ANNEX A

Mid-Term Review of the Pilot Reintegration Project
Republic of South Sudan
New NDDR Programme

Anthony Finn Ph.D.

FEBRUARY 2014
### Abbreviations and Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>Environmental Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERM</td>
<td>Environmental Risk Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESMF</td>
<td>Environmental and Social Management Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFA</td>
<td>Financial Management Framework Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPP</td>
<td>Final Project Proposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoSS</td>
<td>Government of South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Head Quarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IP</td>
<td>Implementing Partner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRS</td>
<td>Information, Counseling and Referral System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPP</td>
<td>Initial Project Proposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KfW</td>
<td>Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MA</td>
<td>Monitoring Agent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDTF</td>
<td>Multi-Donor Trust Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDTF-SS</td>
<td>Multi-Donor Trust Fund for South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIS</td>
<td>Management Information System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTC</td>
<td>Multipurpose Training Centres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDDRC</td>
<td>National DDR Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OP/BP</td>
<td>Operational Policy / Bank Procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAD</td>
<td>Project Appraisal Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIP</td>
<td>Project Implementation Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMU</td>
<td>Project Management Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNDDR</td>
<td>Programme National de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Project Steering Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QCBS</td>
<td>Quality and Cost-Based Selection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFQ</td>
<td>Request for Quotations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>Steering Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLA</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLM</td>
<td>Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLA-O</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Army in Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPMU</td>
<td>State Project Management Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSAF</td>
<td>South Sudanese Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSDM/A</td>
<td>South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TA</td>
<td>Technical Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDRP</td>
<td>Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TL</td>
<td>Team Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOR</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TT</td>
<td>Task Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission to South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table of Contents

Executive Summary ..................................................................................................................... 4
Project Background ..................................................................................................................... 4
Summary of Findings .................................................................................................................. 5
1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ........................................................... 9
   1.1 Project Context .................................................................................................................... 9
   1.2 Project Development Objectives and Key Indicators ......................................................... 11
   1.3 Intended Main Beneficiaries ............................................................................................ 11
   1.4 Original Project Components and Outputs ........................................................................ 11
2. Project Outcomes ................................................................................................................... 16
   2.1 Livelihood Supports .......................................................................................................... 17
   2.2 Institutional Capacity Building ......................................................................................... 18
   2.3 DDR Community Support Projects .................................................................................. 19
   2.4 Performance of the Project as a pilot: learning and knowledge acquisition ....................... 19
3. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes ........................................................ 21
   3.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry ............................................................. 25
   3.2 Risks and Risk Mitigation ................................................................................................. 25
   3.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) by Bank ...................................................................... 25
   3.4 Safeguards including Environmental and Fiduciary Compliance ...................................... 26
4. Assessment of Outcomes at time of MTR .......................................................................... 28
   4.1 Relevance of Objectives and Design .............................................................................. 28
   4.2 Efficiency .......................................................................................................................... 28
   4.3 Effectiveness ...................................................................................................................... 29
   4.4 Sustainability ...................................................................................................................... 31
   4.5 Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ................................................................. 32
5. Assessment of Stakeholder Performance ............................................................................. 34
   5.1 Bank Performance ............................................................................................................ 34
   5.2 NDDRC Performance ....................................................................................................... 36
   5.3 Performance of Implementing Partners ............................................................................ 36
      5.3.1 Adam Smith International and Integrity Research ...................................................... 36
      5.3.2 UNICON .................................................................................................................... 37
6. Conclusions and Recommendations ................................................................................... 38
   6.1 Project Context and Strategic Environment ..................................................................... 38
   6.2 Project Design and Outcomes .......................................................................................... 39
   6.3 Stakeholders ...................................................................................................................... 41
Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing at time of MTR .............................................................. 42
Annex 2. Documents Reviewed ............................................................................................... 43
Annex 3. Consultations .............................................................................................................. 48

Table of Figures

Table 1. Start-up Kit Distribution ............................................................................................... 12
Table 2. Trainings Delivered to Ex-Combatants and Community Members ......................... 13
Executive Summary

Project Background
1. The DDR Pilot Reintegration Project was implemented between June 2013 and December 19th 2013 the latter date marking the Project suspension in response to the deteriorated security environment in RoSS. Originally the Project was intended to run for 1 year until June 2014. The Project was implemented in a complex context including the local political economy, the programme history (which was dominated by the legacy of the preceding CPA DDR process), the wider policy environment of the national DDR strategy and supporting national DDR Council decrees and SSDDRC strategic plan, and the immediate implementation environment where the DDR Pilot Reintegration Project fit with the wider NDDR Pilot Programme hosted at Mapel Transition Facility.

2. The original Development Objectives of the Project include (i) socio-economic pilot objectives, and (ii) reintegration programme, systems and learning objectives.

3. The socio-economic objectives of the pilot are:
   
   (a) To provide ex-combatants with skills enabling and enhancing their livelihood opportunities in communities of return;

   (b) To facilitate the social reintegration of ex-combatants.

4. The reintegration programme, systems and learning objectives are as follows:

   (a) Develop lessons learned that can be applied to future South Sudan DDR programming;

   (b) Develop and instill a system of DDR Reintegration Management in South Sudan that can live beyond the life of the pilot project.

5. The main beneficiaries of the project are: the 290 ex-combatants who received Reintegration supports through the Project as well as community members in the communities of return where training was delivered in cooperative working and where ten Community Based Reintegration activities (bore-hole installation and one Payam rehabilitation) were planned to take place.

6. The Project had four official components: (i) Livelihood Support which had two sub-components: (a) 1: Start-Up Kits, and (b) Training; (ii) Institutional Capacity Building; (iii) M&E, and (iv) DDR Community Support Projects. While not identified as such the Project also had a fourth component: Project Management and NDDRC Support (US$ 130,000) which finances the operational costs to the NDDRC and included the (no-cost to the Project) Technical Assistance (TA) provided by the TDRP.

7. The MTR was conducted in November and December 2013 in RoSS with additional consultations in the United Kingdom. The MTR included a verification mission from Juba to Wau and Kuajok, 42 unique consultations, many of which were then followed up with repeat consultations. The MTR also included an extensive review of project documentation and the
outputs of all Implementing Partners. The preliminary analysis of the MTR was presented at KfW in Berlin, Germany on December 2nd 2013.

Summary of Findings

8. In summary, the MTR finds that with regards to the expected achievements of the core three Project components the following outputs were identified. At the time of MTR the start-up kits had been procured and distributed to State offices in a prompt and efficient manner. In Northern Bahr el Ghazal State all kits had been distributed, in Western Bahr el Ghazal State 3 of 92 kits remained to be collected, in Warrap State 4 of 75 kits remained to be collected and in Lakes 10 of 91 remained to be collected, after a delay in distribution largely as a result of difficult moving in the rainy season.

9. Training of 290 ex-combatants in the 15 modules of the curriculum (which was drafted in advance and then finalized in Mapel Transition Facility) took place over 10 days and in a total of 60 hours commencing 2nd September 2013 and ending 11th September 2013. Training in the States after graduation is more difficult to verify because of limitations on record keeping. The IA reports that training in the States after graduation was delivered to 253 ex-combatants (87 percent of the total 290) and to 284 community members. This quantitative data has not been possible to independently verify for the MTR.

10. Seven team members from the IA including the Team Leader who doubled as the Principle Capacity Building Mentor, implemented institutional capacity building. The total time spent in field directly engaging with the NDDRC in HQ and in the State offices in Greater Bahr el Ghazal (Aweil, Kuajok, Rumbek, Wau) was 35 working days by each of the four State mentors and 66 days by the TL/Principal Mentor. The Component produced a variety of outputs that are documented in the MTR as well as strong shifts in institutional confidence and understanding in the NDDRC.

11. Community Support Projects were contracted in two phases and while progress implementing community-based reintegration activities was limited at the time of the MTR in part because of difficulty working in the rainy season the IA had completed most activities in Phase 1. As part of the Project suspension the Component was suspended having produced the following outputs: (i) PIP; (ii) selection of communities (based on criteria agreed with NDDRC), and (iii) selection of contractors through the tendering process.

12. Project Management and Project Support has enabled the implementation of the Project and created additional project management structures in the NDDRC. Specifically the following have been created: (i) Reintegration Project Steering Committee (SC); (ii) HQ PMU, and (iii) State Level PMUs (SPMUs). The NDDRC with the assistance of the TDRP established the PMU, which meets weekly and comprises the representative staff from all units within the NDDRC. The SC has met three times thus far and the TCC while not part of the overall support of the Project to the NDDRC brings together the major stakeholders including the UN family and meets regularly. At the time of the MTR SPMUs were not functional.

13. The MTR finds that the following outcomes (outcomes can be understood as the shifts in institutional behavior and knowledge because of the Project) have resulted from the Project. The outcomes of Livelihood Supports component include: (i) documented learning regarding how an IA can effectively operate in the complex environment of South Sudan in all aspects of design, procurement, transportation and distribution; (ii) documented learning regarding how the IA can better manage knowledge acquisition and quality control reporting from the field; and (iii)
evidence that if implemented well, Reintegration programming can deliver material assistance in the form of tool kits in a timely manner thus increasing confidence in the effectiveness of Reintegration programming, and as a consequence, increase in the confidence of the NDDRC to manage the processes behind the delivery of material support to ex-combatants. Pending confirmation through a Tracer study, it appears that for now there is an interest and receptiveness by ex-combatants to receive training on entrepreneurship, financial literacy and business skills.

14. By design the Institutional Capacity Building Component resulted in more numerous knowledge outcomes and altered institutional behavior. The main outcomes include: (i) increased awareness in management and key staff of the institutional challenges facing the Commission and some strategies to begin addressing same; (ii) a greater understanding of the need to action learning from the CPA and from this first Pilot; (iii) a positive shift in confidence in the NDDRC regarding the capacity for project implementation; and (iv) a reconstituted M&E department.

15. The MTR finds that the Project has produced certain outcomes coherent with it being a pilot; that is, a learning process. By design the Project is clearly orientated towards capturing learning and it is clear that the NDDRC is eager to learn by doing but requires more time, financing and human capacity to actually engage fully to implement learning at strategic and operational levels.

16. The MTR finds that the Project’s objectives and design are relevant to: (i) RoSS DDR strategies and plan; (ii) national ownership as a pillar of DDR; (iii) the learning principles of pilot programming, and (iv) German donor strategy and the MDTF-SS. The Project aligns with the RoSS National DDR strategies and papers particularly the Republic of South Sudan Policy Paper on Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (23rd September, 2011) and the South Sudan National DDR Strategic Plan 2012-2020 (11th March, 2012). The design of the Project supports engendering national ownership in DDR, both by facilitating the NDDRC to assume the decision-making and management role for South Sudan DDR.

17. The MTR finds that the project’s efficiency is moderately satisfactory because: (i) disbursement was largely on target despite implementation delays; (ii) low budget costs for each Project component; (iii) high unit cost per ex-combatant. Recognizing that if the Project leads to a larger project there are likely to be economies of scale that reduce the cost per ex-combatant, still the Project does not compare favorably in costs with other DDR processes in neighbouring countries. The MTR finds that the Project has been effective in achieving project outputs as outlined in the Project documentation and fully examined in the report body below. Prior to its suspension the Project was making progress towards achieving the Pilot objectives.

18. In summary, the MTR makes the following specific findings that in Section 6 of the MTR report are complemented by at least one recommendation per finding.

19. **Conclusion 1.** Prior to its suspension the Project was performing well, and showing strong progress on two of three sub-components as well as a variety of outcomes addressing institutional knowledge, learning, project management and capacity. The suspension of the Project removes what the MTR identifies as critical to the future success of the Project: the ability to keep up the momentum of the gains made during the Project, particularly in institutional performance and capacity building. Much momentum is likely to have been lost.

20. **Conclusion 2.** Prior to its suspension the Project was restricted by two broad set of factors: (i) material and human resources at the NDDRC, and (ii) the wider strategic context of
the SSR process in South Sudan. In the first instance the NDDRC was severely constrained by a lack of material resources and financing so that everyday performance was restricted while concurrently (and particularly in the States) the NDDRC was constrained by a lack of human resources with insufficient staffing in the States and some spoilers in the HQ offices.

21. **Conclusion 2a.** While the MTR has focused on the program performance aspects of the Project it is clear to all stakeholders that the Project along with the wider NDDRC Pilot Programme at Mapel Transitional Facility was severely hamstrung through lack of buy-in from the SPLA and likely from lack of confidence or progress in wider SSR in South Sudan.

22. **Conclusion 3.** Rather than the outcomes for ex-combatants who have participated in the programming, the focus of the Project on piloting systems, capacity building, project implementation and institutional development dictate the best areas for examining the potential outcomes of the Project and gauging the performance of the Project and the Project Implementers. However, this focus is not reflected Project documentation or M&E frameworks.

23. **Conclusion 4.** In Component 1: Livelihood Supports Sub-Component 1 (Start-up Kits) the Project largely delivered its required outputs by providing high quality start-up kits to nearly all ex-combatants in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Western Bahr el Ghazal and Warrap and (with some remaining in Lakes State NDDRC offices. It did so in a timely fashion and the performance far exceeded that recorded in the CPA DDR.

24. **Conclusion 5.** Component 1: Livelihood Supports under the Sub-Component 2: Training, the Project delivered a tailor-made curriculum and 60 hours of training comprised of 27 hours of Financial Literacy and 33 hours on Entrepreneurship to 290 ex-combatants. However significant challenges were encountered in the delivering the curriculum due to the low literacy and numeracy levels of ex-combatants. While the curriculum was adjusted to take account of this the effectiveness of training may have been compromised at least as held to account to the original expected outcomes of the Component.

25. **Conclusion 6.** Component 2: Institutional Capacity Building. M&E capacity building was seriously undermined by lack of appropriate staff in the NDDRC. This was subsequently resolved but too late for progress on the building of M&E capacity in the Commission during the Project.

26. **Conclusion 7.** The participative methodology of the IA delivering Component 2 suited the culture of the NDDRC.

27. **Conclusion 8.** One of the Project indicators of success was positive change in the confidence held by the community and ex-combatants in DDR programming and the work of the NDDRC, but there were no activities or metrics to measure this.

28. **Conclusion 9.** As a pilot the Project, the TDRP, the NDDRC and IAs were all clearly orientated towards learning and knowledge capture.

29. **Conclusion 10.** Regarding M&E of the Project, many of the Project objectives are over ambitious and/or vague.
30. **Conclusion 10a.** Regarding M&E of the Project, the M&E Framework does not contain indicators specific to the nature of the Project as a learning process orientated towards trialing, documenting, learning and innovation.

31. **Conclusion 11.** The Project design has aligned with all relevant safeguards including: (i) the Conflict Sensitivity Principle of the South Sudan’s National DDR programme; (ii) principles of Do No Harm, and (iii) World Bank approach to Conflict and Fragility as contained in the WDR 2011.

32. **Conclusion 12.** By design the Project has emphasized sustainability: (i) by approaching building the capacity of the NDDRC through learning by doing, (ii) by IAs incorporating sustainability into the design of Component 2 (Trainer for Trainers methodology) and Component 3 (use of VDCs).

33. **Conclusion 13.** The potential impact of Component 3 was overestimated in all project documentation and M&E frameworks.

34. **Conclusion 14.** The Project is efficient with costs minimized and very little remaining room for reducing costs further. However, efficiency is compromised by the cost per beneficiary which exceeds that in other national DDR programmes.

35. **Conclusion 15.** Delivery chains were a key weakness in the delivery of activities in Component 2, Sub-component 2 and compounded the negative effect of some factors affecting implementation such as lack of preparedness of IPs and lack of understanding of the political economy of RoSS.

36. **Conclusion 16.** By design and during implementation the Project sought to engage the wider stakeholders in DDR in South Sudan including those in the UN family.

37. **Conclusion 17.** Throughout the Project the TDRP’s role shifted from providing TA to providing operational assistance.
1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1 Project Context

38. The DDR Pilot Reintegration Project has a complex context consisting of: (i) the external political economy and country context; (ii) the program context, principally the preceding national DDR process implemented by UN Agencies on behalf of the NDDRC; (iii) policy context (South Sudan National DDR Strategy 2012 - 2020), and (iv) the implementation environment where the DDR Pilot Reintegration Project must relate to the wider NDDR Pilot Programme housed at Mapel Transition Facility.

39. The Republic of South Sudan (RoSS) became an independent country on the 9th July, 2011 on foot of a peaceful referendum earlier that year held between the 9th and 15th of January. The referendum followed the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of National Unity (GoNU) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM).

40. RoSS is a new country without a history of formal institutions and public administrations and so it is building national institutions, administrative bodies and practices for the first time. Economically, RoSS is largely undeveloped and characterised as county with largely undiversified, highly oil dependent and subsistence economy. The institutions of the State that currently are being built include those to guide the economic development of the country and to provide services to the general population. They also include the national institution for Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) programming, the National DDR Commission (NDDRC). Economically the RoSS has been hampered by austerity as a result of oil flow stoppages, high inflation, currency depreciation and high reliance on imported food and commodities.

41. Leaving aside the deterioration of the security situation in RoSS since mid-December 2013 the development challenges for RoSS are substantial. Compounded by recent violence and instability RoSS has very low literacy, particularly outside urban areas and for females, low life expectancy and high infant mortality. Very little infrastructural development has occurred outside of Juba and transport links including those between RoSS and neighbouring countries, particularly those upon which RoSS is reliant for imports, for example, Uganda and Kenya. Consequently the external environment within which the Project has been implemented is characterised by limited economic opportunities, severe development challenges and conflict stressors all of which can mitigate against the achievement of development objectives in a DDR project.

---

1 Henceforth referred to as ‘the Project’
2 Henceforth referred to as ‘CPA DDR’
3 In 2010 RoSS was the most oil-dependent country in the world with oil exports accounting for 80% of gross domestic product (GDP). In 2012 Gross National Income (GNI) was US$650 largely because of the significant income outflows to oil companies (WDR 2013). Outside of oil livelihoods are largely concentrated in subsistence agriculture and pastoralism. At the time of the MTR in the national media the President of RoSS has indicated that the country’s two-year-old austerity budget of restricted government spending will be lifted by mid 2014 as a result of increased oil productivity and export.
4 27% of population that is aged 15 years and upward is literate; 40% of males compared to 16% of females are literate and 53% of urban compared to 22% of rural population is literate. National Baseline Household Survey (2009).
42. At the time of writing of the MTR during December 2013 RoSS succumbed to a serious deterioration in the security and political situation in the country. Over the weekend of December 15th fighting broke out between elements of the SPLA barracked in Juba. The conflict quickly developed into a civil conflict resulting in unconfirmed civilian and military casualties and creating anything between 500,000 and 1 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). During January 2014 the GoSS signed agreements on cessation of hostilities with both the SPLM in Opposition (SPLM-O) and the South Sudan Democratic Movement/Defence Army (SSDM/A) to begin to bring fighting throughout South Sudan (and in the case of SSDM/A in Jonglei state in particular) to an end.

43. The CPA DDR dominates the historical program context. As a consequence the Project is tasked with overcoming a negative hangover from the recognised under-performance of the CPA DDR process. Specifically, the challenges that have resulted from this CPA DDR hangover have included ensuring buy-in from the SPLA. However, the focus of the Project on piloting systems, capacity building and implementation arrangements (including institutional arrangements) means that primarily systems, capacities and institutional arrangements are the areas in which the performance of the Project can be gauged, rather than the outcomes for ex-combatants who have participated in the programme. The MTR notes that this distinction is not adequately reflected in the Project objectives.

44. The immediate implementation environment for the Project consists of the wider NDDR Pilot Programme. The NDDR Pilot Programme pilot consists of all elements in the DDR pilot as it is focused on the time spent in the Transition Facility at Mapel including: profiling, verification, processing, accommodating, reinsertion activities, vocational training, life skills, and literacy/numeracy training and psychosocial supports delivered to ex-combatants. The MTR notes that in its official project documentation the Project does not adequately explore how it is intended to fit with the NDDR Pilot Programme other than stating that the Project is intended to align with the strategic objectives of the NDDR Pilot Programme. However in reality, the Project was deliberately aligned (in design and implementation) with the NDDR Pilot Programme, particularly around the purchase and distribution of start-up kits and the development and delivery of the training curriculum. The Project World Bank TT, consultants and IAs all sought to work in varying degrees in collaboration with the implementers of NDDR Pilot Programme, mainly UNMISS and UNESCO. The MTR finds that at the time of the MTR the Project had begun to positively influence the reconfiguration of relationships between the NDDRC and the UN agencies above, something that is likely to be critical to the sustainability of the outcomes of the NDDR Pilot Programme or building on future programming or a Phase 2.

45. The Project is conceptualized first and foremost as a pilot in order to capture learning about implementation, project design, national capacity and to test the institutional systems necessary to implement and upscale reintegration programming to a national DDR programme.

5 The Mapel TF Pilot is being evaluated for the NDDRC separate from this MTR.
6 Objective 1: To contribute to the reduction of the size of the SPLA/SSAF and other organized forces by 150,000 individuals; Objective 2: To assist ex-combatants to reintegrate socially into communities of return; Objective 3: To increase employability and livelihood opportunities for ex-combatants in communities of return; Objective 4: To facilitate the release, return and reintegration of Children Associated with Armed Forces and Groups (CAAF/G) to their families and communities of return; Objective 5: To support social and economic reintegration of Women Associated with Armed Forces and Groups (WAAF/G) through community-based programmes; Objective 6: To strengthen the capabilities of the NDDRC, associated Line Ministries, South Sudanese civil society and the local private sector to effectively support service delivery to the people of South Sudan. NDDRC, [project doc]: 6.
Consequently while the performance of the Project can be measured against the achievements of the Project Development Objectives it can also be measured against the degree to which learning is being acquired and is likely to be utilised.

1.2. Project Development Objectives and Key Indicators
46. The original Project Development Objectives are identified as: (i) socio-economic pilot objectives, and (ii) reintegration programme, systems and learning objectives.

47. The socio-economic objectives of the Project are:

(a) To provide ex-combatants with skills enabling and enhancing their livelihood opportunities in communities of return;
(b) To facilitate the social reintegration of ex-combatants.

48. The reintegration programme, systems and learning objectives are as follows:

(a) Develop lessons learned that can be applied to future South Sudan DDR programming;
(b) Develop and instill a system of DDR Reintegration Management in South Sudan that can live beyond the life of the pilot project.

49. The Project does not have prescribed Key Performance Indicators at Project level.

1.3 Intended Main Beneficiaries
50. The main beneficiaries of the project are: the 290 ex-combatants who received Reintegration supports through the Project. Originally, the intended beneficiaries were 500 ex-combatants who were anticipated to be entered into the NDDR Pilot Programme. As a result of the failure of the NDDR Pilot Programme to secure the target case-load of 500 ex-combatants or to secure the target case-load as it was originally profiled for the NDDR Pilot Programme the profile of the final main beneficiaries was not as specific as originally anticipated and the number not as high as planned.

51. The Project also targets members of communities of return both through community inclusive reintegration activities (Component 3) and through inclusion in extended reintegration supports around forming economic cooperatives (Component 2).

1.4 Original Project Components and Outputs
52. The original project components are outlined in the Project Documentation and along with Project outputs are discussed below.

Project Component: Livelihood Support (*US$ 800,200 Implemented by UNICON*)
53. The Livelihood Support Component consisted of procurement and distribution of start-up kits (Subcomponent 1) and design and delivery of training to ex-combatants in Mapel Transition Facility and follow-up support delivered to ex-combatants and community members simultaneously to support the formation of economic cooperatives at community level. For overall management of the Component and the Start-up Kits sub-component UNICON deployed a Project Lead, Project Manager, Livelihoods Training Specialist, Start-Up Kit Manager and a

---

7Component costs from initial contract plus extensions for Phase 1.
Procurement Specialist. To deliver the Training sub-component UNICON deployed 10 trainers to conduct training in Mapel TF and 4 state managers and 8 state trainers to conduct the training in communities of return.

**Project Component: Livelihood Support Subcomponent 1: Start-Up Kits (US$ 323,100)**

54. UNICON in alignment with the NDDRC provided eight start-up kits all of which were prepared with the engagement of The Ministry of Labour and the Ministry’s Multipurpose Training Centres (MTCs) and FAO and with on the ground consultation with Mapel TF UNESCO Vocational Trainers. UNICON followed a clear and comprehensive bid process with an 18-day turn-around between issuing Request for Quotations (RFQ) and opening of bids on September 30th 2013. Contracts with successful suppliers were signed on October 1st and goods were planned to arrive in Juba approximately on 14th October 2013 with distribution to the State offices by the end of October 2013. To a large extent this timeline was met with only a seven-day delay period resulting from flooding which hampered the roll out in some of the States. At time of writing distribution of start-up kits from State offices is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northern Bahr el Ghazal</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>All distributed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Bahr el Ghazal</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>3 remaining to be collected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrap</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>4 remaining to be collected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lakes</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>10 remaining to be collected. Difficult moving due to rainy season.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Project Component: Livelihood Support Sub-Component 2: Training (US$ 477,100)**

55. As outlined in the Project document Livelihood Support through Training was to be delivered in four areas:

(a) Cooperatives/associations;
(b) Small farm or rural enterprise training;
(c) Individual micro-enterprise business training, and
(d) Adult or formal education.

56. The curriculum as developed by the IA while on the ground in Mapel Transition Facility delivered 15 modules and split the training between the modules delivered in the Transition Facility and further training in situ in communities of return delivered to both ex-combatants and community members working together in associations or in preparation to work as a cooperative.

57. The outputs for this sub-component are:

---

8UNICON reports that the MTCs provided a list of tools for Carpentry, Masonry, Electrician, Plumber, Car Mechanic and Welder. FAO provided inputs for Agriculture and Animal Husbandry.


10Kits remaining to be distributed are in the possession of NDDRC State offices.

11Modules 1 to 15 were: (i) Introduction to Micro-Lab; (ii) Financial Literacy; (iii) Business and Market; (iv) Financial Aspects of Business and Cooperatives; (v) Selecting a Business and Cooperative Format; (vi) Steps in Starting a Business; (vii) Business Skills Development in Cooperatives; (viii) Behavioural Skills in Entrepreneurship and Cooperatives; (ix) Team Building and Management of Cooperatives; (x) Business Plan for Setting –up a Cooperative; (xi) Enterprise Management: Sales and Marketing; (xii) Enterprise Management: Purchasing; (xiii) Enterprise Management: Work Place Management; (xiv) Enterprise Management: Book-keeping; (xv) Concluding and Action Plan for Setting-up Cooperatives.
(a) Training Curriculum  
(b) Training Manual  
(c) Training of Trainers methodology (and resulting cohort of 10 trainers)

58. As conceived in the Project Document the expected outcomes of the activities in this Sub-Component are simultaneously highly ambitious and overly difficult to measure so the degree to which the Sub-Component has achieved or was on course to achieve its outcomes is unclear. Training of 290 ex-combatants in the 15 modules of the curriculum took place over 10 days and in a total of 60 hours commencing 2\textsuperscript{nd} September 2013 and ending 11\textsuperscript{th} September 2013. Training in the States after graduation is more difficult to verify because of limitations on record keeping and differences between testimony collected for the MTR and data provided to the IA by the Trainers. The IA reports that training in the States after graduation was delivered to 253 ex-combatants (87 percent of the total 290) and to 284 community members as follows (table 2). This has not been possible to independently verify for the MTR.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>XCs</th>
<th>CMs</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Warrap State</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lakes State</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Bahr el Ghazal State</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Bahr el Ghazal State</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>253</strong></td>
<td><strong>284</strong></td>
<td><strong>537</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

59. The percentage of community members included in State trainings is well within the Project Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) of twenty percent however there is little gender balance with women comprising 1 percent of the overall ex-combatant trainee complement but which reflects the proportion of women ex-combatants who underwent DDR at the Mapel Transition Facility (12). The actual impact of this training is not possible to gauge at present but indications of possible future impact would have been available following the Tracer and Community Dynamics follow-up studies in April 2014.

Project Component: Institutional Capacity Building (USD 519,506 Implemented by ASI with IR)

60. Institutional Capacity building was implemented by Adam Smith International (ASI) with Integrity Research (IR) providing services for capacity building on M&E systems. In total ASI and IR deployed seven team members in the area of capacity building including the Team Leader who doubled as the Principle Capacity Building Mentor. The total time spent in field directly engaging with the NDDRC in HQ and in the State offices in greater Bahr el Ghazal (Aweil, Kuajok, Rumbek, Wau) was 35 working days by each of the four State mentors and 66 days by the TL/Principle Mentor. As per the TOR to the Implementing Partner (IP) the outputs from ASI/IR for the period of the consultancy have been:

(a) Inception Report  
(b) PIP  
(c) Drafted (with NDDRC) draft PIM (see 2.4 below)

\footnote{NDDRC Pilot Reintegration Project Document: 25}  
\footnote{Budget includes M&E by Integrity Research}
(d) Draft Final Report  
(e) Regular weekly/monthly written reports to the NDDRC  
(f) SWOT analysis for State Offices  
(g) Draft PIM in collaboration with NDDRC and other IAs  
(h) Draft M&E manual  
(i) Two four day training workshops (joint presentation ASI and NDDRC) \(^{14}\)  
(j) Intensive on-the-job mentoring of key staff in NDDRC HQ PMU and staff in State offices in Bahr el Ghazal  
(k) Baseline and Community Dynamics Surveys  
(l) Survey quantitative data (stored in NDDRC ICRS)

61. The M&E activities of Project Component 1 included M&E capacity building to the NDDRC and conducting Baseline and Community Dynamics surveys utilizing the human capacity of the NDDRC (ICRS case-workers as enumerators).

62. Regarding the Baseline and Community Dynamics surveys ASI worked with IR to produce the studies. For the Baseline study of all 290 combatants ASI/IR followed the following timetable:

(a) Trained enumerators/ICRS case workers (July 2\(^{nd}\) to July 4\(^{th}\), 2013)  
(b) Conducted baseline survey (July 6\(^{th}\) to July 15\(^{th}\), 2013)  
(c) Data capture and processing  
(d) Reporting

**Project Component: DDR Community Support Projects (USD 155,750 Implemented by IOM)**

63. The stated goal of the Project Component is “to promote peace building in the four States where ex-combatants will reintegrate through a focus on community empowerment and self-reliance.” \(^{15}\) It is also intended to “test the direct community support mechanism” for future DDR tranches. \(^{16}\) In addition to its goal this Project Component has two objectives:

(a) From a macro perspective at a State level: demonstrate both the NDDRC’s commitment to the larger community through the delivery of these 12 construction or rehabilitation of infrastructure projects (three in each State) and accountability among all parties;  
(b) From a micro-perspective: strengthen trust and cooperation between all parties

64. At time of MTR the outputs of this Component have been:

(a) PIP;  
(b) Selection of Communities (based on criteria agreed with NDDRC);  
(c) Selection of Contractors through the Tendering Process.

65. To date the implementation of the Component has been limited to the Site Selection Phase and some Community Mobilization and the Tendering Process. Construction was delayed due to the rainy season. At the time of the MTR and prior to the suspension of the Project it was

---

\(^{14}\) August 19\(^{th}\) to 22\(^{nd}\) 2013 (NDDRC HQ PMU), August 27\(^{th}\)-30\(^{th}\) 2013 (Staff of State Offices, Bahr el Ghazal).  
\(^{15}\) NDDRC Pilot Project Document: 36  
\(^{16}\) ibid
planned to implement 10 projects (9 boreholes and one Payam building rehabilitation) in the following locations:

(a) Western Bahr el Ghazal State (4 Projects)
(b) Lakes States (3 Projects)
(c) Warrap State (2 Projects)
(d) Northern Bahr el Ghazal State (1 Project)

66. The design of the component has an emphasis on sustainability through the formation of community water management committees however both the experience of IOM during the CPA DDR (which identified that there were difficulties maintaining and charging for the water services) and the model of borehole/water pumps being used (manual compared to solar power) point to the high risks to the sustainability of the water infrastructure post-completion.

Project Component: Project Management and NDDRC Support (US$ 130,000)

67. While not described as a Project Component in the Project documentation the Project has an envisaged management structure comprising: (i) Reintegration Project Steering Committee (SC); (ii) HQ PMU, and (iii) State Level PMUs (SPMUs) and the Project should interact with the Technical Coordination Committee (TCC) for the overall work in NDDRC Pilot DDR project. The NDDRC with the assistance of the TDRP has established the PMU, which meets weekly and comprises the representative staff from all units within the NDDRC. The SC has met three times thus far and the TCC while not part of the overall support of the Project to the NDDRC brings together the major stakeholders including the UN family and meets regularly.
2. Project Outcomes

68. Following is an examination of Project outcomes to date. Outcomes differ from outputs in so far as they are the short to medium term changes that follow on from Project activities and the production of outputs. Implicitly the Project is designed so that Project outcomes fall into three broad categories:

(a) The knowledge transferred and so behaviour changed (institutionally and in project design, management and implementation);
(b) The difference made as a result of the NDDRC (hopefully) acquiring greater knowledge about project design, management and implementation, and
(c) The difference made in the lives of beneficiaries; that is, in the lives of ex-combatants and their communities.

69. It can be argued that if successful, eventually the overall outcome of the Project should have been greater than the sum of its parts. In other words if the Project was successful then the longer term outcome flowing from knowledge transferred (not just through capacity building activities by the IP but also through other dynamics of project design and implementation such as the experience of implementation, TA by the Bank and the knowledge acquired by non-capacity building IPs) will result in concrete changes in the institutional behaviour and performance of the NDDRC, which in turn will influence the design, implementation and success of a future national DDR programme as well as the buy-in and confidence of the GoSS and SSAF.

70. This points to the basic and generic (but in the case of the Project, unwritten) logic model that can be applied to the Project design: by design, the Project when complete should have achieved the short-term outcomes of a positive shift in knowledge in the NDDRC and providing the Commission with systems or institutional arrangements that should enable it to implement knowledge acquired and positively change its institutional performance in the next Reintegration Project. At the time of the MTR the early stage of knowledge acquisition and the links between knowledge and changes in institutional behaviour and performance are not clear. The scale of the institutional development that is required to enable the Commission to implement a national DDR programme is substantial. Despite this the sum short term-outcome of the Project is a diverse body of knowledge and changed institutional arrangements, mainly the PMU.

71. A major challenge to the success of the Project has been finding a functioning recipient for the knowledge acquired during implementation, whether the appropriate institutional body (a PMU, for example), the appropriate individual (a technical or managerial staff member) or the appropriate institutional system (comprehensive M&E or Reintegration programming).

72. While some newly constituted layers in the Commission are performing (PMU, see above) the Project needs to remain objective about these structures and interrogate their effectiveness and suitability in principle to a larger national DDR programme in order to clearly identify what systems or changes have the greatest chance of surviving post-Project.

73. There are examples of the challenge of finding a home in the NDDRC for knowledge acquired during implementation of the Project. For example, the Project has managed to procure, transport and distribute high quality reintegration kits to ex-combatants in a timely manner and with clear and transparent procurement systems. The challenge is to enable the NDDRC in the future to manage an IA to complete required tasks to a similar or better level of performance. At
present it is not clear where the repository lies for actionable knowledge around managing such a process.

74. Similarly the Project has managed to run Baseline Ex-combatant and Community Dynamics studies but it is not evident where the capacity to manage such a process lies in the NDDRC. And it is not clear how the principles of impact measurement as realized in Baseline, Community Dynamics or Tracer surveys can be translated by the NDDRC into Reintegration programming, monitoring and evaluation or sensitization and outreach.

75. Put simply, at the time of the MTR it was unclear how everything achieved to date (and that was likely to be achieved by the end of the Project) would fit together to have a longer-term outcome on either the NDDRC (institutionally or systems) or on Project design and implementation. This is particularly the case when many of the key pieces (such as particular staff members) have been missing or replaced during the Project. While the NDDRC has lead the Project and has constituted new management structures to implement the Project the progress in Project implementation has relied upon intense and embedded operational support of the TDRP. Prior to the suspension of the Project it was clearly too early to withdraw that support without jeopardizing what is arguably the unwritten priority objective of the Project: the creation of systems and institutional capacity that will persist into the medium to long term. However if future programming occurs or a Phase 2 there is a clear need for the TDRP to have a clear exit strategy at Project start-up that best supports the achievement of the development objectives in a sustainable manner.

2.1. Livelihood Supports

76. At the time of MTR the outcomes of Livelihood Supports component are:

(a) Learning regarding how an IA can effectively operate in the complex environment of South Sudan in all aspects of design, procurement, transportation and distribution;
(b) Learning regarding how the IA can better manage knowledge acquisition and quality control reporting from the field;
(c) Evidence that if implemented well, Reintegration programming can deliver material assistance in the form of tool kits in a timely manner thus increasing confidence in the effectiveness of Reintegration programming, and as a consequence, increase in the confidence of the NDDRC to manage the processes behind the delivery of material support to ex-combatants.

77. Regarding learning documenting how an IA can effectively operate in the complex environment of South Sudan in all aspects of design, procurement, transportation and distribution, despite implementation challenges the IA has been strongly learning-focused. In the case of the Start-up Kits sub-component UNICON has delivered high quality reporting that details the steps in design, procurement, transportation and distribution, and that profiles successful and unsuccessful bidders and other external Partners involved in the implementation of the sub-component. Effectively this reporting constitutes a mini-procurement and distribution manual with market intelligence for the NDDRC to implement future similar sub-components.

---

17 See UNICON, 2013 (d)
78. Regarding learning targeting how an IA can better manage knowledge acquisition and quality control reporting from the field, UNICON has worked with overly and unnecessarily complicated implementation arrangements, contracting CRADA, a South Sudanese NGO to deliver the training sub-component and encountering significant personnel, quality, and contracting issues with the NGO. Contracting CRADA appeared to be a way of replicating UNICON’s operating model in other countries. However, the approach put a poorly performing organization and poorly performing CEO between UNICON and the independent trainers who were contracted to deliver training to ex-combatants and the communities. Consequently communications with the key personnel on the ground were mediated by a poorly performing organization, which it was incorrectly assumed would employ its own staff to deliver training. Consequently intelligence from the field as to the effectiveness of training and dynamics in the delivery of outputs on the ground was interrupted and reporting from the field not to the standard expected by UNICON. The IA has indicated that recommendations regarding this issue are being considered as it finalizes its own end reporting to the NDDRC and the TRDP.

79. Regarding providing evidence that if implemented well, Reintegration programming can deliver material assistance in the form of tool kits in a timely manner thus increasing confidence in the effectiveness of Reintegration programming, and as a consequence, increasing confidence in the NDDRC; at present there is no evidence for this outcome. Presently there are no surveys of perceptions in key stakeholders in the GoSS or SPLA or of ex-combatants regarding emerging shifts in perceptions of competency of the NDDRC and confidence in DDR as part of or linked to wider SSR. Regarding shifts that may occur in the perceptions and confidence held by ex-combatants and community members questions were not included in the Baseline and Community Dynamics surveys and so should be in future iterations. Increase in confidence in DDR, Reintegration programming and the NDDRC are critical to the future role of the NDDRC and future DDR programming in partnership with SSR.

2.2. Institutional Capacity Building

80. The Institutional Capacity Building component has focused on knowledge acquisition, knowledge and skills transfer (from the consultants to the NDDRC) and the nascent emergence of new systems and ways of working in the NDDRC. By design it should have produced difficult to measure but critical shifts in the institutional behaviour of the NDDRC. At the time of MTR the key knowledge, skills and behavioural outcomes of the Component are:

- (a) Aggregate knowledge products which while listed above as outputs in aggregate form a greater knowledge bank;
- (b) Increased awareness in management and key staff of the institutional challenges facing the Commission and some strategies to begin addressing same;
- (c) A greater understanding of the need to action learning from the CPA and from this Project;
- (d) Positive shift in confidence in the NDDRC regarding the capacity for project implementation;
- (e) Nascent understanding of key systems required for successful operation particularly internal (within HQ and between HQ and State offices) such as communications; operational planning; human capacity, and monitoring and evaluation;
- (f) Reconstituted M&E department in NDDRC.

---

18 See Section 3 below.
81. The IA produced a body of knowledge products which together cover key areas of institutional development. When understood alongside the outcomes of the one-to-one mentoring (mainly points b, c and e above) there is the beginnings of a shift in institutional culture and practice which if capitalized upon is likely to return dividends in the medium to long term. However, capitalizing upon this emerging cultural shift is a long and complicated process. At the time of the MTR the NDDRC acquired a greater understanding of the full extent of the journey ahead both in terms of required institutional development and required programme design/implementation. Critically, the NDDRC is aware of the need to action historical learning including that from the CPA and that from this project.

82. Despite these challenges the main outcomes from the Project components are: (i) organizational shift in the NDDRC M&E unit; (ii) mapping of institutional barriers to improving the performance of the NDDRC; (iii) capacity changes throughout the NDDRC in key areas such as operational planning, the work of the PMUs, and formalization of job roles and descriptions; (iv) nascent improvements in connectivity and information flow between HQ and State Offices, (v) recommendations pertaining to the way forward for capacity building the NDDRC and critical areas that need to be addressed including relationships with external partners including UN agencies (UNMISS, UNDP and UNESCO), (VI) fast track the development of ICRS, (VII) core team has been trained on the successful delivery of reintegration components and ICRS.

83. The MTR finds that the ASI methodology was participative, inclusive and effective in involving the NDDRC in learning by doing. The mentoring of NDDRC staff including the Chairperson, the Director for Reintegration and the State staff was context specific, that is, it was situated within a strong understanding of the operational context of the NDDRC and was delivered in a manner that was cognizant of the fundamental task of the NDDRC: reintegrating ex-combatants in line with the South Sudan National DDR Strategy (2012 – 2020). ASI/IR also undertook the mentoring process with a strong orientation towards programmatic and institutional learning in line with the Project’s overall rationale as a pilot. ASI/IR have documented a wide selection of areas to be addressed in any future iteration of the Component. 19

2.3 DDR Community Support Projects

84. At the time of the MTR there are no project outcomes from the DDR Community Supports Projects due to implementation delays stemming from disruption of transport links as a result of the rains and the suspension of the Project on December 19th, 2013.

2.4 Performance of the Project as a pilot: learning and knowledge acquisition

85. As a pilot there are certain outcomes that should be expected including actionable learning regarding implementation, political economy/implementation environment; performance of stakeholders and future or follow-on project design. In design the Project is clearly orientated towards capturing learning in all these areas and the Bank TT has worked with IAs to ensure they are also orientated in that direction. It is clear from the significant amount of practical learning acquired that the NDDRC is eager to learn by doing but requires more time, financing and human capacity to actually engage fully to implement learning at strategic and operational levels. The challenge to the Project has been to ensure that as it progresses all relevant learning is communicated clearly within the NDDRC and that staff are engaged. Shared learning must be

---

19October 30th, 2013. ASI South Sudan Pilot Reintegration Capacity Building and M&E Project: Final Report on Assistance to the NDDRC.
understood by the NDDRC as an opportunity to re-engage implementing partners, particularly in the UN family, in this knowledge-orientated project. Critically, the methodologies used in the Pilot, particularly by the IAs should be replicated in future programming by the NDDRC. Ultimately the challenge to the NDDRC is to action the learning it is acquiring: in other words, learning should be reflexive and should practically inform the next phase of the Project and subsequent programme design.
3. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

86. At the time of MTR the Project was on course to meet its project objectives. It was on course to achieve these project objectives despite early implementation challenges in what is now identified as Phase 1 of the pilot. However, progress that has been made towards outcomes faces clear institutional and external environmental challenges and the ability of the Project to deliver reintegration opportunities and to provide a meaningful kick-start to what is hoped will become a national DDR process is seriously challenged by the external environment, particularly the security and political environment.

87. The challenges met by the Pilot can be classified as either: (i) directly related to the Project design and implementation or as (ii) emanating from or being part of the external strategic, operational and physical environment.

88. In summary, the challenges that are directly related to Project design and implementation and which have affected the overall implementation of the Project or which are affecting or likely to affect the Project outcomes are as follows. The factors negatively affecting the Project outcomes are:

   ▪ (a) Design limitations including internal coherence, timing and use of delivery chains;
   ▪ (b) Delays arising with IAs becoming effective and/or beginning implementation;
   ▪ (c) Quality of some outputs, and
   ▪ (d) Capacity (human, skills and resource) within the NDDRC.

89. The factors positively affecting the Project outcomes are:

   ▪ (a) Fit with the NDDRC Pilot DDR Programme;
   ▪ (b) Strong relationship between the TDRP and BICC;
   ▪ (c) Positive relationships between the TDRP and UN agencies;
   ▪ (d) Close project management and operational involvement of the TDRP;
   ▪ (e) Underestimation of the level of involvement required and knock-on effects on TDRP’s ability to respond to IAs in a timely manner.

90. While generally well designed the Project has design limitations negatively affecting the achievement of outcomes. At the time of MTR the project timeline has limited the achievement of outputs and outcomes and has complicated the Pilot design. The Pilot was initiated in line with the intake of the first tranche of ex-combatants to the wider NDDRC Pilot DDR Programme, which occurred during the time of year when normally ex-combatants would tend their agricultural land. The planned time for ex-combatants to be in Mapel Transition Facility was three months however some were on site for up to five months. When ex-combatants graduated from Mapel Transition Facility they did so during rainy season when transport is difficult and in the case of Lakes State unfeasible in many locations. From the perspective of maximising the ability of ex-combatants to put into practice their entrepreneurship and cooperatives training the Pilot is likely to have benefited from better timing so as not to clash with when gardens are tended. With graduation happening during the rainy season many ex-combatants from Lakes State (see above) were been unable to collect their start-up kits and there have been logistical issues getting trainers to communities of return to complete their training of ex-combatants and community members in cooperative working.
91. In general the Project has strong external relevance to the strategic context and the needs of the NDDRC but it does have internal coherence challenges that appear to stem from trying to implement too diverse a range of activities with very limited funds. Internal coherence challenges appear to be around the delivery of limited Community Supports Projects (CSPs). While the capacity of the IA appears strong the budget line for CSPs is limited, the Project document overstates the likely achievements of the component and the documentation is somewhat over aspirational about the usefulness of such a limited intervention.

92. Delivery chains in DDR relate to the layers of implementers employed to deliver services to ex-combatants or the communities of return. In the case of the Pilot and as a result of lack of familiarity with the operating context one IA (UNICON) implemented the Training sub-component with an overly complicated structure and with an implementer who proved problematic in how it has treated the Trainers it hired. Had UNICON better understood the environment including service providers and trainers or had it been more embedded in South Sudan before the Pilot start-up then delivery could have been simplified and the barriers encountered could have been avoided.

93. At the beginning of the Pilot UNICON encountered other barriers to implementation. The main barriers to the IP becoming effective were lack of experience, lack of institutional presence in South Sudan and limited knowledge of operating in South Sudan or of the operational context there. The poor content quality of the initial project documentation produced by the IA reflected a lack of preparedness. Because of these barriers initial implementation of the Livelihood Supports Component was delayed and there was an urgent and immediate high risk that the achievement of outputs of both sub-components would be negatively affected. However the IP benefitted from extra time allowed for implementation by the Trust Fund (TF) extension to September 2013.

94. Despite this difficult start the IP addressed the barriers to implementation by locating increased human and capital resources in South Sudan and being present on the ground during procurement, transportation and distribution. UNICON deployed additional staff to implement the training curriculum in Mapel and engaged additional 10 trainers to deliver the follow-up training on site in communities of return.

95. During distribution the IA was physically assisted by TDRP staff and consultants to distribute kits at State level and as is discussed below the Bank TT actively facilitated introductions of UNICON to other relevant organizations including the wider NDDRC Pilot DDR Programme partners in order to ensure the effectiveness of this component.

96. The turn-around in UNICON’s performance was critical to the success of this sub-component. The distribution of kits and the involvement of stakeholders (which can be improved upon) hugely improved on the provision of start-up kits carried out during the CPA DDR process in terms of timeliness (ex-combatants were provided with start-up kits within one month of formally graduating from the Mapel TF as compared to nine months in the CPA DDR) as well as bringing State ministries on board with kit design as outlined above.

97. The outcome of the Project Component Institutional Capacity Building is difficult to quantify primarily because: (i) the weak institutional capacity in the NDDRC with which the IP was met resulted in the mentors engaging at a low level and in some cases with units in the NDDRC which were not fully functional or which do not have adequate staffing, and (ii) timing, logistics and staffing challenges that were not unique to ASI/IR which limited the degree to which ASI/IR M&E consultants could coordinate activities with other IAs and the NDDRC. In
particular the planned mentoring of the M&E unit failed because of spoilers in the then staff of the unit in the NDDRC. An alternative strategy was developed by ASI/IR, which is to produce an M&E manual to be used in HQ and State Offices.20

98. The one aspect of ASI delivery that was clearly weak was reporting on the Baseline ex-combatant survey. The Baseline survey report appeared hastily put together and had limited analytical content. TDRP and NDDRC comments to the IA resulted in revised versions but from the trajectory of IR engagement on the Pilot it appears that internal staffing and roles were not appropriately aligned in the inception phase. This was partially rectified later during survey administration and the production of the Community Survey report. The M&E manual produced by IR was not optimal and required additional input before being acceptable as a potentially useful tool for the NDDRC. At the time of the MTR the NDDRC does not have the capacity to manage or quality assure future impact orientated studies such as the planned Tracer in 2014.

99. The Project was explicitly designed to begin addressing the capacity challenges within the NDDRC: one Component explicitly addresses this issue as does the methodology applied by the Bank TT in closely working with the NDDRC on Project design and implementation. This cooperation was intended to ensure the implementation of the Project and create structures within the Commission that would simultaneously ensure the implementation of the Pilot while contributing to the creation of effective project management systems. While there are questions raised by ASI in its remit as capacity builder to the NDDRC around the role of the PMU post-Pilot and while the MTR finds that the SC and PMU could better share information in the NDDRC and better involve other key staff, clearly the constructive, partnership approach employed by the TDRP and the focus on capacity building has greatly enhanced the ability of the Project to deliver outputs and secure outcomes.

100. The Project encountered challenges around human capacity and resource capacity in the NDDRC. In summary, the M&E activities of the Capacity Building component were totally undermined due to spoilers in the staffing and then the need to replace the evaluation staff in the Commission. Similarly, the lack of personnel in the States greatly undermined the ability to secure sustainable outcomes from the Capacity Building component. Material resources ranging from financing to fuel and transport including the state of repair of Commission vehicles were limiters on the Commission’s ability to fully engage with the Project. However, when it experienced barriers the Capacity Building IA adjusted its approach to delivering their outputs and to try and have a greater chance at positively influencing systems and institutional behaviour. The input was clearly valued by the NDDRC particularly in the States but the fact remains that the outcome of the Capacity Building component was limited by the often very low starting point of engagement.

101. The design strengths of the Project, particularly its alignment with the NDDRC Pilot DDR Programme and the national DDR strategy have enhanced the implementation of the Project. The strong relationship between the TDRP TT and the UN family, particularly UNMISS and UNESCO has contributed to the TT approaching the Pilot in an holistic manner, understanding the complexity of the overall NDDRC Pilot DDR Programme and ensuring a design fit with the wider vocational training and literacy/numeracy training delivered by UNESCO to ex-combatants at the Mapel Transition Facility. During implementation these same relationships enabled the TT

20At time of writing this manual is still in preparation and has not been reviewed by the consultant.
to facilitate the IAs to relate to the UN family and overcome the implementation delays being encountered.

102. A critical factor influencing Pilot implementation and the achievement of outcomes has been the intensive support of the TDRP TT and the project management applied not only to the Pilot but also to the development of the ICRS. The Bank’s presence on the ground has been critical to implementation and ensuring the coordination of IAs and NDDRC.

103. In summary, the challenges that emanate from or are part of the external strategic, operational and physical environments and which have affected the overall implementation of the Project or which are affecting or likely to affect the Project outcomes are as follows:

(a) Security and political environment;
(b) Legacy of the CPA DDR;
(c) Limits on the buy-in of local SPLA and of the GoSS including the effects of limited SSR;
(d) Little and uneven economic development and market opportunities.

104. At the time of writing of the MTR during December 2013 RoSS succumbed to a serious deterioration in the security situation in the country. Over the weekend of December 15th fighting broke out between elements of the SPLA barracked in Juba. The conflict quickly developed into a civil conflict resulting in unconfirmed civilian and military casualties and creating anything between 500,000 and 1 million IDPs. During January 2014 the GoSS signed agreements on cessation of hostilities with both the SPLM in Opposition (SPLM-O) and the South Sudan Democratic Movement/Defence Army (SSDM/A) to begin to bring fighting throughout South Sudan (and in the case of SSDM/A in Jonglei state in particular) to an end.

105. Thus at the time of the MTR it is clearly not possible to continue the Project putting all achievements to date under severe stress and significantly damaging sustainability and the possibility of outcomes. The project was suspended on December 19th 2013.

106. Prior to the deterioration of the security and political situation there were risks pertaining to the sustainability of Project outcomes as a result of the legacy of the CPA and limited buy-in from the SPLA possibly as a result of that CPA legacy. While other factors may have been in play clearly the NDDRC Pilot DDR programme encountered major barriers even to the recruitment of the appropriate number of SSAF for the Pilot DDR programme (290 soldiers instead of the target 500) and those who did enter Mapel Transition Facility did not match those profiled in the initial start-up of the pilot. While arguably this did not affect the overall progress towards the achievements of objectives by the Pilot these issues (which were characterized as barriers or problems with local SPLA senior staff) were still a significant blow to confidence in the NDDRC Pilot DDR programme and so to the Project.

107. If the Project is to be restarted the achievement of the Social and Economic objective is likely to be negatively affected by the lack of economic opportunity in communities of return, poor local market conditions and the lack of sufficient policy to address economic development. The Project risk management strategy identified this as a risk to be managed. To manage the risk the Project design focused on activities to reduce the reliance of ex-combatants on job creation policies in the context of (i) limited market opportunities, (ii) the lack of micro-finance to establish cooperatives and (iii) the lack of State-level procedures to facilitate establishing cooperatives. However this same context is still likely to negatively impact on the social and
economic benefits to ex-combatant of participating in the Pilot (and arguably, the broader NDDRC Pilot DDR programme).

3.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry

108. Project preparation and design were responsive to the emerging policy frameworks and aligned with GoSS strategy in DDR. Project documentation was drafted on time but was not available in final draft until around the time of the MTR. The project documentation had the basic weakness of over-estimating the impact of the Pilot (for example, as captured in the project objectives) but this has not negatively affected implementation or achievement of outputs. Overall, the Project Management and M&E of the Project has been of high quality and intensive.

3.2 Risks and Risk Mitigation

109. Overall, the identification of risks has been satisfactory however the risk management strategy as mapped out in Project documentation is unsatisfactory and not in sufficient detail. In reality when expected and unexpected risks have been encountered the Bank TT has performed well and approached the implementation of the Project with patience and in a solutions-orientated and problem-solving manner. An example of this approach is the in-depth support of IAs when IAs encountered implementation delays due to their own unsatisfactory preparation for the Pilot. Once fully engaged, IAs utilized the same approach to navigating difficulties in implementation.

110. Critically the project underestimated the risk of deteriorating security and political situation (rated as ‘Substantial’, lower than the rating ‘High’ as per project documentation) but this risk, which is out of the control of the Pilot has been realized and has stopped implementation. Also, the MTR notes that the Project did not identify lack of political buy-in as a risk to success or how the lack of progress in SSR might impact on the Project.

3.4 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) by Bank

111. The Project M&E framework is a high-level design with both Scorecard and ‘Substantive’ indicators relating to progress towards achieving the objectives of the Pilot. The indicators are clustered around three outputs:

(a) State-level operational and technical support: the provision of operational support focused on Greater Bahr el Ghazal to the NDDRC, enabling it to work with line ministries and other partners to facilitate and support project planning, development and implementation processes ensuring that lessons learnt on both process and delivery are identified and captured.

(b) Agricultural livelihoods: development and implementation of agricultural livelihoods support to ex-combatants that have returned.

(c) Urban livelihoods: development and implementation of non-agricultural livelihoods support through entrepreneurship, financial literacy and cooperatives training for ex-combatants choosing urban settlement in skills such as carpentry, mechanics, electrical engineering, metal fabrication and construction.

112. Scorecard indicators for output (a) above are overambitious and vague and probably reflect the view of the TT prior to the engagement of the IA that only then identified the full extent of human and material capacity challenges in the NDDRC. As such the indicators should be revised to more accurately reflect the assessment by the IA and understand the realistically achievable progress given the limitations of NDDRC capacity at present.
113. Score-card indicators for outputs (b) and (c) are a combination of easily measurable indicators (for example, 100 percent of ex-combatants receive a livelihood start-up kit within 2 months of graduation) and those which implicitly defer measurement to future Tracer studies (for example, up to 80 percent of ex-combatants who participated in the non-agricultural training at the Transition Facility initiate decent and sustainable livelihood opportunities, through entrepreneurship training, cooperatives training, financial management, market, product management).

114. The M&E framework would benefit from revision based on the learning from implementing Phase 1 of the Pilot: specifically, it would be useful to scale back the ambition of some of the indicators to more realistically match what IAs have encountered on the ground. For example, it is unlikely that 60 percent of those trained will be assisted to establish economic associations and regardless in this instance ‘assisted’ should be qualified and defined to more accurately reflect the level of support given to ex-combatants and community members thus far in the Pilot. In other words, what does ‘assisted’ mean?

115. The M&E framework does not contain indicators specific to the nature of the Project as a pilot project; that is, one orientated towards trialing, learning and innovation. Despite this as seen above the project management of the Project and the work of the IAs have firmly focused on learning methodologies.

116. Practical day-to-day monitoring of Project activities has been strong. The Bank TT has reported concisely and effectively and has combined monitoring of Project progress with close, effective, on-the-ground implementation support, particularly in the early stages of project when delays were being encountered.

3.5 Safeguards including Environmental and Fiduciary Compliance

117. By incorporating a focus on community-inclusive approaches in its design (Livelihoods component and dedicated Community Support component) the Project has aligned with the Conflict Sensitivity guiding principle of the South Sudan National DDR programme:

(a) It is recognized that the legacy of conflict in South Sudan is such that the entire population faces multiple needs and challenges in terms of their recovery and development. It is therefore intended that overall DDR programme implementation will adopt a community-based approach targeting a number of activities aimed at the supporting communities, particularly in areas where high numbers of demobilized soldiers will be returning.

118. The Project aligns with principles of Do No Harm/Conflict Sensitivity and consciously looks for opportunities to mitigate potential negative effects of the Project. The Pilot is compliant with the 10 Fragile States Principles subscribed to by OECD/DAC donors particularly Principal 1 (take context as the starting point) in so far as the Project is embedded in the NDDRC and supports national ownership, and principal 4 (prioritize prevention) and principal 5 (recognize the links between political, security and development objectives) through supporting reintegration and micro-economic development. Principal 10 (avoid pockets of exclusion) is implemented through the ex-combatant and community inclusive approach. The Project aligns with the World Bank approach to fragility and conflict as contained in WDR 2011.
119. In project documentation the Project identified the need for Environmental Analysis as the first activity in the Community Support Component. During implementation the IA (IOM) identified that the component would align with its own UN procedures for ensuring environmental safeguards and so the TT identified that a full Environmental Analysis was not necessary.
4. Assessment of Outcomes at time of MTR

4.1 Relevance of Objectives and Design

120. The Project’s objectives and design are relevant to: (i) RoSS DDR strategies and plan; (ii) national ownership as a pillar of DDR; (iii) the learning principles of pilot programming; (iv) German donor strategy; and (v) the WB MDTF-SS.

121. The Project aligned with the RoSS National DDR strategies and papers particularly the Republic of South Sudan Policy Paper on Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (23rd September, 2011) and the South Sudan National DDR Strategic Plan 2012-2020 (11th March, 2012).

122. The design of the Pilot particularly supports engendering national ownership in DDR, both by facilitating the NDDRC to assume the decision-making and management role for South Sudan DDR and by focusing on building the capacity of the NDDRC.

123. The Project is closely related to and benefited from the MDTF-SS that during its operation phase 2006 to 2012 supported nationwide the CPA implementation with 21 projects. MDTF-SS had five Strategic Priorities of which two were crosscutting: (i) build the capacity of the GoSS and (ii) coordinate and align international assistance.

124. The Project is interlinked with the MDTF-SS in several ways:

(a) The Project’s focus on capacity building is in the same spirit of the MDTF-SS that had a capacity building element to strengthen state institutions in their governance, management, planning and service delivery functions in most of its 21 projects.

(b) Within its Priority Areas 2 and 3, the MDTF-SS’s funded projects directly supported ex-combatants as beneficiaries of training programs for example the Education Rehabilitation Project. Also, the UNDP implemented CPA DDR was co-funded out of the MDTF-SS with US$ 36.4 million.

(c) The Project likely benefits from MDTF-SS support to the general development of South Sudan as the economic reintegation of ex-combatants will only be successful if they can be absorbed by the local economy. Within its Priority Area 4, the following measures were financed: supportive government policy, a legislative framework and extension services for a modernized agriculture as well as private sector development. This should be especially beneficial for the Projects activities within the Livelihood Support Sub-Component.

4.2 Efficiency

125. The Project efficiency in progress made towards achieving its PDO is rated *moderately satisfactory* because of: (i) disbursement was largely on target despite implementation delays; (ii) low budget costs for each Project component; (iii) high unit cost per ex-combatant.

126. Disbursement to IPs has been on target. ASI received all six payments as per schedule totally US$519,506. UNICON received four of five payments with the fifth pending contract extension leaving US$162,140 to be paid out of a total contract of US$920,200. IOM have had two of five payments made with three pending Phase 2 leaving US$408,563 to be paid on completion of Phase 2 (out of a total contract value of US$450,000).
127. The Project has low budget costs for each component; put simply, the Project has managed to deliver a high volume of work and outputs from IAs for limited cost (Annex 1). Among some of the IAs the consensus is that the design and implementation of the Pilot received high value for money.

128. At the time of MTR the financial management of the Project by the Bank TT was satisfactory and showed flexibility in line with the overall flexibility of the project management in order to enable IAs meet the unforeseen costs in barriers they experienced during implementation. All IAs were highly appreciative of the consultative and flexible manner in which the TT engaged around project budgets.

129. Recognizing that if the Project leads to a larger project there are likely to be economies of scale which reduce the cost per ex-combatant, still the Project does not compare favorably with other DDR processes when the cost per ex-combatant is compared. In phase 1 the cost per ex-combatant of all livelihood support is US$2,759.21 The only regional comparisons are with full national DDR programmes so this distorts the comparative analysis somewhat however the differences with neighbouring DDR costs is still relevant: the PNDDR (DRC) cost per beneficiary was US$1,81722; the cost of the RDRP (Rwanda) was US$2,06523 and Burundi $2,77524. The question to the NDDRC is whether the costs can be reduced should the modalities and focus of the Pilot be brought to scale and where can savings be made?

130. As stated in the Pilot the costs are minimized, with very little opportunity for reducing costs further on any one component. By component the basic cost of start-up kits averages US$671.65 per ex-combatant before transportation and warehousing costs are added which increase the unit cost to US$923.61. Transportation and warehousing costs constitute 28 percent of the overall costs but by far the highest cost incurred was transportation (US$14,000 total cost of importing and transport to the States and US$ 20,000 total cost of local transport within the States) reflecting the logistical difficulties of moving assets into and around South Sudan during Phase 1. Overall, in Phase 1, the main cost to the Project is the provision of start-up kits totaling US$ 323,100 compared to US$ 477,100 for Training supports (US$ 312,600 Livelihood Supports Training plus US$164,500 Mapel Entrepreneurship Training).

4.3 Effectiveness

131. The Project has been effective in achieving project outputs as outlined in the Project documentation and fully examined in Section 2 above. Prior to its suspension the Project was making progress towards achieving the Project objectives. Regarding Objective 1: *To provide ex-combatants with skills enabling and enhancing their livelihood opportunities in their communities of return* the Project had successfully distributed start-up kits to the majority of ex-combatants well within the target time of two months. The Project also delivered a package of trainings designed to suit the literacy and numeracy skills of ex-combatants and capitalize on the potential outcomes of their vocational training. Training was delivered to community members to augment the community-inclusive methodology and to increase the likely sustainability of economic cooperatives. In addition the main IA (UNICON) employed a Training of Trainers (TOT) modality to overcome the lack of available trainers that has had the subsidiary effect of skilling

---

21 Costs discussed in this section are direct costs and do not include management or administration costs.
new trainers and stimulating them to take the first steps towards forming their own economic cooperative.

132. The objectives of the Training sub-component are very ambitious and in reality given the time spent delivering training in Mapel TF and in the communities, and given the literacy and numeracy challenges and that the curriculum was developed and then refined while at Mapel (but to a good standard) some are unlikely to have been fully met at the end of Phase 1 or fully met to achieve the level of outcomes one would expect from the how the objective is framed. This vagueness in objectives is exacerbated by the kind of reporting from the field which overstates the potential impact and complexity of the training which in all reality is training in fundamentals, not training in advanced business as is suggested from an overview of the curriculum. Also, given limits on time it is unlikely that all aspects of the curriculum were implemented in to the communities of return. Similarly given the limits on the knowledge of the Trainers it is unlikely that all modules as per the curriculum were implemented.

133. For example, the IA reports that in Warrap community-based training began on 23rd September and continued until 13th November 2013 during which time 70 of 75 participating ex-combatants were trained along with 34 community members in nine modules. However during the MTR verification visit to Wau and Kuajok trainers identified that they had not spent much time in communities delivering training. In Kuajok it was identified that by the date of the visit

1. Focusing on the objectives of the State-based training, the IA identifies the objectives as follows: (1) To support the ex-combatants utilize the Vocational, Literacy and Life Skills trainings gained at the Mapel Transition Facility toward productive livelihoods in their communities of return; (2) To reinforce and facilitate the operationalization of the decision made by ex-combatants during their training in Mapel to establish themselves in individual businesses or in partnerships and cooperatives; (3) To assist in cooperative formation and offer subsequent training to ex-combatants along with community members who wish to join in the formation of cooperatives and management of cooperatives in different technical sectors; (4) To assist the establishment of individual entrepreneuships or partnerships in business activities by offering further training to ex-combatants in business start-up and management including (i) micro-enterprise skills training as correlated to the vocational trainings received in the Mapel Transition Facility; and (ii) small farm business skills training; (5) To assist ex-combatants in handling the start-up and management process such as board formation, marketing and book-keeping initially; (6) To offer advice in initial troubleshooting such as lack of support of family or community members or selection of location appropriate to the opportunities.

25 Training at State level is outlined as including: (1) Business Start-up Training which has the following modules: (a) Business Development; (b) Cooperative formation; (c) Start-up of Individual and Partnership; (d) Business plan Preparation; (e) Business Skills Development, and (2) Management of Individual Cooperative Enterprises which has the following modules: (a) Legal Process and requirements; (b) Marketing and Sales; (c) Purchase Management; (d) Production and Work Place Management; (e) Book-keeping Practices.

27 (1) Business plan for setting up cooperatives – how to identify resources required to run business, how to name cooperative, how these businesses would be useful to the customers; (2) Financial literacy – how to identify resources required to run business, how to manage resources and how to allocate them, selection of business name, how to make business useful to its customers, how to identify the different type of skills by individuals within cooperative, etc.; (3) Book-keeping management – how to deal with day-to-day operations and how to record transactions, utilization, allocation of profits and how to control others expenses incurred in business; (4) Marketing research – how to inform potential customers, how to advertise the services/goods that are available through this business; assessment, advertisement and promotion of goods and services in the market; (5) Communication skills – how to communicate to the customers in the market and others suppliers - both external and internal suppliers - and how to communicate internally within organization; (6) Planning and controlling – how to plan their businesses, how it will be implemented, when activities shall be taken, and how to control operations to minimize expenses and maximize profits; (7) Time management skills – how to manage time and avoid inconveniences, how to do scheduling; (8) Leadership management skills – how to lead others and how to motivate them, giving them right to participate in decision making process and learn different leadership styles, especially those related to cooperatives; (9) Marketing orientation – how to sell goods and services to customers, how to organize supply of goods and how to check if the goods are still usable, how to select potential suppliers.
(November 14th) trainers had trained ex-combatants and community members for just three hours. From this brief visit there is evidence enough that there are deficiencies in reporting from the field, quality assurance of training outputs and an overall lack of realism in the indicators used to plan deliverables in the Training sub-component.

134. Trainers were unsure how to register or if one could register cooperatives at State level so logically, it is not likely that they trained ex-combatants and community members in legal processes and requirements. What this reflects is the need to revisit the alignment of the curriculum with the capacity of ex-combatants and the available time for trainers to work in the communities to create a set of indicators that more accurately reflect what can be achieved. These indicators should align with verification of the exact outputs in each State during Phase 1, however in the case of this pilot verification is unlikely to be possible given the outbreak of conflict. However, in future designs this recommendation should be implemented.

135. Similar to the limitations on verifying the training it is not possible to verify the numbers of cooperatives formed by ex-combatants and community members or to identify whether ex-combatants and community members formed cooperatives where they had expressed and intention to do so. However, the IA reports that the information from Trainers in the field (which is incomplete) indicates that 11 groups of varying sizes were indicating that they would form some type of associative work practice or cooperative.

136. The Institutional Capacity Building component has been effective and produced the planned outputs as well as less tangible (but not less important) outcomes on institutional knowledge, understanding and behaviour. The component has produced a starting point for what should ideally be a long-term process of highly strategic and highly empowering TA and knowledge transfer including through the methodology of mentoring. The effectiveness of the Component is its assessment of institutional capacity at HQ and State level as well as the linkages between the two and critically, the lack of implementation of lessons learned from previous DDR programmes and their evaluations. The core reporting of the IA was consistent and regular and the final report contains practical and accurate learning and recommendations.

137. The Community Support Programmes has not yet been effective at producing outcomes primarily because the Component was designed to be implemented across Phase 1 and Phase 2. While the IOM experienced challenges to implementation as a result of the effect of the rainy season on road transportation planned activities were completed before suspension of the contract between the Bank and the IOM due to the outbreak of conflict in South Sudan.

4.4 Sustainability

138. The design of the Project emphasized sustainability by approaching the unstated but overall purpose of the Project, (that is, to build the capacity of the NDDRC through learning by doing and concurrently enhance the capital of the NDDRC to implement an effective and relevance reintegration programme) to place the NDDRC front and centre in the new Project thus

---

28 The term ‘associative work practice’ fits the type of collaborative work being initiated by most groups of ex-combatants because the unit they were forming or intended to form would not meet the legal requirements to be a full cooperative, particularly the need for 21 individuals to be members. Also, difficulties and lack of understanding around registering cooperatives were likely to result in ex-combatants with or without community members, joining together as informal associations to benefit from collaborative work practices.

29 Annex 2 for table of cooperatives and associative work practices
exemplifying for any future DDR programme to succeed it must be nationally owned and led by
the Commission. The Project was designed as a first step on re-enabling the NDDRC post-CPA
DDR to take that leadership role and so eventually develop and implement a strategic, effective,
efficient and relevant national DDR programme, which would contribute to the long term reform
of SSAF. Put simply, the point of the Pilot has been to begin enabling the NDDRC to assume its
role in Reintegration programming in DDR.

139. However a critical challenge to the NDDRC (and so the Project) was how to increase
donor interest to ensure a second round of programming with a view to gradually growing a
national DDR process. At the time of the MTR it was clear that any successes thus far would
hopefully contribute to donor confidence and interest in aligning behind a next iteration of
Reintegration programming however, with the changes in the internal security environment any
progress made on persuading donors to contribute to future programming is likely to be seriously
negatively affected.

140. At the level of Components, the Project has had dynamics of sustainability. In the
Livelihoods Component the unplanned strategy of utilizing Training Of Trainers (TOT)
methodology has the potential to create a network of domestic trainers who themselves are
capacitated to build a cooperative and do business in South Sudan. The design of the Training
sub-component emphasizes TDRP learning on supporting ex-combatants to obtain sustainable
livelihoods through the provision of generic business and cooperative working skills that
capitalize on already-acquired vocational training. The principle of including community
members in training has the potential not only to contribute to social inclusion and mitigate
tensions but also has the potential to create more sustainable units of diverse background and
approaches to cooperative working practices.

141. The Institutional Capacity Building component focused on creating a baseline for
sustainable institutional development within the NDDRC to best enable it to assume the role of
leading on Reintegration programming in DDR and by employing mentoring rather than formal
training the component approached skills transfer and capacity building in a more gradual,
collaborative manner which suits the learning style of the Commission and which should have the
greatest chance of creating genuine and sustainable shifts in institutional culture and performance.

142. By design the Community Supports Project component has emphasized the sustainability
of the infrastructure to be provide through working with communities to create community water
committee and if possible generate income through water charges in order to finance the servicing
of boreholes and pumps. However, the outputs of the component had it gone ahead were unlikely
to be as sustainable due to the low-cost and limited design. For example, solar powered higher
volume water pumps also have a longer lifespan then the kind being installed in the Pilot thus
mitigating the reluctance of communities to charge for water and the difficulties obtaining spare
parts and skilled maintenance people.

4.5 Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome

143. The risk to development outcomes is substantial. As has been outlined above the key risk
to the outcomes of the Project has been the security situation in South Sudan that deteriorated to
such an extent that the Pilot was suspended on December 19th 2013. The result is that all Phase 2
planned activities are suspended, as are the delayed Component DDR Community Support
Projects. At present there is no way of verifying what has happened to ex-combatants who
participated in the Project but it is highly unlikely any can progress on livelihood issues in the current situation in South Sudan. During the MTR it was identified that it in order for the NDDRC to build capacity and improve its reputation it would be critical to maintain the momentum of implementation achieved during the Project. With the current security situation in the country this momentum is likely to be lost or seriously negatively influenced.
5. Assessment of Stakeholder Performance

5.1 Bank Performance

The performance of the TDRP is assessed here in relation to how the TDRP performed as per its agreement with the KfW and the NDDRC as providers of Technical Assistance to the NDDRC. The Pilot Reintegration Programme does not constitute formal lending from the Bank. The Bank’s role is limited to Trust Fund management and provision of Technical Assistance as outlined in the agreement.30

(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry
Rating: Satisfactory

144. Quality at Entry pertains to the design of the Project and the performance of the TDRP throughout the period of design and implementation. The TDRP performed satisfactorily because: (1) by design the project took consideration of the capacity of the NDDRC; (2) it executed its role in a manner that was conscious of wider stakeholder roles in the great SS DDR environment including those of the Line Ministries and the UN family; (3) built on learning from the CPA DDR programme; (4) emphasized national ownership.

145. By design the Project was simple with straightforward components and sub-components and so constituted a measured starting point to assess and gradually build the capacity of the NDDRC while concurrently implementing a pilot reintegration programme that was intended to benefit the 290 ex-combatants that underwent reintegration assistance. The components emphasized procurement, and management and facilitation of external implementing Partners as well as assisting the NDDRC to critically reflect on its own internal workings and competencies rather than being overly complex.

146. Interaction with the wider stakeholder community was carried out in a collaborative manner but always with the focus on enabling the NDDRC to lead the Pilot Reintegration project. The TDRP often with the assistance of the NDDRC, facilitated networking the IAs (UNICON, ASI) with the key stakeholders in the wider NDDR Pilot Programme such as UNESCO and UNMISSS. The TDRP’s own involvement sought to learn from the UN agencies in particular and tried to positively guide the NDDRC’s interaction with those same agencies.

147. The TDRP’s role in the Project was informed by a good understanding on the history of DDR in South Sudan and cognizance of the learning from the CPA DDR. The TDRP’s

30The Project Management here is a combination of the management of the Project by the TDRP, and the work of the PMU as a unit constituted within the NDDRC as part of the institutional arrangements to implement the Project. The relevant TDRP activities identified in the invitation from the NDDRC to engage around the Project are limited to establishing a Technical Support Unit and Project Management Teams and instituting M&E. The agreement between the donors (KfW) and the Trust Fund Administrators (TDRP) is more detailed when outlining eligible expenditure and identifying the role of the TDRP.

(a) **Bank-executed Activities** consisting of: (1) analyses and studies on regional aspects of demobilization and reintegration focusing on such aspects as alien ex-combatants as well as cross-border and cross-cutting activities, such as capacity development, research, and evaluation; (2) technical assistance and enhanced supervision activities designed to improve quality and knowledge management for demobilization and reintegration; and (3) analyses and studies on regional aspects of demobilization and reintegration focusing on gender.

(b) **Trust Fund Management and Administration:** Establishment and operation of the Trust Fund Technical Team; management of the Trust Fund; and supervision as well as monitoring and evaluation of Projects.
knowledge was assisted by the NDDRC’s self-reflection and own learning from the CPA DDR and from the knowledge shared with the TDRP by the stakeholders in the NDDR Pilot Programme.

148. Throughout the Project the TDRP’s role shifted from technical assistance to operational assistance with Bank staff and consultants becoming embedded in the implementation of the Project rather than remaining in technical or project management roles. In the field during the implementation of any pilot project the Technical Adviser is often under stress to become more involved in day-to-day implementation of the project than is expected from the role of advisor. Metaphorically there is a thin line between providing TA and then being hands-on during implementation. The TDRP clearly crossed over from TA to operational assistance during the first phase of the Project. While this is somewhat of a grey area and a judgment call by the TDRP staff as to what it will take to ensure the successful implementation of the Project, the TDRP should be more explicit in how it plans for this challenge and should more systematically consider the pros and cons of operating outside the TA remit and plan for same.

(b) Quality of Supervision
Rating: Satisfactory

149. Bank supervision in the form of TF management and Project management is rated satisfactory because: (i) the Bank satisfactorily identified most safeguard issues; (ii) the Project management by the Bank was responsive to the needs of the NDDRC and the implementation of the Project, and (iii) the Bank facilitated additional TA and project implementation assistance although as emphasized above, at times this assistance was operational and not technical assistance.

150. The Bank satisfactorily identified safeguard issues and the NDDRC project documentation clearly identifies the same. In collaboration with the IOM practical and efficient alternatives to ERM were identified however due to the suspension of the Project these were not implemented. The Bank closely managed financial risks and where issues emerged between IAs that were external to the Bank’s own purview the Bank TT worked to support the NDDRC to facilitate resolving the issues.

151. Bank supervision was responsive to the needs of the Project, the capacity-issues of the NDDRC and sought to address implementation delays including those emanating from all IAs. The Bank TT were closely involved in assisting IAs to become effective when faced with implementation challenges and throughout the duration of the Pilot Project they were closely involved with monitoring the progress of IAs. At one point in the implementation of the Project the Bank TT fell behind when providing feedback to ASI on the deliverables by IR and this suggests that the Bank found the volume of work managing the Project challenging. Similarly the IA argues that the Bank’s approach to the project was too hands on and that the form and content expected by the Bank of the IA’s deliverables was too rigid. Specifically, the IA argues that the Bank’s feedback on the Baseline and Community Dynamics reports was too prescriptive and rigid and did not afford IR the freedom to produce the kind of report they planned to produce.

152. The Bank’s role was to advise the NDDRC on the quality of the surveys and the survey reporting and facilitated the NDDRC to develop its understanding of the principle and usefulness of this kind of M&E. Due to the lack of expertise in the NDDRC the Bank lead on reviewing the deliverables of IR and was detailed on its feedback to the IA on the quality and content of their deliverables, which to begin with was poor. It is notable that IR did recover somewhat to produce
a better quality report for the Community Dynamics study. The MTR finds that in the future the Bank should along with the NDDRC be more prescriptive at the beginning of the Project outlining the form of the deliverable in any contract with future IAs.

5.2 NDDRC Performance

153. The NDDRC’s role in the Project was to lead the Project with TA from the TDRP. Throughout the implementation of the Project the NDDRC engaged positively with the TDRP and did so with an emphasis on learning by doing. The NDDRC engaged positively around resolving implementation challenges such as those faced around M&E and some IAs becoming effective. In the case of the latter the NDDRC facilitated IAs at HQ and State level and where particular benefit was identified the Commission sought to capitalize on progress made.

154. Throughout the Project the NDDRC was hamstrung by resource challenges and challenges from its own institutional arrangements (the latter point being identified by ASI) which itself identified as being unable to alter.

155. Resource challenges were felt across the NDDRC but most critically in the States. In HQ very fundamental challenges such as losing power when the generator switched off had severe impact on the infrastructure supporting the work of the Commission, such as IT and communications. Simply put, no power means little work can be undertaken on site. Most critical deprivations have been the lack of human and financial capital in the State offices. NDDRC staff in the States performs multiple roles so the ability of the NDDRC to capitalize on the activities in Institutional Capacity Building Component has been limited. Material resources such as transport, the state of repair of vehicles and communications were all severely restricted at State level.

156. ASI identified challenges in the institutional arrangements that in the analysis of the IA were negatively affecting the ability of the NDDRC to implement learning from the CPA DDR and to build capacity and expertise to effectively implement the Project (and future iterations of same). From the perspective of the NDDRC institutional arrangements are fixed as a result of the Commission’s alignment under its respective GoSS ministry. The reality is that challenges to the effectiveness of the NDDRC to implement the project resulting from institutional arrangements were navigated in part through the creation the PMU, an approach that was beginning to prove effective.

157. The risk of finding practical workarounds to institutional challenges is that occasionally some staff may become unintentionally marginalized so it is incumbent on the NDDRC to balance ways of navigating institutional challenges with ensuring that staff members are included in the various stages of the Project and future iterations. Arguably some staff members were being unintentionally marginalized during the Project and this should be avoided in future iterations. The marginalization occurred both at strategic levels and at operational levels.

5.3 Performance of Implementing Partners

158. The Pilot Project had three IAs: ASI, UNICON and IOM. With the suspension of the project IOM had achieved little in the implementation of the DDR Community Support Projects and so the performance of the IA is not rated below.

5.3.1 Adam Smith International and Integrity Research

159. ASI and IR implemented the Institutional Capacity Building component with IR taking responsibility for the M&E focus including conducting the Baseline and Community Dynamics
surveys. At Project start-up ASI and particularly IR showed a lack of preparedness regarding project documentation, background and modalities. Despite this ASI implemented the Component in an effective manner, adapting to challenges and opportunities as they arose during their engagement by the NDDRC. As identified above the ASI methodology was participative, inclusive and effective in involving the NDDRC in learning by doing. The mentoring of NDDRC staff was context specific and delivered in a manner that was cognizant of the fundamental task of the NDDRC: reintegrating ex-combatants in line with the South Sudan National DDR Strategy (2012 – 2020). ASI also undertook the mentoring process with a strong orientation towards programmatic and institutional learning in line with the Project’s overall rationale as a pilot project. ASI’s reporting was consistent and succinct during the Project and added to the value of the Project as a learning process.

160. Initially, deliverables from IR were of poor quality. While implemented effectively on the ground the Baseline report from IR lacked analysis and was not confident in its own methodology, tools or approach – something that fundamentally undermined the validity of the findings. The Baseline report repeatedly applied conditionality to its analysis and undermined any conclusions that might be drawn from the work. IR recovered from this poor start somewhat with an improved report for the Community Dynamics study but the report still lacked sufficient quality analysis and quality. As noted above the M&E manual was also of poor quality.

161. Overall the potential institutional impact of implementing Baseline and Community Dynamics studies was undermined by the absence of an M&E unit during the initial stages of the Project. This similarly prevented the IA delivering capacity development in M&E. This essentially null level capacity prevented the principle of integrating the study of impact to create a feedback loop for future programming or program delivery taking root in any significant way in the NDDRC. This presents a missed opportunity.

5.3.2 UNICON

162. Initially UNICON displayed poor project preparation. As discussed above the IA encountered barriers to effectiveness such as lack of institutional presence in South Sudan and limited knowledge of operating in South Sudan or of the operational context there. Despite a poor start to the Project UNICON through its perseverance and allocation of extra resources to the Project successfully addressed the barriers to implementation.

163. UNICON’s reporting displayed strong M&E and an orientation towards the Project as a learning process. By the suspension of the Project UNICON had successfully delivered its project outputs but due firstly to issues with the delivery chain involving CRADA and second due to challenges receiving quality reporting from the field the delivery of training in the community was not possible to verify or correctly assess. In response to this UNICON has documented challenges obtaining accurate in field reporting from implementers of sub-components.
6. Conclusions and Recommendations

164. Findings and recommendations are presented below and as follows: (i) as they relate to the context of the Project and the wider strategic environment; (ii) as they relate to the Project design and outcomes of each Component and (iii) as they relate to the role of the stakeholders.

6.1 Project Context and Strategic Environment

165. Conclusion 1. Prior to its suspension the Project was performing well, and showing strong progress on two of three sub-components as well as a variety of outcomes addressing institutional knowledge, learning, project management and capacity. The suspension of the Project removes what the MTR identifies as critical to the future success of the Project: the ability to keep up the momentum of the gains made during the Project, particularly in institutional performance and capacity building. Much momentum is likely to have been lost.

166. Recommendation 1. In any future programming or Phase 2 the negative effect of this stop in momentum which can result from a number of factors not just the extreme situation of the deterioration of the security situation should be considered and planned for including that any future activities in capacity building may be starting from a low level. Momentum is critical and where delays can better anticipated and managed they should be. Events such as an outbreak of armed conflict are outside the control of the Project.

167. Conclusion 2. Prior to its suspension the Project was restricted by two broad set of factors: (i) material and human resources at the NDDRC, and (ii) the wider strategic context of the SSR process in South Sudan. In the first instance the NDDRC was severely constrained by a lack of material resources and financing so that everyday performance was restricted while concurrently (and particularly in the States) the NDDRC was constrained by a lack of human resources with insufficient staffing in the States and some spoilers in the HQ offices. While the spoiler issue was addressed the other issues remained outstanding at the time of the MTR and until addressed will restrict the ability of the NDDRC to function and to capitalize on the outcomes of the Project or any future Project.

168. Recommendation 2. Future programming or Phase 2 should be designed in such a way so that the Government of RoSS should be required to commit to increased financing of the NDDRC and the NDDRC to commit to appropriately resourcing itself in material and in human resources.

169. Conclusion 2a. While the MTR has focused on the program performance aspects of the Project it is clear to all stakeholders that the Project along with the wider NDDRC Pilot Programme at Mapel Transit Facility was severely hamstrung through lack of buy-in from the SPLA and likely from lack of confidence or progress in wider SSR in South Sudan.

170. Recommendation 2a. This critical macro-issue means that while the NDDRC may benefit both programmatically and institutionally if the Project is re-started, it is critical that any future DDR programming is linked on a strategic level to wider SSR so that project achievements are not lost due to lack of progress elsewhere in the broader strategic environment and so that the DDR programme can align and have currency in the broader SSR environment.
6.2 Project Design and Outcomes

171. **Conclusion 3.** Rather than the outcomes for ex-combatants who have participated in the programming, the focus of the Project on piloting systems, capacity building, project implementation and institutional development dictate the best areas for examining the potential outcomes of the Project and gauging the performance of the Project and the Project Implementers. However, this focus is not reflected in Project documentation or M&E frameworks.

172. **Recommendation 3.** The focus on being a Pilot should be more coherently incorporated in future Project documentation or in Phase 2 of the Project and in all relevant M&E frameworks.

173. **Conclusion 4.** In Component 1: Livelihood Supports Sub-Component 1 (Start-up Kits) the Project largely delivered its required outputs by providing high quality start-up kits to nearly all ex-combatants in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Western Bahr el Ghazal and Warrap and (with some remaining in Lakes State NDDRC offices). It did so in a timely fashion and the performance far exceeded that recorded in the CPA DDR.

174. **Recommendation 4.** In future programming the modalities utilized by the IA and the market intelligence in their reporting should be fully utilized by the NDDRC when designing and managing the procurement of start-up kits.

175. **Conclusion 5.** Component 1: Livelihood Supports under the Sub-Component 2: Training, the Project delivered a tailor-made curriculum and 60 hours of training comprised of 27 hours of Financial Literacy and 33 hours on Entrepreneurship to 290 ex-combatants. However significant challenges were encountered in the design of the curriculum particularly in relation to the literacy and numeracy levels of ex-combatants. It is not possible to verify the input for State-based follow-up trainings which included the community.

176. **Recommendation 5.** In future programming or in Phase 2 the curriculum should be further refined to suit the needs and capacities of ex-combatants, a process which should involve the main stakeholders in vocational training such as UNESCO. All curricula should be systematically quality controlled and reviewed for effectiveness as part of ongoing project M&E.

177. **Conclusion 6.** Component 2: Institutional Capacity Building M&E capacity building was seriously undermined by lack of appropriate staff in the NDDRC. This was subsequently resolved but too late for progress on the building of M&E capacity in the Commission.

178. **Recommendation 6.** A key output from the activities of Component 2 has been a capacity audit of the NDDRC. The NDDRC should ensure that the staffing complement is filled in advance of any future programming addressing the capacity and skilling of the Commission.

179. **Conclusion 7.** The participative methodology of the IA delivering Component 2 suited the culture of the NDDRC.

180. **Recommendation 7.** Any future programming or Phase 2 activities delivering capacity building should utilize a similar approach of embedded mentoring rather than formal training. Furthermore this methodology should be correctly timed and matched with sufficient resources (including human resources, that is, staff) by the NDDRC so as to maximize outcomes from such programme.
181. **Conclusion 8.** One of the Project indicators of success was positive change in the confidence held by the community and excombatants in DDR programming and the work of the NDDRC but there were no activities or metrics to measure same.

182. **Recommendation 8.** In Tracer studies attitudinal change regarding the perception by excombatants and civilians of the value and usefulness of the NDDRC and DDR programming in general should be included.

183. **Conclusion 9.** As a pilot the Project, the TDRP, the NDDRC and IAs were all clearly orientated towards learning and knowledge capture.

184. **Recommendation 9.** This orientation should be maximized on in future pilot programming or in Phase 2. Learning and knowledge capture should be integrated into Project M&E and feedback loops to monitor how learning is actioned by the stakeholders should be designed.

185. **Conclusion 10.** Regarding M&E of the Project, many of the Project objectives are over ambitious and/or vague.

186. **Recommendation 10.** In future programming or in Phase 2 the M&E Framework utilized by the Bank should be revised based on the learning from implementing Phase 1. Particularly, the ambition of indicators should be aligned with more realistic expectations of activities under the various Project Components and all ambiguous language should be avoided.

187. **Conclusion 10a.** Regarding M&E of the Project the M&E Framework does not contain indicators specific to the nature of the Pilot as a learning process orientated towards trialing, documenting, learning and innovation.

188. **Recommendation 10a.** In future programming or in Phase 2 this must be addressed so as to properly monitor the performance of the Project and its stakeholders and in order to maximize any gains from Project learning.

189. **Conclusion 11.** The Project design has aligned with all relevant safeguards including: (i) the Conflict Sensitivity Principle of the South Sudan National DDR programme; (ii) principles of Do No Harm, and (iii) World Bank approach to Conflict and Fragility as contained in the WDR 2011.

190. **Recommendation 11.** This good practice should be replicated in all future programming or in Phase 2.

191. **Conclusion 12.** By design the Project has emphasized sustainability: (i) by approaching building the capacity of the NDDRC through learning by doing, (ii) by IAs incorporating sustainability into the design of Component 2 (Trainer for Trainers methodology) and Component 3 (use of VDCs).

192. **Recommendation 12.** In future programming or in Phase 2 sustainability should continue to be emphasized and where challenges exist they should be addressed appropriately. The main design feature that should be addressed is the design of Component 3, particularly the type of infrastructure being put in place and the realistic options to make that infrastructure as sustainable as possible.
193. **Conclusion 13.** The potential impact of Component 3 was overestimated in all project documentation and M&E frameworks.

194. **Recommendation 13.** In future programming involving community-based reintegration, in Phase 2 or in a re-start of Component 3 serious consideration should be given to increasing the resources available for community-based reintegration. Furthermore expanding the scope of activities should also be considered and additional buy-in from local Ministries garnered in order to make activities as likely to produce impact as possible.

195. **Conclusion 14.** The Project is efficient with costs minimized and very little remaining room for reducing costs further. However, efficiency is compromised by the cost per beneficiary which exceeds that in other national DDR programmes.

196. **Recommendation 14.** When estimating the impact on future programming or Phase 2 economies of scale should considered and where possible the cost per beneficiary reduced.

197. **Conclusion 15.** Delivery chains were a key weakness in the delivery of activities in Component 2, Sub-component 2 and compounded the negative effect of some factors affecting implementation such as lack of preparedness of IAs and lack of understanding of the political economy of RoSS.

198. **Recommendation 15.** In future programming or in Phase 2 the use of delivery chains should be explicitly addressed in the design process and the risks associated with it should be appropriately managed. The planned implementation modalities of IAs should be fully interrogated in light of this recommendation.

6.3 Stakeholders

199. **Conclusion 16.** By design and during implementation the Project sought to engage the wider stakeholders in DDR in South Sudan including those in the UN family.

200. **Recommendation 16.** In future programming this approach should be built upon with particular emphasis on re-engaging Line Ministries (particularly as they pertain to assisting in community-based reintegration or support of Income Generating Activities (IGAs)/economic cooperatives), and assisting the NDDRC and UN family to greater share expertise and resources particularly those within the DDR unit in UNMISS.

201. **Conclusion 17.** Throughout the Project the TDRP’s role shifted from providing TA to providing operational assistance.

202. **Recommendation 17.** In future the TDRP should more critically assess the risks of such a shift in its role and be more explicit in how it plans for this challenge. The TDRP should more systematically consider the pros and cons of operating outside the TA remit and consider how to develop an appropriate exit strategy given the difficulties inherent with becoming more embedded in operationalization.
Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing at time of MTR

NDDRC Pilot Reintegration Project Costs
Updated 15 December 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase 1</th>
<th>INITIAL BUDGET</th>
<th>TOTAL COMMITTED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capacity Building and Monitoring &amp; Evaluation</td>
<td>$660,000</td>
<td>$519,506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mentoring/Capacity Building</td>
<td>$442,836</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tracer Surveys</td>
<td>$76,670</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livelihoods Support</td>
<td>$1,200,000*</td>
<td>$800,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mapel Entrepreneurship &amp; Cooperatives</td>
<td>$164,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Start-Up Toolkits</td>
<td>$323,100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-State Entrepreneurship &amp; Cooperatives</td>
<td>$312,600</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Extension</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Support Projects</td>
<td>$400,000</td>
<td>$155,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDDRC Participation Funds</td>
<td>$240,000</td>
<td>$130,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluations</td>
<td>$70,000</td>
<td>$30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingency</td>
<td>$81,711</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL ALL</td>
<td>$2,651,711</td>
<td>$1,919,706</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 2. Documents Reviewed

Project Documentation

2013. NDDRC. *NDDRP Pilot Reintegration Project Implementation Manual*.
2013, April 19th. NDDRC. *Minutes of Preliminary Steering Committee Meeting*.
2013. ASI. *Technical Proposal South Sudan DDR Pilot Reintegration Project*.
2013. ASI. *Financial Proposal South Sudan DDR Pilot Reintegration Project*.
2013. ASI. *Work plan and Deliverables*.
2013. IOM. *Technical Proposal South Sudan Community Support Component*.
2013. IOM. *Financial Proposal South Sudan Community Support Component*.
2013. UNICON. *Technical Proposal DDR Pilot Reintegration Project in South Sudan*.
2013. UNICON. *Financial Proposal DDR Pilot Reintegration Project in South Sudan*.
2013, February 4th. TDRP. *Re: Invitation for TDRP to Pilot the Reintegration Component of the DDR Programme Pilot Phase in South Sudan (Correspondence)*.
2012. NDDRC. *Republic of South Sudan National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (NDDRP) 2012 – 2020*.
2012. NDDRC. *National DDR Programme of South Sudan: Pilot Reintegration Project Documentation*.
2012. NDDRC. *Reintegration Component of the DDR Programme in the Republic of South Sudan 2012-2020 (Presentation)*.
2012. NDDRC. *National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme 2012-2020: Strategic Direction (Presentation)*
2012. World Bank. *Trust Fund Administration Agreement between KfW and IBRD concerning the TDRP MDTF (Correspondence)*.
2011. NDDRC. *Republic of South Sudan Policy Paper on DDR*.
2011. NDDRC. *South Sudan National DDR Strategic Plan 2012-2020*
2010. NDDRC. *Southern Sudan DDR Commission Planning Monitoring and Evaluation Tool Kit.*

n.d. GoSS. *SPLA and DDR SOP for Determining Eligibility and Selection Criteria.*

n.d. GoSS. *SOP 111 on Reinsertion and Labour Intensive Projects.*

n.d. NDDRC. *South Sudan Reintegration Pilot Programme – Indicators (Draft 1)*

**Mission Reports**

2013, April 7th to April 27th. TDRP. SMO.

2013, May 15th. TDRP. BTOR: *Initiation of ICRS Registration System and the Pilot Reintegration Project Steering Committee for the Pilot Reintegration Project of the Republic of South Sudan DDR Programme.*

2013, May 21st to June 14th. TDRP. SMO.

2013, May 21st to June 14th. TDRP. BTOR.

2013, June 30th to July 27th. TDRP. SMO.

2013, June 30th to July 25th. TDRP. BTOR.

2013, August 29th to November 8th. TDRP. SMO.

2013, August 29th to November 8th. TDRP. BTOR.

2013, October 18th to November 12th. TDRP. SMO.


2012, October. TDRP. BTOR.

2012, November 27th to December 15th. *Aide Mémoire, South Sudan DDR Pilot Reintegration Project.*

2012, November 27th. TDRP. SMO

n.d. TDRP. *Findings of Pilot Design Confirmation Focus Group.*

**Project Outputs by Consultants**

2013. ASI. *PIP South Sudan Pilot Reintegration Capacity Building and M&E Project: Support provided by Adam Smith International (ASI) and Integrity Research & Consultancy (Integrity) to the National Disarmament, Demobilization & Reintegration Commission (NDDRC).*

2013. ASI. *Work plan*
2013. ASI. Inception Report: South Sudan Pilot Reintegration Capacity Building and M&E Project. Support Provided by Adam Smith International (ASI) and Integrity Research (IR) to the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (NDDRC).

2013. ASI. Draft Plan ASI/IR Training Sessions.


2013. ASI. Training Component (Presentation).

2013. ASI/IR. Beneficiary Survey

2013. ASI/IR. Community Dynamics Survey

2013. NDDRC with ASI. Reintegration Workshop (Presentation).

2013. NDDRC with ASI. Republic of South Sudan: Pilot Reintegration Project: Service Component (Presentation).

2013. ASI. Purpose and Modality of the Workshop: NDDRC Training Workshop for Pilot Reintegration Support (Presentation).

2013. ASI. Team Building (Presentation).

2013. ASI. Have Lessons Been Learned? (Presentation).

2013. NDDRC with ASI. Objectives of the Pilot Reintegration Programme (Presentation).

2013. ASI. Report on ASI’s Mentoring in Western Bahr el Ghazal State.


2013. ASI. Report on ASI’s Mentoring in Northern Bahr el Ghazal State.


2013. UNICON. Technical Proposal World Bank – South Sudan DDR Pilot Reintegration Project in South Sudan.
2013. UNICON. Financial Proposal World Bank – South Sudan DDR Pilot Reintegration Project in South Sudan.

2013. UNICON. Project Implementation Plan

2013. UNICON. Project Inception Report

2013. UNICON. Request for Quotations.

2013. UNICON. Agricultural Kit for No Objection.

2013. UNICON. Auto mechanics Kit for No Objection.

2013. UNICON. Carpentry Kit for No Objection.

2013. UNICON. Electrical Kit for No Objection.

2013. UNICON. Masonry Kit for No Objection.

2013. UNICON. Plumbing Kit for No Objection.

2013. UNICON. Welding Kit for No Objection.

2013. UNICON. Bid Adjudication Steps.

2013. UNICON. Opening of Bids (Minutes).


2013. UNICON. Weekly Report 1

2013. UNICON. Weekly Report 2

2013. UNICON. Weekly Report 3

2013. UNICON. Weekly Report 4

2013. UNICON. Weekly Report 5

2013. UNICON. Weekly Report 6

2013. UNICON. Weekly Report 7

2013. UNICON. Weekly Report 8

2013. UNICON. Weekly Report 9
2013. UNICON. *Weekly Report 10*

2013. UNICON. *Weekly Report 11*

2013. UNICON. *Training of Trainers Manual*

2013. UNICON. *Training Curriculum (Mapel).*

2013. UNICON. *Final Report South Sudan DDR Pilot Reintegration Project in South Sudan.*

2013. IOM. *Technical Proposal South Sudan DDR Pilot Reintegration Project – Consultancy to Implement DDR Community Support Projects.*

2013. IOM. *Financial Proposal South Sudan DDR Pilot Reintegration Project – Consultancy to Implement DDR Community Support Projects.*

2013. IOM. *Project Implementation Plan.*

2013. IOM. *Log frame DDR Community Support Projects.*

2013. IOM. *DDR Community Project Location Selection Criteria.*

2013. IOM. *Interim Report to the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission and the World Bank: South Sudan DDR – Pilot Reintegration Project – Consultancy to Implement DDR Community Support Projects.*

**Other**

2012 SCL. *Social Management and Analysis of the Project Implementation Tracking Data (Reintegration Component of the South Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Project)*


2011(b) GIZ. *Impact Evaluation of the Socio-Economic Reintegration Program of Ex-Combatants in Central Equatoria State in South Sudan (2010-2011).*

Annex 3. Consultations

**NDDRC**

William Deng Deng (Chairperson)
Majur Mayor Machar (Deputy Chairperson)
Ambrose Kambaya (Member and Supervisor for Operations)
Claude Obwaha Akasha (Director General for Operations)
Kamilo Loku (Director of M&E)
Kerbino Yel Deng (Director for Communications/Public Information)
Rosa Weet (Gender Advisor)
Peter Garang Ngor (Procurement Coordinator)
Kuot Kuot Deng (Senior IT Officer)
Benson Mungai (Web Administrator)
Peter Gai (Reintegration)
Chan Moses Awuol (ICRS Manager)
Meen Mawut Nyok (State Coordinator)
William Tong Uruan (State Coordinator)
Temrol Deng Garang (State Coordinator)
ICRS Caseworkers (x6 as Focus Group)

**BICC**

Claudia Breitung (Technical Advisor to the Commission)
Wolf Christian Paes (BICC)

**World Bank and KfW**

Stavros Stavrou (TDRP)
Alexandra Burrall Jung (TDRP)
Kathrin Kaestle (KfW)

**Implementing Partners**

Kees Kingma (ASI)
Andrew Cummings (ASI)
Peter Olowo (ASI)
Warrap State Trainers (x3 as focus group)
Francis Odiwuor (ASI)
Western Bahr el Ghazal State Trainers (x3 as focus group)
Rustam Davletkhanov (UNICON)
Sergey Burnaev (UNICON)
Matt Huber (IOM)