shelter and paid a monthly cash allowance. Half of the ZANLA/ZIPRA soldiers were between the ages of 20 and 25; 80% were single; 13% had no previous education; and 75% were either unskilled or had no work experience (World Bank, 1993: 57). Due to the number of soldiers to be integrated no comprehensive psychological assessment of these combatants was undertaken.

In a process called Operation Sausage Machine, members of ZANLA and ZIPRA were divided into two groups. Those with sufficient education and officer potential were placed in one group, with the balance of soldiers being placed in the other. The former group underwent an intensive four-month training programme supervised by BMATT to provide them with opportunities to achieve an officer’s rank in the ZNA. The latter group was divided into battalions, but their training was not prioritised (Alao, 1995: 108). There were inadequate command and control structures and processes, and as a result there were a number of
incidents of ill discipline, which in some cases escalated to mutiny. There were also insufficient activities to keep the combatants occupied. Consequently Operation SEED (Soldiers Employed in Economic Development), and a number of co-operative projects, were introduced, which sought to create agricultural opportunities for combatants (Tapfumaneyi, 2004; Alao, 1995: 108).

However, both Operation SEED and most of the co-operatives had failed by 1985, due to inadequate, and they were premised on the romantic (but naïve) notion that the combatants, infused with a deep sense of patriotism, would swap their arms for farming implements, and work government-owned land for the benefit of the nation. Many combatants perceived the agricultural work to be demeaning, and saw Operation SEED as a strategy by senior military offices to exclude them from being integrated into the ZNA (Musemwa, 1995:46).

Security consequences of the integration process

In the early-1980s there were sporadic outbreaks of violence emanating from the APs countrywide, committed by both ZANLA and ZIPRA former combatants. This was derived from the slow pace of ZNA integration and rivalries from the liberation struggle era. In early 1981, some 50,000 former guerrillas (with their weapons) were transferred from APs to low cost housing settlements in overcrowded townships in Harare and Bulawayo where pre-independence ethic and political differences had not been entirely resolved. This lack of housing space necessitated close co-habitation by ZANLA and ZIPRA cadres, which merely acted to exacerbate tensions between members of the two guerrilla armies.

In February 1981 violence broke out in Entumbane, one of the areas where these soldiers had been settled (Alao, 1995: 109). In July 1982 ex-ZIPRA combatants fired shots at President Mugabe’s residence in Harare. In the same year, armed uprisings in Matabeleland and areas of the Midlands (the heartland of ZAPU support) by dissidents, many of which were former ZIPRA members, resulted in a major security crackdown by the authorities in order to quell this uprising. Thousands of unarmed civilians were either killed, assaulted, or suffered property loss at the hands of the security forces, particularly the ZNA’s 5th Brigade (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, 1997).

In order to reduce the possibility of further violence, voluntary demobilisation was introduced as a means to reduce the number of ex-combatants in the APs (Nyambuya, 1996; Rupiya, 1995). Military authorities decided that a total of 36,000 combatants would be demobilised (Musemwa, 1995:46).

The demobilisation and reintegration process

A Demobilisation Directorate was established under the Ministry of Labour and Social Services to facilitate the demobilization and reintegration process. This Directorate had two main reintegration functions. First, it was to assist former combatants with acquiring gainful employment in the public and private sectors, in which it was relatively successful. Second, it was to facilitate skills training for those former combatants who wished to pursue careers outside of the job placement margins of the Directorate. However, in this regard, it lacked the capacity and resources to provide suitable and relevant training, and had not designed a long-term strategic plan (Masarire and Rupiya, 2000; World Bank, 1993: 38).
Those combatants who were demobilised by the Directorate received $185 per month reintegration stipend over a two-year period. They were encouraged to establish co-operatives and pool their resources to create and administer joint projects. By the end of 1982, more than 25,000 former combatants had taken advantage of the demobilisation facilities and programmes. The Directorate was closed in June 1983, and its final report published in 1984, it was reported that 35,713 individuals had benefited from its programmes (see Table 2 below).

Table 2: Beneficiaries of programmes administered by the Demobilisation Directorate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of support</th>
<th>Number of personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scholarships</td>
<td>4,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial programmes</td>
<td>2,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-reliance projects</td>
<td>4,333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>1,579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal employment</td>
<td>3,041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>19,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>35,713</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Rupiya, 1995:7)

However, despite this reintegration support, many of the business ventures failed, as numerous former combatants unknowingly bought insolvent or unprofitable businesses from unscrupulous individuals. Many of the former combatants that established new businesses did not have the necessary skills or expertise to convert them into profitable ventures. Accounting procedures were largely absent and illiteracy rates were high (Rupiya, 1995: 7).

Consequently the Zimbabwe government intervened and overhauled its reintegration programme, and implemented it through the Department of Co-operatives. Probationary periods were introduced and viability surveys were undertaken before any money was invested. Management and consultancy courses were offered to former combatants, and Z$4 million was set aside as an emergency fund to assist ailing projects. In 1989, the Zimbabwe government released figures on the economic reintegration of former combatants that indicated 81.4% were either employed or had established co-operatives or had undertaken further training, and 18.6% were unemployed (see Table 3 below).

Table 3: Economic reintegration of former combatants into civilian life (1989)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of reintegration process</th>
<th>No. of personnel</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Former combatants in the employment of the state and private sector¹</td>
<td>43,000</td>
<td>61.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former combatants who formed co-operatives or undertook further training</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed former combatants</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>70,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Musemwa, 1995:46)

¹ Former combatants were employed soldiers, policemen, prison staff, general civil servants and private sector security personnel.
At a cursory glance, it would appear as though economic reintegration of former combatants had been relatively successful. However, the figures in table 2 present a distorted picture of the reality of reintegration, as most of the former combatants in the first category were actually part of the ZNA, and the second category does not indicate whether the co-operatives or training actually assisted former combatants with economic reintegration. A World Bank study, which was published in 1993, found that only 28% of former combatants had found employment outside of the public and military sector, and close to 40% of those participating in co-operatives had withdrawn from the programmes.

In 1993, Musemwa (1995) estimated that there were in excess of 25,000 unemployed former combatants that were destitute, and that this number was growing. Many former combatants had found the demobilisation allowance to be grossly inadequate, as after leaving the APs, many had to build new homes, feed and clothe themselves and their families, as well as pay the school fees for their children and younger siblings. Consequently they could not make meaningful financial contributions to the co-operatives. In addition, many of the co-operatives that were agriculture-based collapsed due to inadequate resources and drought. In Matabeleland, many co-operatives were adversely affected by the actions of the 5th Brigade (Masarire and Rupiya, 2000).

Many former combatants were unable to secure sustainable employment in the private sector or the non-military public sector, as many lacked the necessary educational requirements. Following independence, the Zimbabwe government set the minimum educational qualification for civil service employment at a 5 Ordinary Level (O-Level) pass, of C grade or better. Many former combatants had joined the armed struggle before attaining O-Level certificates, either due to the Rhodesian government’s discriminatory educational policy or because they had left school prematurely when they were recruited for training. As a result, they were ineligible for employment. In addition, the government’s ‘education for all’ programme was producing thousands of well-educated young people, with whom unemployed former combatants could not compete in the job market (Musemwa, 1995).

Some reintegration initiatives, such as the Danhiko School, which combined education, vocational training, and apprenticeships, secured high employment rates among graduates, some of which were disabled ex-combatants. The school recruited ex-combatants directly from APs, and provided them with relevant training from established professionals and apprenticeships in areas such as furniture design (for which a market feasibility study had been carried out). Statistics relating to the number of recruits, however, are not available (World Bank, 1993).

**The emergence of the war veterans as a political force**

Throughout the 1980s the community of liberation struggle veterans could be described as fractious and disorganised. No representative military veterans association existed to look after their welfare and articulate their needs and grievances. Essentially the war veterans community could be divided into two loosely defined groups: the empowered and the disempowered. The former group, which was made up of predominantly ZANLA veterans had been able to benefit both financially and politically from the demobilisation and reintegration process. The latter group was mainly comprised of those numerous impoverished ex-combatants who lived in rural areas and urban slums.
According to Kriger (2003), the empowered group of war veterans was the consequence of a deliberate strategy on the part of ZANU, which following independence, had sought to build a power base within the civil service and the private sector, as well as take control of the labour movement. ZANLA guerrillas were the vehicles through which such control could be achieved. The white dominated government bureaucracy and business sector were consequently pressured and persuaded to employ ex-combatants.

In February 1981, ZANU facilitated the creation of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), in a response to a number of militant workers strikes that had taken place without ZANU support. As part of this process, powerful worker committees were established in the workplace, which largely dealt with issues relating to working conditions, racism and salary issues. Ex-ZANLA cadres were able to obtain influential positions on these committees. However, by the late-1980s, ZANU perceiving that it had cemented its control over the civil service and private sector, withdrew its support of the workers committees, which left a number of veterans with a sense of betrayal (Kriger, 1993: 166-177).

In March 1988 the Zimbabwe Parliament began to debate the ex-combatant issue, with some parliamentarians raising concerns about the large numbers of impoverished military veterans. National newspapers, such as The Chronicle, subsequently started to publish stories on the plight of ex-combatants, and consistently referring to them as “forgotten heroes” (Kriger, 1995: 156-57).

Despite these developments, no ex-combatant policy was forthcoming, and in April 1989, discontented former combatants from both ZANLA and ZIPRA put aside their historical differences, and established the Zimbabwe War Veterans Association (ZWVA) to act as a voice for unemployed former combatants, as well as a trade union for employed former combatants who felt victimised in the work place. Its formation, however, was met with suspicion by some government and ZANU-PF officials, as it was launched at the same time as an opposition political party, the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (Musemwa, 1995).

Realising that the ZWVA constituted a significant political and moral force, the Minister of Labour and Social Welfare legislated for the welfare of war veterans, and in July 1991, the War Veterans Administration Bill was drafted. This Bill was given to ZWVA for their review, and they responded with anger and distain, as in their view, the Bill did not “properly represent their needs and invests too much power in the Minister” (Kriger, 2000). It entitled only the Minister to decide the amount, nature and duration of the assistance that was to be granted to dependants of war veterans. In addition, the draft only dealt with destitute and unemployed war veterans instead of all ex-combatants. This objection was motivated by the claim that employed ex-combatants were mainly engaged in menial jobs. Following discussions with government, a compromise War Veterans Act was promulgated in July 1992 followed by the War Victims Compensation Act the following year, which both provided for compensation and benefits to both unemployed and employed ex-combatants (Musemwa, 1995; Kriger, 2000).

The war veterans and the political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe

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2 ZANU-PF is the result of a merger between ZANU and ZAPU, which took place in 1988.
In 1992 Zimbabwe experienced the highest post-independence unemployment rate, that of 22%, which was linked with a lack of economic growth (CSO, 2000; CSO, 1998). Over the next few years, the situation was exacerbated due to an exponential increase in the cost of living both in rural and urban areas. By 1996, a Zimbabwe government study showed that 50% of Zimbabwe’s rural population was living in extreme poverty (CSO, 1998: 51). Large numbers of ex-combatants were living in rural areas, and as a result were adversely affected by these conditions.

Between 1993 and 1997, the system for dealing with applications for war-related compensation in terms of the War Victims Compensation Act was haphazard and characterised by blatant corruption and mismanagement. Approximately Z$80 million was paid out to claimants, many of whom were high ranking members of ZANU-PF, who allegedly had falsified their claims. This acted to further alienate the grassroots former combatants from the ZANU-PF elite (Chitiyo, 2004: 63; Kriger, 2000: 35).

In 1997, Chenjerai “Hitler” Hunzvi was elected as Chairman of the ZWVA, and in a short space of time transformed the veterans’ association from a “do nothing organisation of has-beens” to a powerful and militant force (Meldrum and McGreal, 2001). Hunzvi was able to mobilise the impoverished veterans community to actively campaign for a more equitable distribution of compensation and benefits for veterans. Violent street protests by war veterans were a direct result.

Government responded by establishing the Commission of Inquiry into the Administration of the War Victims Compensation Act [Chapter 11.16], with the terms of reference being to enquire into the following:

- The manner and circumstances in which claims for compensation under the Compensation Act were submitted, assessed and granted during the period beginning 14 November 1980 and ending on 30 November 1997;
- Cases of fraud, misrepresentation, corruption or any other abuse in the submission, assessment or granting of the aforementioned claims for compensation;
- Measures for recovering all such amounts of compensation as may have been inappropriately paid in contravention or in excess of the qualifications and requirements prescribed in the Compensation Act;
- Administrative deficiencies in the submission, assessment and granting of the aforementioned claims for compensation;
- General or specific defects in the provisions of the Compensation Act and the regulations made thereunder, which may have contributed to or facilitated any of the afore-mentioned abuses and administrative deficiencies; and
- Measures for the reform of any general or specific defects identified in the provisions of the Compensation Act and the regulations made thereunder.

The Commission of Inquiry ruled that the administrators of the war compensation scheme were responsible for the mismanagement and corruption, and had colluded with high-ranking politicians to defraud the fund (Kriger, 2000). The Commission of Inquiry’s findings resulted in the ZWVA splitting, with one faction supporting the findings and the other faction rejecting them. This was accompanied by leadership struggles between a number of prominent ZWVA members.
Following the outcome of the Commission of Inquiry, government awarded each legitimate war veteran a lump-sum payment of Z$50,000 and a pension of Z$5,000, the total cost of which was estimated to be Z$4 billion. This precipitated a national financial crisis (Chitiyo, 2004: 63). Meanwhile, under Hunzvi’s leadership, the ZWVA became increasingly fractionalised, especially with Hunzvi articulating further demands for veterans’ benefits and compensation from government. In 2000, a group of war veterans split from the ZWVA to establish the Zimbabwe Liberators Platform to: “set up a forum of war veterans and war collaborators to refocus on the original aims and objectives of the liberation struggle.”3

With intensification of the national economic crisis, and the creation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), an opposition political party that emerged from the Zimbabwe labour movement with significant popular support in September 1999, the ZANU-PF government began to feel increasingly besieged both domestically and internationally. Hence, malleable political partners and supporters were sought out, with the war veterans and the rural poor being the obvious choices. In return for their assistance to secure a ZANU-PF victory in the 2000 parliamentary elections, the war veterans were promised increased monthly pensions. Impoverished black people living in rural areas were offered white owned land in return for their support (Chitiyo, 2004: 65). The ZWVA subsequently led the invasion of approximately 1,800 farms by war veterans (Meldrum and McGreal, 2001).

Typically, a war veteran was responsible for commanding and directing a farm invasion, and would be supported by a group of ZANU-PF youth militia, ZANU-PF supporters and/or rural poor. Intimidation, terror and force were used to gain control of a farm. War veterans were also deployed by ZANU-PF to intimidate Zimbabweans into voting for the ruling party in the 2000 elections. Numerous human rights abuses took place during both the land invasions and the run-up to the elections (Human Rights Watch, 2002). The official number of legitimate war veterans involved in the land invasions is not publicly available, and it is not possible to obtain this information from independent sources.

War veterans have continued to be a disruptive and destructive force after the 2000 elections, particularly with respect to the controversial processes of land redistribution and more recently the “indigenization” of the economy (particularly mining). The defence ministry has been tasked with the financial and administration management of the war veterans, who have become a type of “reserve force” in the army. Sections within the war veteran community were also been directly involved in widespread intimidation and assault of MDC supporters in subsequent elections. The war veterans were a decisive force in ensuring that ZANU-PF did not have a relinquish power in the highly contentious 2008 national elections, which resulted in an uncomfortable power-sharing arrangement between the MDC and ZANU-PF.

From 2012 war veterans have agitated for further financial compensation (with US$18,000 per war veteran being demanded), further economic opportunities (such as mining concessions) and parliamentary seats. In December 2012 it was reported that the head of the Zimbabwe military, General Constantine Chiwenga informed war veterans that they would each receive $2,000 each in monthly payments for a nine month period (Shoko, 2013). In February 2013, on the even of possible June 2013 elections, the head of the War Veterans

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Association publicly stated that there would be violence should ZANU-PF be unsuccessful at the polls (Gonda, 2013).

DEMOLISATION AND REINTEGRATION IN THE CONTEXT OF MILITARY DOWNSIZING

Lesotho

Historical background

Lesotho gained independence from Britain in 1966, and faced a rather unique challenge of being surrounded by apartheid South Africa (and its aggressive foreign policy) for close to three decades. This had a profound impact on the political and security dynamics within the mountain kingdom. At independence Lesotho did not have a military per se, but rather a Police Mobile Unit, which was then transformed into a Paramilitary Force in 1980, and then into an actual Defence Force in 1982 (Matlosa, 2005: 86).

Chief Leabua Jonathan ruled Lesotho until 1986 when he was overthrown in a military coup d’état led by Maj. Gen. Justin M. Lekhanya. The military coup resulted in an era of military authoritarianism, which lasted until 1993 when democracy was restored through national elections. The transition to democracy has been fragile, as the military has resisted attempts to instil civilian control over it on a number of occasions.

In the early-1970s the exiled Basotho Congress Party (BCP) launched the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA), which largely operated from South Africa and engaged in a series of sabotage attacks, torture and assassinations in Lesotho. The LLA received technical and logistical support from the South African security forces from the late-1970s following a breakdown in relations between the Jonathan government and that of the National Party government (South Africa). Internal disputes with the LLA resulted in it splitting into six factions, which were aggravated by a détente in relations between the governments of Lesotho and South Africa in mid-1980s following the military coup in Lesotho. This saw South African support for the LLA largely evaporating.

The BCP won the 1993 elections, with the head of the BCP claiming that the LLA had been disbanded (with no reintegration support), but rumours that LLA members would be integrated into the LDF, which contributed to munity in the LDF in 1993 (Pherudi, 2001: 266-277).

Attempts to downsize the LDF

In late-1993, armed confrontations within the LDF led to a political crisis, which resulted an Organisation of African Unity, the Commonwealth and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) intervening in Lesotho. They recommended a fundamental restructuring and professionalization of the LDF. A government commission of inquiry was established to investigate the violence perpetrated by elements in the LDF, and recommended the gradual downsizing of the military (Matlosa and Pule, 2003: 52-54). Some military reforms were made between 1994 and 1998, but the personnel size of the military remained relatively unchanged.
The results of the 1998 national elections were disputed and resulted in high levels of tension within Lesotho, a breakdown in civilian control over the police and military, as well as armed clashes between the police and military. In response the Lesotho Prime Minister requested military assistance from SADC. Troops from Botswana and South Africa were subsequently deployed to Lesotho to restore order. Further security sector reforms took place after this event, which included the downsizing of the LDF (Matlosa and Pule, 2003: 60-61). However, efforts to reduce the size of the LDF have been met with strong resistance from the military.

**Malawi**

**Historical background**

Malawi gained independence from Britain in 1964, with the Malawi Congress Party (MCP), becoming the dominant ruling party. However, the MCP became afflicted by a severe crisis due to opposition and criticism of its leader’s (Dr. Hastings Banda) authoritarian approach to governance. Cabinet ministers resigned and sporadic insurrections took place, which were suppressed by the security forces. President Banda subsequently initiated a militarised strategy of nation building and used the MCP as the main vehicle in this regard.

One of the hallmarks of this approach was the creation of a youth militia known as the Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP) to be “an army for development” that would target “the new war on poverty, ignorance and disease” (Government of Malawi, 1972). According to President Banda:

“I organised the Young Pioneers so that the youth would make useful citizens of the country. I did not want our youth to roam the streets of Zomba, Blantyre, and Lilongwe, loafing with their hands in their pockets… parasites leaning on their parents, depending on their parents to give them everything while they just sat and ate, doing nothing. No, they had to be taught first and foremost, discipline and respect for their elders; then respect for manual labour” (Phiri, 2000).

MYP training bases were established in 1965 with the support of the Israeli government, and offered recruits an educational programme, which had a strong emphasis on political indoctrination. Military style training and drills were also adopted. Some MYP trainees were sent to Taiwan and France for specialist training (Chirambo, 2004: 153). By 1989 there were MYP training bases in all districts of Malawi, with many trainees being required to work on a range of agricultural and rural development projects. Approximately 2,000 youth (mainly males) were recruited annually. However, the majority of the recruits were school dropouts whose employment opportunities were extremely limited (Charman, 1999). It was estimated that a total of 50,000 Malawians served with the MYP during its existence (Phiri, 2000).

The MYP also established a business arm, The Spearhead Company, which entered into a number of business ventures, including the establishment of an airline. Within a short period of time the MYP became an official paramilitary force under the command of the repressive Police Mobile Force (PMF), but were effectively loyal only to the ruling party and the de facto bodyguards for the President. It engaged in intelligence gathering and frequently intimidated and harassed suspected critics and opponents of the MCP. MYP members were also implicated in numerous cases of public violence and human rights abuses. Members of
the MYP were also allegedly responsible for widespread extortion of money for Malawians, which would then be channelled to the President Banda. Controversially, the MYP provided support (including arms smuggling) to the Renamo rebel group from 1987 in neighbouring Mozambique at a time the Malawi military had forged ties with the Mozambican government (Frelimo) (Hedges, 1989; Phiri, 2000).

A referendum on the political future of Malawi was held in June 1993 in which the majority of Malawians voted in favour of a multi-party democracy, and therefore an end to the one-party State of Dr Banda. In late-1993 the MCP government agreed to a National Consultative Conference to discuss, among other issues, the disarmament and demobilisation of the 6,000-strong MYP. Due to pressure from the international community, the government agreed to gradually demobilise and disarm the MYP members, and incorporate them into the police and army.

**Disarmament and demobilization of the MYP**

In late-1993, command and control in the Malawi army had been severely weakened, and tensions between the military and the MYP were heightened. Consequently, Operation Bwenzani was initiated by mutinous junior army officers against the MYP sparked by a bar brawl between a group of soldiers and MYP members (Chirambo, 2004: 155). The military launched attacks against MYP bases and resulted in 25 deaths, 123 injuries and the disarmament of majority of hundreds of MYP members (who surrendered to the military). Hundreds more fled to rural areas to find shelter with relatives. It however, estimated that approximately 2,000 MYP cadres fled to Renamo-held areas in neighbouring Mozambique or into Angola along with their arms (Phiri, 2000).

The disarming of the MYP created a political environment conducive to the advancement of the multiparty reform process and national election that was held in 1994, bringing the United Democratic Front into power. There were notable post-election security sector reforms, such as the disbanding of the PMF, and the demobilisation of some soldiers within the Malawi military. The demobilised soldiers and MYP members received little attention and financial and material support.

In 1998 a group of close to 700 former MYP threatened to take legal action against the Malawi government for their “illegal and summary dismissal” (Afrika News Network, 1998). Government largely ignored these complaints. Eventually, in September 2012 a group of roughly 300 former MYP members held demonstrations and invaded the Office of the President and Cabinet in Lilongwe demanding pensions and financial compensation for their dismissal following Operation Bwenzani. The government responded by stating that it would pay compensation of a total of 300 million Kwacha to approximately 4,000 former Pioneers (Face of Malawi, 2012).

**Swaziland**

**Historical background**

Swaziland became independent from Britain in 1968, with the first post-independent elections being held in 1972. However, the following year the Swazi King, Shobhuza II rescinded the Constitution, dissolved parliament and assumed absolute control over
government. All political party activities were banned and trade unions were from operating in Swaziland.

The Royal Swaziland Defence Force (later renamed the *Umbutfo* Swaziland Defence Force - USDSF) was established in 1973 and was comprised of approximately 10,000 personnel, which was drawn from World War II veterans (who had supported the Allied war effort) and soldiers from former colonial militia, but also included individuals with no previous military experience (Tshabalala, Nhlengethwa and Rupiya, 2005: 276-277). To date the USDSF has not been involved in operations outside Swaziland (with the exception of peacekeeping operations) but has frequently been involved in the suppression uprisings and the expression of opposition ideas on behalf of the monarchy (Motsamai, 2011).

**Demobilization and reinteg ration**

The Swazi military was beset by internal friction at its inception, which was principally informed by disagreements over military ethos, approaches to training and conditions of military service, as well as weak military leadership. Military veterans objected to what they considered to be an overly severe training regimen, and then staged a protest march to the King’s Royal Residence at Lobamba. The King responded by instituting a retirement process and benefits for many of the military veterans. Further retrenchments of military veterans were implemented in 1976 with early retirement packages being offered (Tshabalala, Nhlengethwa and Rupiya, 2005: 276-283). However, many of these military veterans were largely unsuccessful in securing post-military employment.

In 1995 the USDSF initiated another process of downsizing and retiring targeted personnel. No formal reintegration process was created, nor was any financial assistance provided other than modest government pension that had been established in terms of the Public Service Pension Order of 1993. Since then very few demobilised soldiers have been able to secure employment or engage in sustainable income generating activities, which has been exacerbated by the overall high levels of poverty and unemployment in Swaziland. Given this state of affairs there was a high level of dissatisfaction with government and retired soldiers have engaged in protest action (USDF, 2008).

The Swazi government has established the USDF Ex-servicemen Assistance Bill, which envisages support in securing employment for demobilised soldiers; education support and vocational training; medical care and social welfare support. The following have also been established: the USDF Ex-servicemen Committee; the USDF Ex-servicemen Association; as well as Ex-servicemen Regional Committees (USDF, 2008).

**Tanzania**

**Historical background**

Tanzania gained independence from Britain in 1961 with the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) becoming the ruling party. Throughout the 1960s the Tanzanian military remained a largely colonial institution as British nationals dominated its officer corps. Both wages and morale was low, which resulted in a mutiny by indigenous soldiers against the British officers in 1964. This event resulted in the creation of a new military structure later that year, the Tanzanian People’s Defence Force (TPDF), which had direct links with the ruling party, with all military personnel being required to be members of TANU (Omari,
2003: 94). From the late-1960s the size of the armed forces noticeably increased from close 8,000 to in excess of 50,000 in 1980, largely in response to tensions with neighbouring states, particularly Uganda.

In 1972, war between Uganda and Tanzania seemed eminent as relations between Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere and Idi Amin (Ugandan head of state) were strained. President Mohammed Siad Barre of Somalia, however, brokered a peace deal, the Mogadishu Agreement, which led to the cessation of military operations between the two countries. Nonetheless, in November 1978, Amin’s forces attempted to annex the northern Tanzanian province of Kagera. Tanzania repulsed Ugandan forces from Kagera and invaded Uganda with the assistance of anti-Amin Ugandan exile groups. The Uganda-Tanzania War ended when Amin fled into exile in April 1979.

**Military Downsizing**

There was no Tanzanian DDR program at the conclusion as it was a relatively short military campaign. Additionally, since Tanzania’s intervention was not widely supported, the invasion and subsequent peacekeeping role resulted in considerable economic strain for the Tanzanian government at the time. The armed forces were reduced in number by close to 50% (from 50,000 to approximately 27,000) between 1994 and 1998 due to military reforms and budget cuts (Lindemann, 2010: 4-6).

Tanzania also hosted a number of African liberation movements and their armed factions in the 1970s and 1980s, but no demobilisation and reintegration in relation to these insurgent forces was undertaken on Tanzanian soil. Tanzania also hosted refugee communities from neighbouring countries particularly Burundi and Rwanda in the 1990s and beyond. However, the militarisation of these camps (combined with international pressure) compelled Tanzania to expel the residents of many Rwanda/Burundi refugee camps.

**Zambia**

**Historical background**

Zambia was granted independence from Britain in 1964, with the United National Independence Party (UNIP) becoming the ruling party with Kenneth Kaunda being elected Zambian President. In 1972 all opposition political parties were banned and Zambia effectively became a one-party state. However, a prolonged economic crisis and sustained insurrection and popular protests resulted in democratic reforms in the early-1990s, with multi-party elections being held in 1991.

The Zambia Defence Force was established at independence and consisted of an army and an air force, but remained under British command until 1973 when a Zambian officer corps took over after a process of “Zambianisation” of the military (Lungu and Ngoma, 2005: 316-317). The size of the Zambian armed forces was less than 5,000 at independence, by gradually grew to approximately 16,000 by 1990. The personnel strength of the military expanded to close to 24,000 directly after the multiparty elections (Lindemann, 2010: 11)

Elements within the Zambian military have sought to shape the manner in which Zambia was governed, and to date there have been five attempted military coup d’etats, none of which were successful. Interestingly, some of coups involved collaboration with opposition political
groupings (Phiri, 2001). Prior to 1991 there were also tensions within some sections the military over the requirement they had to implement political partisan policies that were generally unpopular (Phiri, 2003: 9).

**Demobilisation and the downsizing of the Zambian military**

Two modest DDR programmes have been implemented in Zambia. The first was undertaken prior to independence to provide support to Zambian soldiers who fought on the side of the Allies during World War II. At conclusion of the war, soldiers returned to their places of residence in Zambia and were provided with a monthly pension for the remainder of their lives (Mibenge, 2005: 33).

The second DDR process was relatively small in scale and mainly targeted senior military commanders following the multi-party elections and the change of government. It has suggested that these former soldiers struggled to adapt to civilian life and were unable to secure sustainable employment (Mibenge, 2005: 36).

Over the past ten years the size of the Zambian military has decreased significantly to 15,000 personnel. This was mainly due to the implementation of sector reforms, as well as economic and budgetary constraints (Lindemann, 2010: 11).

**EIGHT COMMON DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS**

1) Primacy of peace agreements

Following the conclusion of a sustained period of internal armed conflict, an inclusive peace agreement where the main conflicting parties formally commit to a non-violent future based on the principal of co-existence is an essential foundation for a viable process for the reintegration of ex-combatants. The DDR processes in Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe are positive examples in this regard, while in Angola, precarious peace settlements resulted in two aborted DDR initiatives in the 1990s.

2) Simplistic notions of reintegration have limited utility

Perceptions of reintegration in the earlier DDR programmes in Southern Africa were arguably romanticised and naive. Some country initiatives were based on the assumption that the majority of ex-combatants were passionate about working the land (such as Zimbabwe and Mozambique), and wanted to be involved in agricultural production, and that in effect all ex-combatants needed was cash, equipment and seeds. However, in reality, only a minority of ex-combatants in these countries desired to be farmers.

There were similar notions with regards to support for the development of ex-combatant small businesses. This was based on the assumption that ex-combatants were naturally entrepreneurial, and significant, on-going technical and financial support would not be required. Consequently, many of the initial ex-combatant economic ventures had limited success.

3) Senseless skills training
Skills training have been a component of most DDR processes in Southern Africa. However, such training was often not linked to market dynamics nor did it consistently address the specific and realistic career aspirations of ex-combatants. The training was typically provided by government-affiliated institutions, and at times in a militarised environment. Such institutions were generally ill suited to prepare ex-combatants for income-generating options in the non-military private sector. This resulted in limited successes in terms of linking reintegration training support to ex-combatant livelihood pursuits.

4) Cash is not always king

In the absence of meaningful medium- to long-term reintegration support, immediate cash payments for ex-combatants had a negligible positive impact. Evidence from the earlier Southern African DDR processes indicate that these funds are typically spent on consumable items, rather than being invested or saved (there is clear evidence from South African research). This is not to say that there should not be a cash component to reintegration support, but it is critical that such payments are part of a more comprehensive reintegration process.

5) All roads lead to an ex-combatant/veterans ministry

All Southern African countries that had significant DDR programmes eventually established a government ministry responsible for ex-combatant affairs (principally to develop and disburse ex-combatant pensions). In many cases, it took more than a decade for such ministries to be instituted. This typically occurred after sustained protest action by ex-combatants who felt that they had been inadequately supported by government, or due to party political expediency.

However, some manifestations of these institutions have been mired in controversy, mainly relating to ineptitude, mismanagement and corruption. Consequently, in order for these bodies to be effective, there should be strategic leadership, robust financial management, regular financial audits, and oversight by a representative and respected veterans entity. Such ministries may require specialised technical assistance from outside agencies.

6) Uncomfortable legacy of the liberation struggle

In those Southern African countries where a former liberation movement becomes the ruling party, ex-combatants from its former armed wing are frequently celebrated for being at the forefront of the liberation of the country from colonialism and/or authoritarian/racist rule. This approach has resulted in such ruling parties being vulnerable to demands from these former combatants, with the ruling party then using scarce state resources to provide partisan ex-combatant benefits at times of political crisis (often decades after the conclusion of the DDR programme).

7) Partisan pension schemes

In virtually every Southern African country that had implemented a demobilisation, reintegration and/or security sector reform programme widespread dissatisfaction amongst ex-combatants and military veterans arose in response to the nature of
pension schemes (or the lack thereof). In some cases there were even violent protests. The reason for this state of affairs was that many of the pension schemes where established after the conclusion of the DDR programme, and were often developed in a non-transparent, piece-meal and partisan fashion.

8) Security through government employment

In some countries governments resorted to providing ex-combatants with public sector employment, mainly in response to security concerns. This has arguably contributed positively to the reintegration process. Such an option is nonetheless dependent on the available budgetary resources. However, it is crucial that the placement of these ex-combatants in government jobs does not overly prejudice other stakeholders, or undermine peace-building and reconciliation efforts.

CONCLUSION

It is evident from the analysis of ten countries in Southern African that the issue of the reintegration of ex-combatants remains highly relevant in this region. This is largely due to long term consequences of inadequate and inappropriate reintegration assistance that was provided in the immediate aftermath of armed conflicts, combined with the mobilisation of former combatants into formidable political organisations that advocate on ex-combatant issues.

In the majority of countries assessed in this paper sections of the ex-combatant population have continued to agitate for better reintegration support, particularly pensions, decades after the conflict has ended. In some countries, such as Zimbabwe and Mozambique, demobilised ex-combatants have engaged in destabilising activities, with the actions of the Zimbabwe military veterans being linked to the ruling party. In South Africa, elements within the ex-combatant population that are loyal to the president of the ruling political party have threatened violence against of the president.

In countries where impoverished ex-combatants were part of demobilised liberation armies (and where the former liberation movement is the ruling party), governments have typically responded with more comprehensive reintegration support and benefits when there have been persistent ex-combatant protests. Such support has involved the creation of new government entities specifically target ex-combatants (South Africa and Mozambique) and absorbing ex-combatants into government employment (Namibia). It is important to note that governments with a liberation struggle history are particularly vulnerable to the demands of ex-combatants given the role (actual or symbolic) such individuals played in bringing about a change in government.

A key lesson from the Southern African experience for current and future DDR programmes in Africa and elsewhere is that devising appropriate and sustainable reintegration processes at the onset is essential otherwise future interventions (possibly at a higher cost) will have to be pursued.
Bibliography


